INTERSECTIONALITY, THE SUBJECT OF this essay, is intertwined with my hopes for both traditional philosophy and feminist philosophy. I want to encourage traditional philosophers to do philosophy that is "part of the solution" rather than "part of the problem." To continue to be part of the problem, all philosophy has to do is to leave unquestioned the ways in which its concepts, theories, frameworks, and methods have contributed directly or indirectly to perpetuating oppression and other forms of injustice. I want to encourage feminist philosophers to be more genuinely pluralistic, especially to de-center white, middle-class women in our theories and practices. Intersectionality, which I characterize in more detail later, includes the idea that various forms of oppression and privilege interact with each other in multiple complex ways. I focus on intersectionality here in order to encourage philosophers to appreciate the multifaceted relationships among kinds of oppression and privilege, and to value the roles that complex social identities play in the construction of their own theories, specifically the complicated ways in which gender, race/ethnicity, class, sexual orientation (and the "embarrassed, etc.")) are interwoven. If philosophers, both traditional and feminist, more fully appreciate these complexities, then the possibilities increase that many theories will be richer, better, and, dare I say, true. In addition, I hope that philosophers of whatever theoretical, moral, and political bent want their theories not only to be plausible but also, where relevant, to exhibit respect for all human beings. Understanding the complex nature of human social identities and systems of oppression moves us toward this goal.
Of course, feminist philosophers think of ourselves as already “part of the solution” or surely at least moving toward it. Unlike many traditional philosophers, we intend for our work to be applicable to daily life and have a bearing on social justice. We contribute to the dialogues and practices that will lessen oppressions of various kinds and improve the lives of women everywhere. To do this seriously and realistically, we must ensure that feminist philosophy is inclusive and pluralistic. Offering lip service to these goals is much easier than doing the hard work to accomplish them. Unfortunately, most feminist philosophers are still drawn from dominant races/ethnicities/classes/nationalities in our societies, so we must work more diligently to overcome layers of denial and resistance. In North America and Europe, this means that in order to create inclusive and pluralistic feminist philosophy that moves women far from center stage, white women must (i) learn a great deal about the lives and thinking of women of color and women from the global south, (ii) understand more deeply the ways in which various oppressions/privileges are intermeshed, and (iii) acknowledge and remedy the ways in which our practices have marginalized women from non-dominant groups. This is old news, but it is old news that white feminist philosophers must take seriously and integrate more fully into our work.

I maintain that intersectionality offers the best framework at present in which to do the work that I want feminist and traditional philosophers to do (although I would be pleased with any framework that could do at least as much of the same kind of work without its limitations). This might seem an uncontroversial claim, since intersectionality is a concept that has been part of feminist discourse since Kimberlé Crenshaw introduced the term in 1989, and grew from an already existing discourse of women of color. Until fairly recently, feminist theorists and activists welcomed the concept for the most part uncritically, both for theoretical and everyday political purposes. We were relieved to have a way to discuss the interactions among race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, social class, and so forth, that (i) rejected ranking them, and (ii) enabled both our activism and our theories to move forward with at least a minimal understanding of the ways in which the major axes of oppression interacted with each other and affected human lives, and helped us start to grasp the complexities of our similarities, differences, and the networks of hierarchical relationships among us.

For well over a decade, even the most conceptually nitpicky feminist theorists, among whom we would have to number feminist philosophers, were not inclined to tinker with the concept of intersectionality. This might have been in part because so many feminist philosophers are white women who did not want to tinker with a fruitful concept introduced by feminists of color, but it might also be attributed to a phenomenon observed by Kathy Davis, namely, “that, paradoxically, precisely the vagueness and open-endedness of ‘intersectionality’ may be the very secret to its success” (2008, 69). Using the work of sociologist of science Murray S. Davis (1971, 1986), Kathy Davis argues that “successful theories appeal to a concern regarded as fundamental by a broad audience of scholars, but they do so in a way which is not only unexpected, but inherently hazy and mysteriously open-ended” (K. Davis 2008, 70). This explanation seems apt and squares with the apparent lack of interest in refining the details of the concept of intersectionality for quite a long time after its introduction. We did not want to mess with a good thing that addressed a number of strongly felt needs.

Today intersectionality has its critics, some of whom I have argued against elsewhere and discuss briefly here (Garry 2007, 2008a, 2008b). However, in spite of (or perhaps because of) my advocacy of intersectionality, I find it very important to understand the limitations and scope of intersectionality. It has many practical, political, and theoretical virtues, but it is only a framework—some would even say a tool. It does not do the hardest work of investigating the “intersections” in the lives of real people or analyzing the ways that structural oppressions interact in social contexts. What it needs to do is to provide a basis for a good strategy and conceptual structure that we can use for practical feminist politics as well as for at least two theoretical purposes: the first is to enable feminist theorists, critical race theorists, queer and trans theorists, and others creating emancipatory theories to understand human social complexity, oppression, and privilege in ways that improve both their theories and the conditions of our lives; the second is to help traditional philosophers (and other traditional academics) both to understand and to care about what it takes to become “part of the solution.” The traditional group is, of course, the tougher nut to crack. It is especially difficult to persuade some traditional academics to care enough about the lives, experiences, and oppressions of people sufficiently unlike them that they see the need to modify their previous theories. However, we should try to crack the toughest nuts with the best strategy and conceptual structure possible. This does not imply that the most precise concept of intersectionality is best, for precision might fly in the face of the complex variety of expressed needs of members of oppressed groups. Instead, a concept of intersectionality that
is modest, broadly conceived, and "good enough" is the best approach we have at this point.

In order to support intersectionality, I pull several threads together. My overall aim is to clear the way for the use of intersectionality, that is, to make it "safe" for feminist and traditional philosophers to use it. This requires explaining its scope and limitations and addressing some of the objections to it. In section 1, I briefly lay out some benefits and limitations of intersectionality; in section 2, I discuss limitations of the images used to explain it; section 3 considers Maria Lugones's position on intersectionality and gender(s); section 4 sets out an intersectional family resemblance position that supports Lugones's aims, but differs with her view of the number of genders that women have.

1. THE BASICS, THE BENEFITS, AND THE LIMITATIONS

I propose to use a broad, inclusive concept of intersectionality in order to see whether it gives us a structure in which to start addressing traditional philosophers and to meet the theoretical and practical needs of feminists:

Oppression and privilege by race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, class, nationality, and so on, do not act independently of each other in our individual lives or in our social structures; instead, each kind of oppression or privilege is shaped by and works through the others. These compounded, intermeshed systems of oppression and privilege in our social structures help to produce (a) our social relations, (b) our experiences of our own identity, and (c) the limitations of shared interests even among members of "the same" oppressed or privileged group.

I use the term "intersectionality" for the concept in order to affirm continuity with the tradition from which it springs, not because it is identical with everyone else's usage. I also want to emphasize that my support is for this kind of concept, rather than with the particularities of my expression of it.

In this section, I retrace some familiar steps to explain why we need such a concept. I start with the most fundamental needs—ones that apply only to traditional philosophers who have yet to see the relevance of feminism or critical race theory, queer theory, or other liberatory theories.

From "square one," I move in increments to considerations that realistically will apply only to those with a commitment to social change.

Many traditional philosophers still fail to grasp that human beings cannot be treated generically in their theories, let alone that philosophers should consider the various complexities of our identities and our structures of oppressions and privileges. Assuming that they want their theories to be more applicable to real human beings (or perhaps they have a naturalized bent and are willing to reflect a more complex world in their naturalizations), what can intersectionality do for them?

First, it can help them understand not only that gender matters to philosophy but also that people are not simply men and women. By noting this, I do not mean to begin a discussion about people who are intersex or transgender, interesting though it would be, but to make the "intersectional point": we all have other important facets to our identities and are differently impacted by multiple interacting systems of oppression and privilege depending on what those other facets are. Perhaps intersectional analyses can help traditional philosophers fast-forward through earlier decades of feminist and critical race theory that did not adequately address the impact of these intertwined systems of oppression and privilege. There will be no need to be sidetracked by attempts to rank competing oppressions or to make facile false generalizations about social groups. For example, intersectionality gives philosophers working on personal identity a framework in which to understand the relevance of work by Gloria Anzaldúa (1987), Maria Lugones (2003, 2006, 2007), and Cherrie Moraga (1983), just to cite a few. They have detailed many ways in which dominant theories render their lives invisible. They explain how and why their identities contain multiplicity, but are unified, not fragmented (although others' labels try to split them) and the ways in which they construct identities by resistance to oppressions. Philosophers who take these views seriously might well need to rethink the way they frame issues of personal identity and assess differently which theories succeed.

Second, if we assume, as I do, that self-understanding and awareness of one's social location can help improve one's philosophical views, then it's important to note that intersectionality can aid those willing to examine their own social identities and especially their unacknowledged privileges, including the privilege of remaining ignorant of marginalized people. Many white people do not consciously see themselves or their conceptual frameworks as raced. Similarly, heterosexuals of any race/ethnicity or class often render gay men and lesbians conceptually invisible. Patricia Hill Collins
finds intersectional analysis helpful in our ability to identify “the oppressor within us” (acknowledging Audre Lorde); she applies this not simply to those in privileged groups, but to all people (1993/2008, 98). The value of self-knowledge is not simply for moral self-improvement, but also to enable us to undertake the very hard work of understanding the implications of philosophy’s Eurocentrism. It is difficult for philosophers to look at the colonial legacies and deep biases based on race, class, and gender that permeate Western philosophy in its methods, formulation of issues, and substantive positions.

Recent work on “epistemologies of ignorance” have called attention to the ways in which dominant groups’ ignorance is constructed and maintained, explorations of whose power is served by such ignorance, and the ways that our current interests, beliefs, and theories block why we sometimes do not even know that we do not know, or if we do know it, why we do not care (see Mills 1997, Tuana and Sullivan 2006, Sullivan and Tuana 2007).

Alison Bailey’s discussion, directed toward white analytic feminist philosophers, but applicable to all analytic philosophers, illustrates the difficulties of dealing with deep biases and shows that philosophers need to rethink the reasons that we value certain methods and styles of philosophy over others. Analytic philosophers can be averse to the idea of tinkering with their methods of argument or with the high levels of abstraction and generality in which they discuss issues. Intersectional approaches can feel threatening to philosophers who believe that such approaches put the “purity” of philosophical methods at risk. They then try to label the work of philosophers who value intersectionality and want to reflect upon the thinking and actual diverse conditions of the lives of women of color as “not philosophy” (Bailey 2010).

Third, intersectionality can point all of us to the locations where we need to begin identifying issues and constructing our theories. Here again, I am making a very basic point. Feminist standpoint theorists have explained to us for decades the importance of starting our thinking or our research from the lives of marginalized people (for example, Harding 1991). Intersectionality helps to point us to fruitful, complex marginalized locations. It does not do the work for us, but tells us where to start and suggests kinds of questions to ask. It sets the stage to counteract the deep Eurocentrism referred to above by trying to formulate issues from the lives of those not part of the Western philosophical canon. Starting with the African-American woman’s life experience and structures of authority might well lead a naturalized epistemologist to shape his/her questions and strategies differently about the ways in which epistemic authority is constructed, how we choose “experts,” and whose views carry weight and whose are not even acknowledged when a working-class African-American woman has a disagreement over medical symptoms or a factual dispute with a middle-class white man.

Although feminist philosophers certainly need to be reminded about the points above, our focus should have incorporated these ideas and moved along. Let us review quickly some of the other benefits of intersectionality for feminists as well as for any traditional scholars who are motivated to become part of the solution.

Fourth, the focus on systemic interaction, compounding, and intersecting avoids several misunderstandings of the ways oppression and privilege work as structural forces. These arguments are well known in feminist theory. For example, race, gender, and sexual orientation, whether used to oppress or to privilege human beings, are not simply added together in Black lesbians or added/subtracted in white gay men. Additive or “pop-bead” models of identity or oppression do not work.

Although intersectionality builds on a rich literature by feminists of color about multiple oppressions and double consciousness, it does not merely repeat that women of color or lesbians of any ethnicity are multiply oppressed. Instead it points to the ways in which oppressions intersect with each other or are used to construct each other. This can be seen both in the ways they act as structural forces and are applied to individuals. Consider, for example, the ways in which racist stereotypes of African-American, Asian-American, and Latina women are used to objectify these women sexually as well as to assign them to “appropriate” jobs. Or consider Anna Stubblefield’s analysis of the ways advocates of eugenic sterilization in the first half of the twentieth century intertwined classism with racialized theories of intelligence and sexist views of moral depravity in the concept of feeblemindedness (Stubblefield 2007).

Fifth, as noted above, the inclusion of both privilege and oppression in intersectionality implies that members of dominant groups must consider the factors of privilege in their own identity and positionality. Intersectionality applies to everyone, not simply to members of subordinated or marginalized groups. This is important to me not only because I think it is correct, but also because it overcomes the objection raised by Naomi Zack to some analyses of intersectionality, namely, that intersectional analyses keep white women central to feminism and exclude women of color and women from the global south from the feminist conversation table. Zack believes that intersectionality helps to maintain
the distinction between “feminism” on the one hand and “multi-cultural feminism” and “global feminism” on the other (2005). Given that all people, not just the oppressed, have race/ethnicity, then intersectionality as I conceive it undermines Zack’s conceptual basis for dividing feminists. In fact, it can facilitate moving white feminists from center stage, make them less likely to overgeneralize about “women,” and decrease the extent to which they are “arrogant perceivers” of other women.13 It can also increase the awareness of “relationality” and hierarchical power relations among women, for example, the extent to which privileged women’s lives are dependent on the work of other women who care for their children and their homes.14

Sixth, intersectionality has many other practical advantages for feminists as well. It can enable us to face squarely and understand the reasons why we might have different interests at stake in a particular issue, for example, lesbian interest in marriage. It can support alliances and solidarity even when there are salient differences, for example, East Asian women have formed alliances across historically conflicting nationalities to work on behalf of “comfort women” pressed into sexual service by the Japanese military in World War II.

We need to consider also the limitations of intersectionality: what it is not capable of doing or does not imply. I do not consider these “objections” to intersectionality, but a realistic assessment of the scope of the concept. Of course, not everyone agrees with me.

First, although I hesitate to use the word “methodology” because its meaning varies widely across and within disciplines, I doubt that intersectionality is one.15 The term I used earlier, “framework,” is loose, but apt. One can develop methods and methodologies that support an intersectional framework (or even an intersectional picture). Intersectionality’s positive value can be seen in its function as a “method checker” (or even a “framework checker”) that provides standards that a method or methodology should meet.

Second, by itself, intersectionality provides neither any structural analyses of oppressions and privileges nor any particular analysis of anyone’s complex identity or experiences. Instead it points out what kinds of analyses might be useful, namely, ones that consider mutually constructed or intermeshed axes of oppression or facets of identities.

Third, it is not a theory of power, of oppression, or of any other central concept of social and political theory.16

Fourth, it provides neither a theory of identity formation nor a theory of agency.17

Fifth, it does not abolish identity categories; instead they become more complex, messy, and fluid. A number of critics have argued that the treatment of identity categories in intersectional analyses is problematic. These would include (i) poststructuralist critiques that seek to undermine identity categories deeply, (ii) critiques that pushing identity categories to a higher level remains problematic, and (iii) Lugones’s critique that identity categories embody a “logic of purity.”18

Sixth, it does not imply that all situations are intersectional to the same extent. The degrees and kinds of intersectional intermeshing need empirical investigation. For example, the degree to which a gay couple is subject to economic oppression will need a thoroughgoing intersectional analysis. We need to consider whether they are gay men or lesbians, what their races/ethnicities and social classes are, whether they speak the dominant language of the country, how these all fit together, and so forth. In contrast, if we want to know whether this gay couple is discriminated against by the legal prohibition of same-sex marriage, we need to know far less about them. The laws under which they live determine whether they can marry (whether rich or poor, white, Asian, Latino, or Black, gay man or lesbian). I am not saying that marriage laws are completely devoid of relevant intersections, just that there are differences in the degree of intersectional analyses needed in different situations.19

Having noted some of the benefits of intersectionality as well as a few limitations on what it can do or provide, let us turn to the limitations of the images in which intersectionality has been explained.

2. METAPHORS AND IMAGES

Explaining a concept, especially a concept that goes against the grain of dominant institutional structures and thought, often requires metaphors, images, or analogies. Intersectionality is no exception, although itself is a metaphor. I want to look at some of the ways in which intersectionality has been visualized in order to understand some of the critiques of it, and consider whether the problem is the concept of intersectionality itself or the metaphors and images used to discuss it.

Crenshaw originally used a traffic intersection to explain the ways in which Black women were harmed by existing U.S. legal categories that allowed African-American women to be disadvantaged by only one axis of discrimination at a time.
Consider an analogy to traffic in an intersection, coming and going in all four directions. Discrimination, like traffic through an intersection, may flow in one direction, and it may flow in another. If an accident happens in an intersection, it can be caused by cars traveling from any number of directions and, sometimes, from all of them. Similarly if a Black woman is harmed because she is in the intersection, her injury could result from sex discrimination or race discrimination [or both]. (1989, 149)²⁰

This image of intersectionality caught on in a way that a more sterile intersection of sets in mathematics or a Venn diagram would not have. Even if streets are more linear and horizontal than axes of oppression, the vivacity of the images of multi-car collisions and of Black women being battered by multiple vehicles representing oppressions helped people to expand their thinking beyond legal frameworks that were based on analyses of equality that relied on the “single-axis” model of discrimination: “but for” this one oppression, they’d be treated equally.

As I have visualized intersectionality over two decades, I have added many more streets to the intersection and placed a roundabout in its center. We need these changes in order to distinguish intersectionality from more simplified cases of multiple oppressions. Being hit by two different cars does not show the ways that oppressions can interact. A roundabout works better if we want to point out that one axis of oppression uses another to oppress a single person, or that axes can sometimes blend together to produce a distinct mixture (consider, for example, Carla Trujillo’s treatment of Chicano Catholic homophobia [1991] or Lugones’s position on the colonial/modern fusion of race and gender [2007]). In a roundabout, different axes can intermesh in various ways after they enter the central space. The central space is up for grabs! There might not even be an “island” in the middle, just an open space. A person standing anywhere in the central space could be hit by any number of axes either in combination or singly. Cars, trains, buses, and motorcycles all could be vehicles carrying different axes of oppression into the central space. Vehicles could even crash or fuse together first before hitting the person. No need to keep it simple. Imagine here the life of a U.S. Muslim lesbian with family members in Afghanistan trying to enlist in the U.S. military between 2001 and 2011.

This more fluid roundabout allows us to visualize more facets of intersectionality. It is now easier to expand the axes of oppression beyond race and gender to include sexual orientation, class, and other factors; in addition, the central area is suitable for incorporating several types of intersectionality. By “types” I include the interactions among axes in institutions or social issues as well as intersectional effects on an individual. For example, Patricia Hill Collins explains the ways in which Black slavery exemplified patriarchy and class hierarchy as well as racism (consider the many reasons for controlling slave women’s sexuality and fertility) (1993/2008, 100–1). Crenshaw, in addition to discussing the importance of intersectionality in dealing with domestic violence, details the interaction of axes of oppression on each other in a more structural way and distinguishes among structural intersectionality, political intersectionality, and representational intersectionality (1991, 1993).

However, a horizontal roundabout presents a problem, particularly if we adopt a concept of intersectionality that includes privilege as well as oppression.²¹ If a person is subject to axes of privilege/oppression rather than just oppression, how or where do we locate her on the axes and in the intersection? Suppose our U.S. Muslim lesbian above is white with family in Europe, not Afghanistan. Is she standing on a “white curb” protected from racism while being hit by a combination of heterosexism and anti-Muslim bigotry? Or perhaps an axis in terms of which she is privileged simply bypasses her as she stands in the roundabout. Or imagine that no cars are allowed to enter the intersection from the privileged end of the axis, so battering an oppressed pedestrian is done by cars, trucks, and buses on one-way streets from the oppressive end.

Something is still wrong: a person with privilege can sometimes choose to mitigate a few of the damaging effects of oppression, not just bypass that axis. A wealthy Chicana lesbian can choose to use her wealth to mitigate some of the damage done by her ethnic/religious community’s homophobia. For example, she could donate funds to organizations that resist homophobia in her community or move away from the neighborhood in which her daily social interactions are oppressive, even if such a move has emotional costs in other respects. The possibility of mitigation makes it look as if a multi-dimensional matrix of axes of oppression and privilege would be needed. In addition, we must also keep in mind that social forces do not merely “strike one differently” depending on one’s location in this complex matrix, but that agents choose to act differently within their locations. They can resist oppressions even without other privileges; those with some privilege can use their privilege in a variety of ways (or not). It might be worthwhile to explore Collins’s image of the matrix of domination to assist us here, but that will have to wait for another occasion.²²
In order to address the horizontality of the model and its lack of ability to incorporate the ways in which privilege in one respect can mitigate or modify oppression in another, let us introduce mountains to add verticality. Intersections can be found on various places on the side of a mountain. A heterosexual’s intersections are found higher up on the “heterosexualism mountain,” or if the heterosexual is also middle class, higher up on the mountain of combined heterosexualism and classism.

Once we have mountains, we can replace vehicles with liquids to show the ways in which some oppressions or privileges seem to blend or fuse with others. Different liquids—milk, coffee, olive oil, nail polish, beet borscht, paint in several colors—run down from different places at different altitudes into a roundabout. Some of the liquids run together, some are marbled with others, and some stay more separate unless whipped together. To me, this image captures intersectionality better than many others, but it still cannot capture agency well.

Although I yearn for a rich concept of intersectionality that can be visually captured, it is, in fact, difficult to find visual images that both capture all the features of intersectionality and are simple enough to help explain the concept. This fact has always made me somewhat uncomfortable. However, this difficulty does not imply that the fault is with the concept of intersectionality. Perhaps we simply need to realize that intersectionality itself is a metaphor that, as it has evolved, encompasses too many facets for any image to capture completely: the interaction of the axes of oppression and privilege across a variety of social structures and situations; the agency of people within these structures; the conflicting interests of members of an oppressed group; individuals’ social identities—how people see and represent themselves and each other; and so on. I mean here to allude not simply to Crenshaw’s categories of structural, political, and representational intersectionality, but also to the sheer array of cases and uses at hand. We might recall Kathy Davis’s claim that it is precisely the somewhat amorphous character of intersectionality—coupled with the needs it satisfies—that gives it such a wide appeal.

3. LUGONES: INTERSECTIONALITY, COLONIAL/MODERN POWER, AND GENDERS

Although we now turn to María Lugones’s work, we continue our discussion of metaphors, visual images, and the need for messiness in them. Not only is Lugones’s writing full of rich imagery, but she is also especially concerned that intersectionality and related concepts not leave our key concepts pure, tidy, and separate from each other. I consider her work in some detail not only because of her valuable contributions, but also because it challenges the position I develop in section 4.

I concentrate on two of her essays, “Purity, Impurity, and Separation” (in Lugones 2003) and “Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern Gender System” (2007), focusing on her treatment of the role of intersectionality and her position that women differently situated by oppressions have different genders. Although I argue against Lugones on the latter issue, her work has influenced my thinking for decades. I strongly support her overall aims to make feminist theory pluralistic, to make women of color visible, and to push white feminists and men of color (I would add white men) to appreciate more fully the importance of work done by and the interests of women of color. I explain later the ways in which my work supports Lugones’s aims.

In “Purity, Impurity, and Separation,” Lugones develops a framework built on the contrast between the logics of “purity/splitting” and “impurity/curdling.” The logic of purity/splitting encompasses dominance, control, hierarchy, categorizing, and selves that are either unified, fragmented, or both. In this view, “unification and homogeneity are related principles of ordering the social world” (2003, 127). This logic fragments the identities of women of color. The contrasting logic of impurity/curdling resists intersected oppressions, sees that the social world is “complex and heterogeneous and each person is multiple, non-fragmented, embodied” (2003, 127), and has “potential to germinate a nonoppressive pattern, a mestiza consciousness” (2003, 133).

The image that is most vivid is that of “curdle-separation” in contrast with “split-separation.” Lugones draws on our knowledge of emulsions: if mayonnaise is curdled, the egg yolk, oil, and water are not separated cleanly and completely; instead “they coalesce toward oil or toward water . . . [there are] matter[s] of different degrees of coalescence . . . you are left with yolky oil and oily yolk.” (2003, 122). If curdled mayonnaise is beyond a reader’s grasp, Lugones offers another image of “impurity”: our frequent inability to separate the two parts of an egg completely. We leave some yolk in the egg white. Curdle-separation is the act of a subject resisting the logic of purity. It gives a way to characterize the identity of la mestiza and the nature of mestiza consciousness. Lugones, of course, acknowledges that she is writing within the mestiza tradition of Gloria Anzaldúa and others (see Moraga 1983, Anzaldúa 1987). For our
discussion here, it is important to note that curdled identities are intersectional identities, but not split or fragmented identities. A passage from Anzaldúa is illustrative of curdled identities that are misperceived by others as fragmented or split:

I am a wind-swept bridge, a crossroads inhabited by whirlwinds…What am I? A third world lesbian feminist with Marxist and mystic leanings. They would chop me up into little fragments and tag each piece with a label…. One foot on brown soil, one on white, one in straight society, one in the gay world, the man's world, the women's, one limb in the literary world, another in the working class… Who, me confused? Ambivalent? Not so. Only your labels split me. (1983, 205)

We need to be explicit about the relation between intersectionality and Lugones's concepts. That oppressions intersect is a necessary condition for (or an assumption of) Lugones's analysis. Nevertheless, she usually speaks in more specific terms. Oppressions that are interlocking are part of the logic of purity that fragments people; they require that fragments are “unified, fixed, atomistic, bounded…” (2003, 231, n. 1). They do not change the nature of what is interlocked. In contrast, intermeshed or enmeshed oppressions more closely approach the logic of impurity/curdling she uses—although a “mesh is still too much separability,” (2003, 231, n. 1). Although I cannot discuss her theory of resistance here, resisting multiple oppressions is central to Lugones's long-term work. It is important to note that curdle-separation resists both interlocking and intermeshed oppressions.

In “Heterosexuality and the Colonial/Modern Gender System,” Lugones weaves together two frameworks: the coloniality of power, as exemplified in the work of Anibal Quijano (1991, 2000a, 2000b, 2001–2002), and theories emphasizing intersectionality that detail the exclusion of women of color and Third World women from “liberatory struggles in the name of women,” work done primarily by Third World feminists and women of color feminists or critical race theorists (Lugones, 2007, 189). This essay and Lugones's larger project of decolonial feminism pose complications for my view of intersectionality.

Lugones offers an historicized analysis that includes gender oppression, heterosexuality, racial classification/oppression, colonialism, and capitalism as “impossible to understand apart from each other” (Lugones, 2007, 187). I focus here on her view that colonial/modern power and the colonial/modern gender system mutually constitute each other. Lugones states: “Colonialism did not impose precolonial, European gender arrangements on the colonized. It imposed a new gender system that created very different arrangements for colonized males and females than for white bourgeois colonizers. Thus it introduced many genders and gender itself as a colonial concept and mode of organization of relations of production, property relations, of cosmologies and ways of knowing” (2007, 186).

Lugones explains the “light” and “dark” sides of gender in the colonial/modern gender system, drawing on work by Quijano, Oyeronke Oyewumi (1997), and Paula Gunn Allen (1986/1992) among others. The “light side” includes “biological dimorphism, heterosexuality, and patriarchy” (Lugones 2007, 190) and applies only to the gender of the colonizers. Women on the “light side” are thought to be fragile and sexually passive (2007, 203). The gender characteristics on the “dark side” result from white colonists’ need for many kinds of labor coupled with their fears of the sexuality of the native people. Indigenous people were thought to be intersexed or hermaphrodites with both penises and breasts (2007, 195), with their sexuality characterized in animalistic terms (2007, 203). Colonialized women were thought to be sexually aggressive, sometimes perverse, and capable of doing any kind of labor (2007, 203).

On these bases, Lugones maintains that the colonized women and colonizers’ women have different genders. They are parts of different systems of distinctions. All are different from precolonial Yoruban society as explained by Oyewumi (1997). Oyewumi says that the Yoruba categories of obirin and okunrin are mischaracterized by using “female/woman” and “male/man.” Instead the terms “obirin” and “okunrin” refer to only anatomical features: she uses the terms “anafemale” and “ananmale” (1997, 32–34). She maintains that gender was not an organizing principle for the Yoruba until colonial powers imposed it. The distinction between obirin and okunrin is “one of reproduction, not one of sexuality or gender” (1997, 37). Her claim that gender is absent rests on her identification of gender with social categories containing hierarchy or binary opposition (1997, 34), neither of which she finds in the relation of ananmales and anafemales. She offers detailed explanations of the mistaken attribution of gender in various social contexts in Yoruban life by other scholars—usually anthropologists, both feminist and nonfeminist. She finds hierarchy among the Yoruba, but it is based on seniority and is context relative.

Although there are no doubt many controversial issues in Oyewumi’s account, it is at least inspiring to think about a culture in which physical
reproductive differences played a minor role in social organization—whether or not Oyèwumi’s denial of gender is precisely correct (or relies too heavily on her definition of gender). But even if Oyèwumi is wrong and there were precolonial genders among the Yoruba, Lugones can still make a point about the existence of multiple gender systems. She will need to clarify the sense in which “gender itself as a colonial concept” (2007, 186), the ways that gender and colonial/modern power constitute each other or fuse, and the ways that the imposed systems relate to the Yoruban precolonial gender system. Assuming she can do this successfully, then she can increase the number of genders from four to at least six: at least two precolonial genders and two others imposed by the colonizers, all of which are different from the Europeans’ own two genders. However, what is more important here than the precise number of genders, four or six, is that colonial/modern force imposed a different and very vicious set of rules and norms on indigenous men and women than on themselves, that the Yoruban anafemales became inferior in all spheres of life (cognitive, economic, political, as well as control over reproduction), and that the process was accomplished with the cooperation of the Yoruban anamales (Lugones, 2007, 198). It is these truths that require continued feminist focus.

Because I focus on the roles that intersectionality plays in Lugones’s position, I cannot do justice here to her very rich project. Her exploration of mutually constructed colonial/modern intersections promises to expand feminist thinking. Her position relies on intersectionality, as did her position in “Purity, Impurity, and Separation”; not surprisingly, Lugones again advocates the need to avoid separability in the intersection (2007, 193). Avoiding separability here is not expressed in terms of “curdling”; instead it means that systems of oppression, namely, colonial/modern power and the colonial/modern gender system (along with heterosexuality, racial classification/oppression, and capitalism), literally constitute each other and cannot be understood apart from each other. This is a strong position.

Lugones explicitly addresses the relation of intersectionality (as conceived by Crenshaw) to Quijano’s structural axes such as colonial/modern power:

> I think the logic of “structural axes” does more and less than intersectionality. Intersectionality reveals what is not seen when categories such as gender and race are conceptualized as separate from each other. The move to intersect the categories has been motivated by the difficulties in making

visible those who are dominated and victimized in terms of both categories. . . . It becomes logically clear then that the logic of categorical separation [the logic that identifies women with white bourgeois women, blacks with black heterosexual men, etc.] distorts what exists at the intersection, such as violence against women of color. Given the construction of the categories, the intersection misconstructs women of color. So, once intersectionality shows us what is missing, we have ahead of us the task of reconceptualizing the logic of the intersection so as to avoid separability. It is only when we perceive gender and race as intermeshed or fused that we actually see women of color. (2007, 192–93)

Using Lugones’s own terminology, I want to sort out four positions to help us determine whether there is any leeway in the kinds of analysis that make women of color visible, and whether intersectionality remains part of the logic of purity. These positions include those that Lugones rejects as well as the one that she holds.

A. The most “pure” position within the logic of purity conceptualizes categories of oppression in ways that do not allow for differences within categories such as gender or race. It cannot distinguish “transparent” interests (those of the dominant group within a category, for example, straight Black men among Blacks) and “thick” interests of those who are marginalized within that group, for example, Black women, gay Black people of either gender (Lugones 2003, 140–41). This position is often identified with essentialism of some kind and with “pop-head” metaphysics. It is difficulties in positions of this kind that lead to the need for intersectional analyses.

B. Views that focus on multiple oppressions and multiple jeopardies of women of color are precursors to intersectional analyses; however, these analyses do not explore the inseparability of the intersections in a way that moves nearly far enough toward Lugones’s goal. In fact, they might not even speak in terms of interactions or intersections. Lugones’s other views imply that this kind of position is still part of the logic of purity.

C. Intersectionality of interlocked oppressions does not change the nature of what is interlocked: for example, in this view racism is not mutually constructed by patriarchy or heterosexuality, nor are identities curdled. Lugones sees this kind of position as part of the logic of purity.
However, although the natures of the interlocked oppressions have not changed, even this kind of intersectionality takes extremely important steps toward making the “thick” interests of Black women or Latina lesbians visible. The point of Crenshaw’s original intersectional analysis and examples were to do precisely this (1989, 1991). Something similar could be said about Collins’s analyses (1990). And as we have seen from the uptake on early intersectional analyses over two decades, they were effective theoretically by helping to break down essentialism, and effective practically by encouraging complex institutional changes to benefit the lives of women of color, for example, in programs of domestic violence. My own sense is that there is a very big difference between “pre-intersectionality” purity of categories (pop-beads, essentialism, and so on) and “post-Crenshaw-intersectionality” categories of oppression and identity. The latter categories do not continue to imply essentialism, even if they are not themselves as “impure” as Lugones desires. They also encourage, as Lugones repeatedly recognizes, continued explorations in the right locations. So even if intersectionality of interlocking oppressions does not go as far as Lugones wants toward her view that women of color can be seen only by perceiving “gender and race as intermeshed or fused” (2007, 193), it is important to acknowledge how extensively it moved feminists both in theory and in practice.  

D. Mutually constituted and fused oppressions: This is Lugones’s considered view that I explained above—joining together the tradition of intersectional analyses with Quijano’s analysis of the modern coloniality of power. The conceptual content at the intersections explains the inseparability of oppressions. The logic of impurity reigns.

4. MY VIEW: FAMILY RESEMBLANCE INTERSECTIONALITY

Where does my view of intersectionality fit into these four positions? The short answer is between (C) and (D): intersecting oppressions change each other, but are not necessarily fused. My framework pairs intersectionality with a Wittgensteinian family resemblance analysis of the “identity categories”—the approach I find most appropriate for thinking about women, men, Latinos, Anglos, gay men, or transfemmes. Take women as an example. A family resemblance view acknowledges that although there is nothing—neither a property, an experience, nor an interest—that all women have in common, we know what a woman is and who women are because of crisscrossing, overlapping characteristics that are clear within social contexts. In this way, we can say that women share a gender (or that woman is a gender). Of course, the contexts as well as the properties, characteristics, and gendered roles are all intersectional. Race, sexual orientation, class, and so on are part of the family resemblance analysis of women. Similarly, gender, sexual orientation, and class are part of the family resemblance analysis of African-American. We should not take “resemblance” too literally or narrowly; our terms are not merely “descriptive” here. For example, suppose a feminist wants to argue that subordination in a hierarchy or other prescriptive features are important to a characterization of women; these would be fine in my analysis. Family resemblances can, I believe, be much messier and more politically laden than any of Wittgenstein’s own examples of games or numbers.

I have argued elsewhere that a position that pairs a family resemblance analysis with intersectionality can accommodate a wide variety of feminist positions, is anti-essentialist without the need to argue against the existence of categories in a thoroughly postmodern manner, gives us a strategy to answer the most problematic objections to intersectionality, and provides plausible accounts of women for everyday politics (Garry 2006a, 2006b). It is also very useful in my argument here against Lugones’s position that women have many genders. In terms of political metaphysics, it falls between a view such as Naomi Zack’s, which requires that women have a disjunctive nominal essence to ground inclusive feminism, and views that thoroughly critique identity categories or advocate a “solidarity” view of feminism not based on identities at all.

I discuss only two issues here: I first argue that my position is not part of the logic of purity and so, although more open-ended than Lugones’s position, is compatible with some facets of it. Then I turn to the question, “How many genders do women have?” in order to see whether an intersectional family resemblance account or a multiple genders account better serves Lugones’s (and feminism’s) overall aims.

My commitment is to a framework in which intersecting oppressions are mutually shaped and changed rather than to any particular substantive analysis in the intersections. Lugones’s project shapes the substantive analysis in more detail. My terms are weaker than Lugones’s: for example, I say that gender oppression works through and is shaped by racism, classism, or heterosexuality. Mutual construction seems to be a good way to state their relations in many circumstances (although Lugones might not agree with my usage). In any case, she uses a variety of expressions including
"co-construction," "mutual constitution," and "fusion" apparently interchangeably (2007). I do not interchange the terms because fusion seems the most restrictive and, although it is harder to argue for it, I hear a nuanced difference between co-constructing and mutually constituting race and gender as well. As fruitful as I find Lugones's discussion of fused categories, I want to leave open the possibility of a wider range of relations among oppressions.

I worry about how many kinds of oppression must mutually construct each other at once (not to mention fuse), how these will vary from case to case, and the multiple, precise ways they apply in our lives. Recall an example I used earlier: economic discrimination against gay couples is much more thoroughly intersectional than is legal discrimination against their marrying. In general, I want to be able to (i) claim that most of the time oppressions are inseparable in individual people's lives (though not necessarily to the same degree in every single instance), and (ii) state the conceptual relations among oppressions in such a way that we leave open to be explored the details of lives and experiences in the intersections. Although oppressions might be conceptually fused from the start, the fact that they are enmeshed in people's lives does not necessitate their antecedent conceptual fusion.30

Let me explain briefly why my view of intersectionality is not linked to Lugones's logic of purity. In addition to my explicit statements that the categories are in fact changed by intersecting, there is a simple logical point. The fact that a logic of purity can use intersectional analyses of certain kinds (interlocking oppressions) does not imply that intersectionality must be part of the logic of purity. Intersectionality is useful within both curdled and pure logics.31

Although Lugones says that "the intersection misconstrues women of color" (2007, 193), she also realizes that intersectional analyses move at least part way out of the logic of purity to set the stage—give necessary conditions—for intermeshed oppressions that are resisted in impure/curdled logic as well as for the fusion of the colonial/modern gender/power system. Granted that intersectionality (with or without family resemblances) does not entail either of Lugones's analyses, it can still be consistent with the direction she wants to go. What's important for Lugones's position on intersectionality is that oppressions not be thought of as unchanged or separated. My account and hers do not differ in this regard.

We must also not be misled into thinking that an intersectional analysis, whether mine or anyone else's, is part of the logic of purity because of the way it retains the terminology of race, gender, class, and so forth. We do not imply that categories are static or have internal homogeneity simply by using the term "gender" or "class." Given that we must have some way to speak of the factors that intersect, mutually construct each other, or even fuse, we simply speak in the everyday terms available to us.

Let us turn to the final issue of the number of genders that women have. I address it here because critics of intersectionality such as Zack appeal to theoretical and political fragmentation resulting from women's allegedly multiple genders as a reason to repudiate intersectional analyses (Zack 2005). As an advocate of intersectionality, I aim to clear away this avenue of critique so that a broad range of people can feel comfortable developing intersectional analyses.

Zack argues that intersectional theories are harmful because they fragment feminist theory and solidarity. Specifically, she maintains (i) that intersectionality entails that each ethnic group of women has a different gender, and (ii) that this proliferation of genders promotes both theoretical fragmentation (because each "virtually incommensurable" group can produce theories applicable only to itself) and political fragmentation that can easily preclude "common goals as well as basic empathy" (2005, 7). She visualizes segregated groups of feminists engaging in "parallel play" unable to find common ground (2005, 7).

I disagree with all of these claims, but because my principal dialogue here is with Lugones rather than Zack, I must be brief. Against claim (i) I offer my family resemblance approach. In addition, if each new intersection of ethnicity and gender constitutes a different gender, it obscures intersectionality's conceptual logic and makes it harder to explain how ethnicity affects one's gendered experience. Nevertheless, Lugones (unlike many other advocates of intersectionality) would agree with claim (i).

Both clauses in claim (ii) are highly controversial. However, we can construct weaker, more plausible claims: that multiplying genders can encourage theoretical and political fragmentation or that there is a risk that postulating multiple genders for women can lead to fragmentation. If one believes that ontological, conceptual, or linguistic framing influences theory construction and politics at all, one could not deny that there is at least a risk of theoretical fragmentation here.22 If we have an alternative position that avoids this risk, it makes sense to use it. Why take a chance with a more risky position?

Lugones's position is exactly the kind that Zack believes promotes fragmentation: colonized women have a different gender from European women; women from different ethnic groups have different genders.
I aim to avoid a Zack–Lugones dispute by changing the terms of the discussion to family resemblances.

One advantage of coupling intersectionality with a family resemblance analysis is precisely to have a framework that can block the implication that differences among women mean that we cannot share the gender woman. Theory fragmentation does not get off the ground because we are women in virtue of the crisscrossing resemblances, similarities, reasons for places in the hierarchies of power, possible relations to reproduction, and so on. This precludes neither “opting out” nor borderline or ambiguous cases; indeed, we should have troublesome cases because binary gender systems are problematic on many grounds. Family resemblances can easily accommodate Lugones’s analyses of curdle-separation and curdled identities, for nothing precludes curdled family resemblances or curdled identities among women. No purity is needed in family resemblances. Lugones wants to give visibility to women of color—to their resistance to the logic of purity and to their previously “thick” interests. A family resemblance analysis can support her aims.

However, Lugones’s discussion of the fused colonial/modern/gender/power analysis moves in a different direction from a family resemblance analysis. Of course, we could stretch a family resemblance analysis to the point that a precolonial Yoruban anafemale (regardless of everything else about her life and experience) will be in the same gender as a European woman colonizer by noting that they have in common one of the many characteristics of the gender woman—they are both the kind of human being who typically can give birth. However, since Lugones takes there to be no precolonial Yoruban gender at all, there is no conceptual space for woman in this picture. Unless I am prepared to mount both a conceptual and empirical argument against Oyèwumi’s account of the absence of gender (including the way it was based on making hierarchy part of the definition of gender), I cannot simply insert a family resemblance gender concept into it. If the reader will allow a bit more Wittgenstein, we can say that gender makes sense within certain forms of life (common as they are). In Oyèwumi’s account, the precolonial Yoruba did not have such a form of life.

When the concept of gender clearly enters the picture, mutually constructed with race and modern colonial power, Lugones can speak of different genders for the colonizers and the colonized, but does not necessarily need to do so. I understand her motivation for postulating four genders, but since a move that proliferates genders is open to Zack’s fragmentation objection, let us try to accommodate Lugones’s central points without proliferation. If we speak in terms of family resemblances among the colonized women and the European women, it could actually illuminate rather than disguise both the hierarchies of power and the mutual construction of modern colonial power, race, and gender by pointing to the extreme differences among the characteristics of European women and colonized women (for example, in the norms for their sexual behavior and their labor). There is no need for these women to occupy different genders in order to explain the male colonizers’ motivation or implementation of different norms and expectations for different groups of women within the hierarchies they imposed. Nor do multiple genders for women help to explain the relations of dependency that the European women have on the colonized women.

Of course, I cannot talk Lugones out of multiple genders. They are integral to her decolonial feminist project (see Lugones 2010). Lugones is likely to reject Zack’s critique as part of the logic of purity because Zack uses nominal essences to overcome fragmentation among women. Both Zack and Lugones want to overcome fragmentation, but focus on different kinds. Zack does not want women as a group fragmented—severed from each other theoretically or politically. Lugones opposes fragmenting or splitting the elements in identities of women of color. She maintains that white women are already split from women of color and tend not to see them. So Lugones tries to make visible women of color (with coherent, nonfragmented, but multiple identities as well as agency that resists oppression) and to make intelligible the reasons for their current invisibility. I interpret Lugones as taking a step toward solidarity, toward improving empathy among women. Zack is unlikely to assess; she would reject it as a wrong-headed way to go about it. One might think that Zack would find my approach more amenable because I place women in one gender, a move that should promote empathy as well as theoretical cohesion. However, Zack also rejects family resemblances, although I do not know whether she would consider them a lesser evil than multiple genders.

It is clear, I hope, that my family resemblance approach supports Lugones’s overall aims despite my disagreement with her on the number of genders women have. If we speak as if women have one gender (not defined in terms of a single kind of hierarchy) and use intersectional family resemblances, we can discuss the intermeshed, mutually constructed systems of oppression and encompass the enormous variations in their characteristics, roles, and experiences. I believe that it is an asset, not a liability, that this view is almost as wide-ranging as Lugones’s is. Yet because it stops with
family resemblances, and does not take Lugones’s step to multiple genders, we can stop theory fragmentation and proliferation and have an anti-essentialist flexible framework from which to think about women’s lives. Lugones and I will still disagree about how widely we can apply “woman” because she means literally that gender is a colonial concept (2007, 186). In any case, the historical and contemporary varieties of intersectional gender systems offer plenty to keep feminist theorists busy.35

My view also has a communicative advantage over Lugones’s because I use everyday terminology in both theoretical and practical contexts. Even if ordinary language is rightly considered conservative, being able to explain “the diverse and sometimes contradictory interests of women” (or even “curdled identities of women”) in everyday speech has a better chance of success than a theoretical approach that eschews our standard uses of “woman” or “gender.”36 In fact, without everyday concepts it is more difficult to explain the ways in which oppressions intersect and to express or even locate our intersecting identities. As noted earlier, we are not necessarily using the logic of purity if we say that a bit of stability in terminology, especially terminology that people already understand, can be valuable in explaining how differing by race, class, or sexual orientation changes women’s lives. Consider the example of an Ecuadorian woman of European ancestry who moves to Chicago. In Ecuador she was a member of the dominant group; in Chicago she might well be thought of by feminist theorists as a woman of color (she might or might not also think of herself that way). I find it neither plausible nor useful to think that she changes genders by moving to Chicago. Instead, understanding her situation requires attention to the intersecting changes that her gender and her move from dominant group to immigrant group have on each other. Creating a new gender for each new intersection does nothing in itself to help us explore the intersection. Instead, intersectional analysis becomes more difficult without this bit of conceptual stability to express the Ecuadorian woman’s intersectional life changes.37

Nevertheless, there is a serious downside to my strategy. If women from many different groups share a gender, we must constantly be vigilant to keep dominant (for our purposes, white or Western) women de-centered, off center stage—historically, now, and in the future. Otherwise we cannot construct pluralist, inclusive feminist theory. I know this will be difficult; we are battling not only history, but also the perceived self-interest of certain white women. However, it is very powerful for women of color to refuse to let white women “own” a gender that is not white women’s to own. My account recognizes that exploring the many specific historical and contemporary intersections requires hard, fascinating work of exploration and analysis. White women’s lives are likely to be irrelevant to these explorations and analyses.

I understand the appeal of Lugones’s multiple genders: we can de-center white women by excluding them from the analyses of other women’s genders; we make women of color visible; and we can attend to the details of intermeshed (fused) oppressions in their lives in specific historical contexts. This approach speaks to the worry that a family resemblance framework could dilute the experience of colonized women and women of color.38 Although it makes sense to worry, being alert to this possibility is not the same as prejudging the results of intersectional analyses. I think the best plan is to remember that exploring intersections in their specificity is an empirical activity. Of course, we will have some theoretical framework or strategy within which we do it, but both Lugones’s and mine allow specificity to flourish. And both of us need to speak about the relations among women—in whatever terms we choose to do it.

I also understand the pull of saying that different gender systems imply different genders. However, I do not think we are required to say it without considering the costs, namely, the likely promotion of theory fragmentation, and the conceptual problem concerning how multiple and shifting genders will intermesh with other axes of oppression. Because both Lugones’s account and mine encourage exploration of the intersections that result from mutually constructed categories, and because an intersectional family resemblance concept of women is designed to increase, not decrease, the visibility of women of color, I do not think we have to choose between prioritizing the experiences and lives of women of color and having coherent, flexible concepts that end theoretical fragmentation and simplify communication.

5. Final Remarks

I have advised caution lest we overextend or expect too much of the concept of intersectionality. It is neither a methodology nor a theory of power or oppression. It provides a framework or strategy for thinking about issues, a set of reminders to look at a wider range of oppressions and privileges to consider their mutual construction or at least their intermingling (if these are different). The hard work is in digging into the details of the ways that the full range of oppressions and privileges

4. Alison Bailey, also an advocate of intersectionality, analogizes its status as a tool to a spell checker (2009). I would say a "framework checker"—if only our software had such a thing! More on this point later.

5. From this point on, I speak in terms of traditional and feminist philosophers rather than broader disciplinary groups. Most of the points I make are relevant to wider groups, including activists as well as scholars, but brevity beckons.

6. Initially, intersectionality and related concepts concerned only oppressions, not privileges (and only gender and race, but it's usually not controversial to include other oppressions). Still today the major focus of intersectional analysis is, quite rightly, on oppressions and multiply oppressed people. Maria Lugones puts it nicely: "Though everyone in capitalist Eurocentered modernity is both raced and gendered, not everyone is dominated or victimized in terms of their race or gender" (2007, 192). Jennifer Nash addresses an open question whether intersectionality "is a theory of marginalized subjectivity or a general theory of identity" (2008, 10). Ange-Marie Hancock advocates mainstreaming intersectional methods to include dominant groups (2007); Rita Dhamoon has worries about this strategy, including that to do so might weaken intersectionality's central focus of critique (2008). One reason that I believe it is important to include privilege is that if the analysis overlooks the fact that men are gendered, white people have a race, and straight people have a sexual orientation, those in dominant groups are more likely to remain in denial (or ignorance) of their privileged statuses and to continue to marginalize "the others" in thinking about the categories. I will say more later about why the move to include privilege helps to overcome certain objections to intersectionality.

Notes

My thanks go especially to Alison Bailey and Talia Bietcher for comments on this paper and for several years of very enlightening conversations and sharing their work, and more recently to Anna Carastathis, Sharon Crasnow, Sally Markowitz, Diana Meyers, Anita Superson, and reviewers for *Hypatia*. Sections of this paper or its forbearers were presented at conferences of the Society for Analytic Philosophy (2008), Feminist Ethics and Social Theory (FEAST) (2009), National Women's Studies Association (NWSA) (2009), and the Critical Race Studies Symposium at UCLA Law School (2010). An abbreviated version appeared in *Hypatia* 25:4 (2011).

1. This is Judith Butler's expression (1999, 182), but my point in this footnote is not related to her. In the original intersectional analyses given by African-American women and other women of color, the central kinds of oppression were race and gender (see note 3 below). Then, over time, the kinds of oppressions/privileges that are mentioned and become salient on the list change with the context of consideration. For example, colonialism, nationalism, disability, immigration status, age, or religion might be at least as important in some contexts as the ones mentioned in the text. We should also remember that oppression due to gender (gender identity and expression) encompasses transgender oppression as well as sexism. The general move is to "ask the other question" (Matsuda 1996, 64) in order to understand what oppressions are interwoven.

2. My hope for philosophy is consistent with what Anna Stubblefield calls "postsupremacist philosophy" (2005).
7. My use of “naturalized” is both broad and weak. Philosophers who engage in naturalized forms of epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, etc., believe that empirical evidence/facts about human beings and the world are relevant to doing normative philosophy. So, for example, understanding how people can and do act, acquire beliefs and moral emotions, and develop a sense of self would all be relevant to philosophy.

8. I sincerely hope that they do not need to work through all of this step by step, but I cannot help thinking of Wittgenstein’s remark in *Zettel*: “In philosophizing we may not terminate a disease of thought. It must run its natural course, and slow cure is all important. (That is why mathematicians are such bad philosophers.)” (1967, #382). I am hoping that the “natural course” of this disease has already run long enough.

9. I know of no traditional philosopher, and very few feminist philosophers, who have attempted this. One related example in feminist philosophy is Diana Meyers’s “Intersectional Identity and the Authentic Self” (2000), which considers the impact that intersectional identities make on philosophical treatments of autonomy. In the course of it she reexamines notions of self-knowledge, self-definition, authenticity, and so on. It is a big, complex job! Charles Mills, who has written widely on race, has a chapter, “Intersectioning Contracts” (2007).

10. Helpful suggestions on race can be found, for example, in Mills (1997, 1998), Yancy (2004), Stubblefield (2005), and Bailey (2010).

11. In *Epistemic Injustice*, Miranda Fricker introduces the terms “testimonial injustice” for the ways in which credibility is deflated by prejudice and “hermeneutical injustice” for disadvantages experienced by not having “collective interpretive resources” and “to make sense” of their social experiences” (2007, 1). Kristie Dotson (2011) lays out practices of silencing testimony.

12. “Pop-bead” metaphysics is Spelman’s expression (1988). Authors in the tradition being referred to in this paragraph are cited in note 4 above.


15. Social scientists are particularly interesting on this topic, for example, McCall (2005) and Nash (2008). Political scientist Hancock argues that it should be thought of as a normative and empirical research paradigm (2007a, 2007b). I noticed in conversation with feminist political scientists at NWSA (November 2009) that they call “intersectional methods” what I term “strategies or methods that support an intersectional framework.” For example, we need to note who is left out at the policy table or not called to testify in front of Congress or the FDA about women’s reproductive health, and then attend to the positions of those who have been excluded. Social scientists at NWSA also spoke of intersectionality’s being

a “paradigm shift.” I believe that this is not a technical Kuhnian use of the term, but a way to claim emphatically that we must start thinking very differently to do intersectional work.

16. In fairness, one might want to explore whether it should be such a theory. For example, see Anna Carastathis (2008) and Wendy Brown (1997) on the problems with intersectionality’s not being or having a theory of power or oppression. I should acknowledge that there are a number of critiques of intersectionality that I have not engaged at all here or elsewhere. They deserve to be considered carefully. For example, see Carastathis (2008 and n.d.), Brown (1997).

17. Nash believes that intersectionality will need to provide both of these (2008).

18. On (i) see Butler (1999) and Brown (1997), on (ii) Carastathis (2008), and on (iii) Lugones (2003 and 2007). Because I return to Lugones later, but not to the others, let me note here that even those who believe that subjects are constituted through regulatory power still often note the mixtures of various kinds of power in terms of race, gender, etc., so proceed on a path in some ways analogous to intersectional analyses.

19. For example, gay transpeople who want to marry are affected by heterosexism/oppression. In addition, heterosexism mixed with sexism probably motivates much opposition to same-sex marriage.

S. Laurel Weldon is among the other theorists who support great flexibility in thinking about the empirical details of intersectionality and other relationships of structural oppressions, e.g., multiplicative, additive, or autonomous (Weldon 2006).

20. “Or both” was not in the original essay, but was added as clarification at some point in the many reprints of the 1989 essay, for example, in David Kairys (1998, 361). Crenshaw uses other variations on intersections and crossroads, including a crossroads image cited by Bailey (2009, 16) and Yuval-Davis (2006, 196): “The main highway is ‘racism road’. One cross street can be Colonialism, then Patriarchy Street. …She has to deal not only with one form of oppression but with all forms, those aimed as road signs, which link together to make a double, a triple, multiple, a many layered blanket of oppression.” [The original website with this passage is no longer available.] In a talk at U.C. Santa Barbara, Crenshaw spoke of the great depth of the multiple roads in the intersection—racism, sexism, heterosexism, classism; she pictured contemporary issues and effects of these oppressions as the traffic that flows on the roads (2008). I am not totally satisfied that any of these images captures the ways the oppressions intermesh or mutually construct each other.

21. It is not that Crenshaw lacks vertical imagery; it is just that it doesn’t transfer well to an explanation of intersectionality. Her other image in her 1989 essay is vertical—the narrow door in the floor through which those with the fewest disadvantages (standing on the shoulders of others) can climb through into the non-oppressive space, for example by affirmative
action. Carstathis (n.d.) has an excellent critique of horizontal imagery and discussion of Crenshaw. My concerns are somewhat different from hers.

22. Collins uses the language of intersectionality as well as the matrix of domination; the images do not seem to compete in her eyes (1993/2008). Although it is tempting to run through possible permutations of Collins’s matrix image, I will instead make only a few points about it. If the matrix is at least three-dimensional rather than flat, this is already an advantage. But it would be a mistake to visualize this matrix with straight lines at right angles because this doesn’t capture the ways in which oppressions and privileges intersect. If I were to rely on a matrix image, I would move quickly to a tangled ball of many strands of yarn, some of which are themselves woven together. In addition, the issue of the kinds of agency that are possible within different points on the matrix complicates the problem further.

23. Two points here about “interlocking oppressions.” First, Lugones says in this same endnote that “interlocking does not alter the monadic nature of the things interlocked. In Elizabeth Spelman’s words, it does not trouble the ‘pop bead’ metaphysics (Spelman 1988:15)” (Lugones 2003, 231, n.1). I appreciate Lugones’s point here, but I think that even a minimal intersectional analysis such as interlocking oppressions takes decisive steps to undermine “pop bead” metaphysics simply by questioning essentialism. (“Essentialism” can mean many things, I use it here to refer to positions of the following kinds; (i) that there is a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of a concept such as woman, or (ii) that there is a set of experiences that women universally share.)

Second, although Lugones refers briefly in this same endnote (2003, 231, n.1) to transnational or postcolonial contexts, she does not make explicit the extent to which she means to engage transnational feminist/anti-racist discussions of interlocking oppressions in their own terms. There is more work to be done here for many reasons, not the least of which is that terms are given different meanings by different writers. For example, Sherene Razack’s use of “interlocking” is different from Lugones’s. Razack states, “I use the word interlocking rather than intersecting to describe how the systems of oppression are connected. Intersecting remains a word that describes discrete systems whose paths cross. I suggest that the systems are each other and that they give content to each other” (Razack 2007, 343). And: “Analytical tools that consist of looking at how systems of oppression interlock differ in emphasis from those that stress intersectionality. Interlocking systems need one another, and in tracing the complex ways in which they help to secure one another, we learn how women are produced into positions that exist symbiotically but hierarchically [e.g., domestic workers and professional women]” (Razack 1998, 13).

24. Lugones understands her 2007 essay as the beginning of a larger decolonial feminist project that requires detailed work with historically specific concepts, immersion in nonwestern ontologies/frameworks, collaboration among researchers, and so on (2007, 207 and conversation at NWSA 2009). In this way, women as historical subjects become visible. Lugones further develops her view in “Toward a Decolonial Feminism,” published after I wrote this essay (Lugones 2010). Her 2010 essay helps us understand more fully the meaning of her 2007 statement that gender is a colonial concept (2007, 186).

25. Two points. First, I take Lugones to be critical of Crenshaw from her claim in the passage quoted, “Given the construction of the categories, the intersection misconstrues women of color” (2007, 193). However, nothing in my essay hangs on whether Lugones intends to place Crenshaw explicitly in “the logic of purity.” Second, see note 23 above concerning differing uses of “interlocking.”

26. Wittgenstein uses the term “family resemblance” to evoke the wide variety of kinds of resemblances among family members: those who share coloring might not have similar chins or noses; others share only a chin; others share temperament but not physical features (1958, § 36). In the preceding section, Wittgenstein illustrates his position about family resemblances by using the example of games (1958, § 66). We cannot give a set of properties that are necessary and sufficient for something’s being a game, but game is still an important and useful concept with clear applications. If space permitted, it would be fruitful to analyze further the family resemblance metaphor. Both José Medina (2003) and Marilyn Frye (2011) provide useful work here (Frye includes as well Wittgenstein’s image in PI § 67 of a spun thread of twisted fiber on fiber). Shelley Park pointed out in discussion (FEAST 2009) that since families are formed in a variety of ways, we need not focus only on “resemblances.” I agree, and believe that Wittgenstein’s talk of families of cases or of meanings is consistent with this strategy. Remember, too, that family resemblance concepts are sometimes called “cluster concepts” by others.

27. Other feminists have used a Wittgensteinian analysis of woman or gender, for example, Jacob Hale (1996), Crescida Heyes (2000), Hilde Lindemann Nelson (2002), and Natalie Stoljar (1995) in addition to Frye and Medina (see note 26). Unfortunately, I cannot take time to differentiate the ways in which my view differs from each of theirs. Linda Zerilli uses Wittgenstein’s views in On Certainty to argue that feminists (and others) are held captive by a misleading picture of woman (1998). A “prescriptive” analysis is given by Alessandra Tanesi (1996). Concerning hierarchy, I am thinking of Sally Haslanger’s definition of woman (2000) that includes systematic subordination. (However, I differ from Haslanger in that I would make systematic subordination merely one factor in a family resemblance analysis; Haslanger incorporates it into necessary and sufficient conditions.)

28. Zack’s position is that “[a]ll women share the nonsubstantive, relational essence of being assigned to or identifying with the historical, socially constructed, disjunctive category of female birth designees, biological mothers,
or heterosexual choices of men—category FMP” (2005, 162). F=designated female at birth; M=biological mother; P=primary sexual choice of [heterosexual] men (2005, 8). Butler (1999) is among those offering a thorough-going critique of identity categories. An early “solidarity” approach is found in hooks (1984), and a recent one is in Carastathis (2008). An alternative strategy is Mikkola’s feminist politics can avoid definitions of “woman” and rely on our intuitions about the extension of “woman” (not the content of the concept) in order to explain on whose behalf feminists struggle (Mikkola 2009). Space does not permit engagement with the decades-long “essentialism” debate.

29. I was motivated to give this argument by comments of Alison Bailey.

30. Again, see Welkon 2006.

One other difference between Lugones’s view and mine is that I do not specifically focus on capitalism or the modern/coloniality of power in my characterization of intersectionality. They are obviously extremely important factors in oppression, ones to which we should all attend. Nevertheless, they are more central to Lugones’s ongoing decolonial feminist project than to my much smaller project here—to make intersectionality plausible and useful.

31. Alison Bailey points out that because intersectionality is very useful in everyday politics to advance the interests of women of color, they would not reject it as a tool simply because it sometimes falls into a logic of purity (email correspondence, August 28, 2009). Bailey suggests that a “curled up approach” can see intersectionality as both curled and pure. Lugones does, after all, see that the two logics co-exist (Lugones 2003, 126).

32. I cannot enter into a full discussion of any of the following: the extent to which metaphysics can influence politics, factors that increase or undermine empathy, or thorough explanation or critique of Zack’s argument (see Garry 2007, 2008a, 2008b for reasons to prefer my view to Zack’s). If I could pursue Zack’s claim (ii) here, I would start by noting the ways in which groups of women are, in fact, commensurable and that theorists can indeed go (and have gone) beyond their own group in constructing theories. I would also note that what promotes or undermines empathy is a complex empirical question. Metaphysics might well be relevant to it, but it is not likely to do all the heavy lifting! See Bailey’s critique of Zack on empathy (Bailey 2009). I particularly like Bailey’s statement, “It is not women’s relations to the FMP category that are important; it is women’s relationships to each other” (2009, 31). Note 28 above explains “FMP.”

33. Although the binary gender system needs critique, I am not undertaking it here. It is important to note that a family resemblance analysis can be used with more than two genders. Some transpeople reject an identity within the binary gender system at all. So do some lesbians, for example, Wittig (1992) and Cohnou (1994). However, family resemblance analyses that give no special place to women’s heterosexuality take away a principal reason that lesbians advocate opting out of the category woman. Intersexes have often been forced to adopt one of the binary gender identities.

34. Zack explicitly rejected my family resemblance analysis as a replacement for her own disjunctive nominal essences in remarks on a SWIP-sponsored panel on her book, Inclusive Feminism (2005), at the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division meeting in March 2005.

35. One might wonder about an issue that is beyond the scope of this essay. Do I want to extend a family resemblance analysis (or a family resemblance analysis within forms of life) to gender systems or class systems, or systems of race-class-gender-sexual orientation? Yes. I do not know a better way to think about their relation to each other than this. Sally Markowitz is currently considering an approach along these lines (n.d.).

36. Mikkola makes a similar point (2009). In general, I think one needs a very good reason to use language in a revisionary (non-ordinary) way when doing feminist theory. In addition, it is extremely difficult not to rely on ordinary usage (that is, to smuggle it in) to support one’s arguments. Although Lugones’s 2010 essay is beyond the scope of this chapter, it presents a stark challenge to ordinary usage. She states, “the semantic consequence of the coloniality of gender is that ‘colonized woman’ is an empty category: no women are colonized; no colonized females are women” (Lugones 2010, 745). She advocates care in using “woman” and “man,” wanting to “bracket them” when needed (2010, 749).

37. This point is somewhat modified from what I wrote in 2008: “Intersectionality need not multiply genders for each different ethnicity/race or social class; indeed, an intersectional analysis does not make sense if it does so. After all, gender, class, and race/ethnicity must intersect. The individual axes must have a least a minimal degree of stable meaning for the analysis to work. If every intersection produced a new gender or a new race (or both!), there would be no way to make sense of the ways in which ethnicity affects one’s gendered experiences” (2008, 616). This passage sounds misleadingly like “the logic of purity,” which I did not intend.

38. Lugones expressed this worry to me in conversation at NWSA 2009.

References


Hull, Gloria T., Patricia Bell-Scott, and Barbara Smith, eds. (1982). All the Women Are White, All the Blacks Are Men, but Some of Us Are Brave: Black Women's Studies. Old Westbury, N.Y.: Feminist Press.


Abortion, 7, 23, 53–54 n. 19, 180, 183, 245
right to, 33, 35, 38, 43–46, 50, 54 n. 21, 55 n. 28, 56 n. 31
Accommodation, 5, 18, 19, 24, 26, 29
Adaptive preferences, 75, 161
Affiliation, 457, 477, 483
Agency
assisted, 66
critical, 308, 325, 328, 330
and identity, 451, 475, 504, 515
shared, 60, 66, 67, 76, 77
theories of, 455, 500
Alcoff, Linda Martin, 353, 355
Allen, Paula Gunn, 507
Altemus, Margaret, 416
American Philosophical Association, 28, 165, 234, 525 n. 34
Anderson, Elizabeth, 5, 7, 11, 157, 161, 340, 365 n. 12, 366 n. 15, 422, 435, 443–445, 447 n. 8
Anderson, Pamela, 125
Analytic philosophers, 251, 435, 498
Analytic philosophy, 18–19, 253, 259, 290, 409, 421, 447, 454
Analytic philosophy of language, xi, 251
Analytic tradition, ix, 405, 436, 479
of feminist philosophy, 15
Annas, Julia, 135 n. 28
Anscombe, Elizabeth, 258
Anzaldúa, Gloria, 497, 505
Appiah, Kwame Anthony, 16, 461
Aristotle, 84, 186, 102, 118, 120, 128, 133 n. 6, 134 n. 11, 358, 479
Arnold, Benedict, 178
Ascription
and group-membership, 452
and identity, 474–476
Austin, John L., 218–220, 222, 224, 236–237 n. 11, 238 n. 17 and 20, 240 n. 30, 251–253, 258
Authority, epistemic, xii,
79 n. 17, 499
Auto-immune disorders, 407, 408, 415, 417
Autonomy, 10, 25–27, 65, 77, 78 n. 7, 219, 222, 231, 313, 520 n. 9