

The Crises Research Project

Rwanda Genocide

Timeline

1918 Under the Treaty of Versailles the former German colony of Rwanda-Urundi is made a League of Nations protectorate to be governed by Belgium. The two territories later to become Rwanda and Burundi, have Tutsi monarchs instilled to govern. Both Germany and Belgium turn the Tutsi-Hutu dynamic into a class system. Using the Tutsi (14% of the population as tools to enforce their rule, given privileges and western-style education) over the Hutus (85% of the population).

1926 Belgium institutes a system of ethnic identity , giving ethnic cards to differentiate between Hutu and Tutsi.

1957 PARMEHUTU (Party for the Emancipation of the Hutus is formed while Rwanda is under Belgium rule.

1959 Hutus rebel against the Belgian rule and the Tutsi class, forcing 140,000 Tutsis to flee to Burundi.

1960 Hutus won some local elections supported by the Belgian government.

1961-1962 Belgium withdraws as the colonial power leaving Rwanda and Burundi as two independent countries. A Hutu revolution begins after Belgium leaves, installing a Hutu government, forcing the Tutsis to flee to Burundi where the Tutsis still retain power.

1963 Massacre of Tutsis in Rwanda as a result of a Tutsi military attack in Burundi. Estimated that by the mid-1960s more than half of all Tutsis were living outside of Rwanda.

1967-1973 Continued massacres of Tutsis in Rwanda and a policy of ethnic quotas are developed where the Tutsis are allowed only 9% of the available jobs. This plan was implemented by General Juvenal Habyarimana, future president of Rwanda.

1975 Pattern of exclusion of the Tutsis continued throughout the 70s and 80s. Habyarimana forms the MRND (National Revolutionary Movement for Development). Hutus from the president's home area and northern Rwanda get preferential treatment in jobs and services.

1986 In Uganda, Tutsi refugees form the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front)

1990 The Rwandan Patriotic Front (Tutsi) invade Rwanda from Uganda. The French and Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo) send troops to assist the Hutu government. A cease-fire is negotiated.

1990-1992 The Rwandan government (Hutus) begin arming civilian militias and training them. Throughout this time thousands of Tutsis are killed by civilian Hutu militias.

1993 The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF,Tutsi) organize an attack and almost reach the capital, Kigali, until French forces are called in by the Hutu government for support.

1993 Habyarimana and the RPF sign a peace treaty, allowing for the return of Tutsi refugees to Rwanda from Uganda. The United Nations sends 2500 troops to oversee the ceasefire.

1993-1994 Hutu militia training intensifies. Major General Romeo Dallaire, commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), sends a fax to the UN detailing an impending attack by the Hutus on the Tutsis.

1994 President of Rwanda, Habyarimana and the president of Burundi are killed in a plane crash. Many believed it was done by Hutu extremists. The killings began on April 6, 1994.

1994 On April 7th, the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR, Hutu) and Hutu militia went house to house killing Tutsis and moderate Hutus. The UN does not intervene and watches as thousands of Tutsis are killed, primarily by machete, on that first night.

1994 On April 21st, the UN cut its forces from 2500 to 250, after 10 Belgian soldiers are killed.

1994 On April 10th the United Nations Security Council holds a meeting condemning the atrocities without using the word “genocide” which would have obligated lawfully the UN to act to stop the atrocities.

1994 In May, the United Nations agreed to send 6800 troops with the power to defend civilians in Rwanda. The deployment is delayed because of discussions as to who will bear the brunt of the cost. The US argues about sending heavily armored vehicles on a peacekeeping mission.

1994 The UN Security Council asks the French government to send troops and establish a safe zone. The 6800 UN troops were never deployed. The French protect some Tutsis in the safe zone, but many are still killed. On June 22nd, the US uses the term “genocide” for the first time.

1994 In July, the RPF (Tutsi) invaded Rwanda and captured the capital, Kigali. The Hutu government and many refugees flee to Zaire (Democratic Republic of the Congo). The UN French troops leave and are replaced by UN troops from Tanzania.

1994 In August, the new government made up of mostly Tutsis agreed to trials before a tribunal developed by the United Nations

1995 The UN tries to work with Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo) and Tanzania to return Hutu refugees back to Rwanda, the UN refuses to send troops to assist in this and to supervise the refugee camps.


1996 In December, the tribunal in Tanzania developed by the UN begin trials against Hutus that participated in the 1994 genocide.

Maps



Facing History & Ourselves. "Colonial Presence in Africa." Map. August 2, 2016. In Facing History & Ourselves Digital Collection. <https://www.facinghistory.org/>.

The area that is now Rwanda was originally colonized by Germany then given to Belgium after World War I. The justification for this source is to demonstrate colonial influence in Rwanda where European influences created the racial and cultural divisions that developed into cultural hatred which eventually became the Rwandan genocide.



"RPF Military Advance in Rwanda, 1994." Map showing Rwandan Patriotic Front territorial control and military advances, April-July 1994. <https://www.theholocaustexplained.org/what-was-the-holocaust/what-was-genocide/the-rwandan-genocide-the-genocide-of-the-tutsis-1994/>

1. Genocide Fax : Major General Romeo Dallaire's Urgent Report on a potential genocide in Rwanda, 1994.¹

1. Force commander was put in contact with an informant by a very very important government politician. informant is a top level trainer. in the cadre of interhamwe-armed militia of hand.
2. He informed us he was in charge of last saturday's demonstrations which were to target deputies of opposition parties coming to ceremonies and Belgian soldiers. they hoped to provoke: the RPF ban to engage (being fired upon) the demonstrators and provoke a civil

¹ Richard A. Clarke to the National Security Council, 16 February 1994, outlining plans for evacuation and the withdrawal of UN forces during the early days Rwandan crisis The National Security Archive, Washington, D.C., <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/27352-document-section-genocide-fax>

war: deputies were to be assassinated upon entry or exit from parliament. Belgian troops were to be provoked and if Belgian soldiers resorted to force a number of them were to be killed and thus guarantee Belgian withdrawal from Rwanda.

3. Informant confirmed that 48 RGF para cdo and a few members of the gendarmerie participated in demonstrations in plain clothes. Also, at least one minister of the Mrnd and the sous-prefect of Kigali were in the demonstration. rgf and interahamwe provided radio communications.
4. Informant is a former security member of the president.
5. Interahamwe has trained 1700 men in RGF military camps outside the capitol
6. The principal aim of interhamwe in the past was to protect Kigali from the RPF. Since the unamir mandate, he has been ordered to register all Tutsi in Kigali; he suspects it is for their extermination. An example he gave was that in 20 minutes his personnel could kill up to 1000 Tutsis.
7. Informant states he disagrees with anti-Tutsi extermination. He supports opposition to the RPF but cannot support the killing of innocent persons. He also stated that he believes the president does not have full control over all elements of his old party faction.
8. Informant is prepared to provide the location of a major weapons cache with at least 135 weapons. He has already distributed 110 weapons, including 35 with ammunition, and can give us details of their location.

2. Richard A. Clarke to the National Security Council, 16 February 1994, outlining plans for evacuation and the withdrawal of UN forces during the early days Rwandan crisis.²

With dawn on Sunday, convoys two and three will leave the Danish Mission 2 kms from the border and drive into Burundi. During the night the USMC force in Buj will run hourly radio checks on the status of the convoys. That will leave us with the following questions:

- how do we get the remaining Americans out?
- do we help the Belgians get in? (note: The Rwandan rebels are reportedly rpt reportedly moving toward Kigali.)
- do we pull the UN force out?

1. Getting the Americans out
The embassy may put together another convoy or may put the Americans out the French flights out. The first French flight out left late on Saturday.
2. Getting the Belgians in

There are 2000 Belgian citizens still at risk. Fighting is likely to escalate. Thus, once we know that our citizens are safe, we should work with the French to see if they can insure

² ² Richard A. Clarke to the National Security Council, 16 February 1994, outlining plans for evacuation and the withdrawal of UN forces during the early days of the Rwandan crisis. The National Security Archive
<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB511/>

the safety of flights in to Kigali. If the French do secure the airbase area, we probably should fly the Belgians in.

3. Terminating the UN Force

We make a lot of noise about terminating UN forces that aren't working. Well, few could be as clearly not working. We should work with the French to gain a consensus to terminate the UN mission.

3. U.S. Senators Paul Simon and Jim Jeffords, United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Letter to President Clinton, 13 May 1994, The National Security Archive, The U.S. and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994, Information, Intelligence and the U.S. Response: Dear Mr. President.³

We are concerned about the continuing disaster in Rwanda, and the failure of the international community to halt or even diminish the slaughter taking place there. We have been consulting with those who work with the refugee community including Rwandan who barely escaped from the disaster; General Romeo Dallaire, the Canadian military leader in charge of the remnant of the United Nations troops in the capital city of Kigali; and others. We suggest the following action to be considered immediately and acted upon swiftly:

1. The United States should send a signal to the present government, such as it is, and tho those who rebel, that a government which does not strive to halt the civil war, eliminate the massacres, and assist in getting food to hungry people, regardless of ethnic background, will not receive assistance from the United States, and we will encourage the community of nations to follow a similar policy.
2. The United States should take steps to discourage the importation of arms into Rwanda.
3. The United States should press the United Nations Security Council to immediately approve an increase in authorized UN force levels of the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR).

General Dallaire, the UN forces commander in Rwanda, has indicated that a minimum of 5,000 troops would be necessary to ensure a credible UN presence. He believes a force of 8,000 would effectively achieve the desired results. The force should have the mandate to (a) stop the massacres; (b) protect civilians throughout the country; and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. General Dallaire believes a force of that size could effectively achieve the desired result. Obviously there are risks, but an end to the slaughter is not possible without

³ U.S. Senators Paul Simon and Jim Jeffords to President Clinton, "Letter to President", letter, 13 May 1994, The U.S. and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994, Information, Intelligence and the U.S. Response, document 48, The National Security Archive, Washington, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB511/docs/DOCUMENT%209.pdf>

this action. These can be primarily African-nation troops, though some non- African troops should participate. The United States should assist the United Nations with finances and provide some basic equipment to some of the less well equipped forces. Delays, or simply doing nothing, are not acceptable substitutes for a foreign policy of leadership. Human life is at stake, and swift and sound decision-making is needed. We request that you ask your top military and diplomatic personnel to immediately analyze the soundness of our proposals, and to report back to you quickly so that timely action can be taken.

Justifications

Source 1: The "Genocide Fax" is a document sent by General Romeo Dallaire, commander of the UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, in January 1994. It warned of impending mass killings and detailed plans by extremist groups to murder Tutsi civilians. The fax highlighted the failure of international response to prevent the genocide.

Source 2: Richard served as a crisis management and senior counterterrorism counselor to the National Security Council. This communication, which reflects high-level U.S. policy decisions and priorities during the Rwanda crisis, is especially relevant because of the author's status as a senior White House official. His suggestion that UN forces should be withdrawn had a significant influence on the administration's non-interventionist stance.

Source 3: In 1994, Senators Paul Simon and Jeffery Jeffords wrote to President Clinton urging swift action to prevent and stop the Rwandan genocide. They emphasized the U.S. responsibility to intervene, expressing concern over the lack of response to escalating violence and calling for immediate diplomatic and humanitarian efforts.

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