

The duality of non-conceptual content in Husserl's phenomenology of perception¹

MICHAEL K. SHIM

*Philosophy Department, Fordham University Bronx, New York, USA
(E-mail: mishim@fordham.edu)*

Abstract. Recently, a number of epistemologists have argued that there are no non-conceptual elements in representational content. On their view, the only sort of non-conceptual elements are components of sub-personal organic hardware that, because they enjoy no veridical role, must be construed epistemologically irrelevant. By reviewing a 35-year-old debate initiated by Dagfinn Føllesdal, I believe Husserlian phenomenology can be updated to offer an important contribution to this discussion. On my interpretation, what Husserl calls “hyletic data” may be read as that subjective quality of experience inarticulable as a propositional attitude – and, thus, hyletic data are non-conceptual. In anticipation of the recent conceptualist position, Føllesdal and his adherents argued that what Husserl had called “noema” or representational content is, however, entirely conceptual. A closer inspection of the relevant texts, however, reveals that Husserl admits non-conceptual elements into his characterization of the noema. If that is correct, then Husserl must have been a dualist about non-conceptual content. In turn, I believe what explains this dualism is a non-foundationalist reconstruction of Husserl's phenomenological reduction.

Key words: foundationalism, Husserl, hyletic data, noema, non-conceptual content

Introduction

With his highly influential 1969 paper, “Husserl's Notion of Noema,” Dagfinn Føllesdal ushered in a veritable sub-genre of phenomenology dubbed the “Fregean interpretation.” As expanded upon by David Woodruff Smith and Ronald McIntyre, proponents of the Fregean approach argue that what Husserl calls “noema” can best be made intelligible by interpreting it as “intension” (with an-*s*) or, as I prefer, “concept” (see Husserl 1952a, 1952b, pp.101–102). In light of a recent debate among some epistemologists over whether representational content should be construed as entirely conceptual or at least partially non-conceptual (*cf.* Brewer 1999; Kelly 2001a, 2001b; McDowell 1994/1996; Peacocke 2001; Sedivy 1996) a debate for which the Fregean interpretation of Husserl may be viewed as a rehearsal, I think it worthwhile to dust off this 35-year-old phenomenological discussion for review and reassessment.

In this paper, I want to, first, offer a critique of the Fregean interpretation with the claim that the noemata of perception (which are analogous to representational contents) are indeed themselves perceived.² In fact, on my reading, a perceptual noema just is what Husserl calls the “immanent” profile of an individuated object (for example, the front-side of a particular house). Second,

I will then show that that is why the semantic scheme offered by Smith and McIntyre cannot handle Husserl's theory of perception; and, third, proceed to the claim that Husserl, specifically in *his theory of perception*, was a dualist about non-conceptual content. In my view, when it comes to perception, Husserl allows for not only noetic non-conceptual content (that is, the so-called "hyletic data" or experiential *quale*) but noematic non-conceptual content as well.³ My conclusion is that Husserl allows hyletic data no veridical import, thus they are epistemologically *irrelevant*; however, noematic non-conceptual content does provide veridical brakes to the perceiver and is, therefore, epistemologically *relevant*.

If that is correct, I believe the phenomenologist would be exempt from having to confront what John McDowell has called the "anxiety" of choosing between a coherentism of the sort recommended by Davidson and what Sellars calls "the Myth of the Given" (McDowell 1994/1996). That is because noematic non-conceptual content would offer the desired "external constraint" without obligating the phenomenologist to offer an explanation of any putative causal interaction. However, in order to enjoy this exemption, it seems the phenomenologist must embrace the *epoché*, the method of phenomenological reduction. For it makes sense to speak of noematic non-conceptual content only if one can talk of noemata; and one cannot talk of noemata except under the phenomenological reduction.

Fulfilling sense

Føllesdal (1969) offers 12 theses on how the noema should be interpreted. In my view, the most revealing and important of these twelve theses is thesis-9, which reads: "Noemata are not perceived through the senses" (Føllesdal 1969, p. 684). This is because thesis-9 makes clear that Føllesdal intends no mere analogy between noemata and Fregean concepts, but seeks to assert an identity-thesis. Otherwise, little of Føllesdal's preceding theses would encourage the ascription to the noema of a characterization of concepts, namely that noemata cannot be perceived just as concepts cannot be perceived.

As a matter of fact, until thesis-9, all that Føllesdal does is offer similarities in functional roles between the Husserlian noema and the Fregean concept: for example, that the noema is distinct from the object, yet mediates our relationship to that object, and that the same object can be referred to by different noemata, and so on (Føllesdal 1969, pp. 682–683). But such similarities, even if obtained, would not suffice for thesis-9. The only further argument Føllesdal offers in support of his thesis-9 is the following: "all visible objects can be experienced only through perspectives. Since noemata. . . are not experienced through perspectives, they are hence not visible. Presumably, they are not perceived by the other senses either" (Føllesdal 1969, p. 684). But this argument

seems to assume the soundness of thesis-9. Indeed, the premise of this passage (“all visible objects. . .”) by itself just is the converse of thesis-9, which is what needs to be justified. So, if the passage were construed as a further argument for thesis-9, then the argument would be circular.

One problem with Føllesdal's interpretation is his close association of Frege's “*Sinn*” with what Husserl calls “*Sinn*.” Since Frege's *Sinne* are entirely conceptual, if the noemata should be entirely conceptual as well, noemata may just be *Sinne* in the Fregean sense. However, as J. N. Mohanty correctly points out, the terminological choice in Husserl that best corresponds to Fregean *Sinn* is what Husserl calls “*Bedeutung*” (Mohanty 1964 p. 17; also, Smith and McIntyre 1982a, 1982b, pp. 171, 176). Indeed, when the term *Bedeutung* is first introduced in the *Logische Untersuchungen*, Husserl's characterization reads like a commentary on Frege's conception of *Sinne* from “Über Sinn und Bedeutung.” For instance, *Bedeutung* is the propositional content expressed by linguistic signs, (Husserl 1984, pp. 30, 37–38), denotes an extension under which various instances of the concept should fall, (pp. 44–45, 52–54, 60), and diverse *Bedeutungen* can refer to the same object (p. 53). Most crucially, like Frege, Husserl thinks of *Bedeutung* as objective and independent of any *direct* influence by the noesis.⁴

In contrast, what Husserl then calls *Sinn* is saturated by noetic influence.⁵ Husserl writes that the “noematic sense. . . is different in kind in different kinds of lived experiences, [so that] what is given as common is at least diversely characterized. . . the noematic correlates are therefore nevertheless essentially different for perception, fantasy, image presentification [*Vergegenwärtigung*], memory, etc.” (Husserl 1950, p. 188). For present purposes, we may think of the noesis as the intentional mode by which the representational content is conceived, or that which gets articulated as a propositional attitude. For example, the verbs in the following sentence articulate the noesis: “I (remember, perceive, imagine) a centaur.” Typically, Husserl characterizes an instantiation of *Sinn* in the following ways: “the perceived *as* perceived *in* perceiving,” “the liked *as* liked *in* liking,” “the remembered *as* remembered *in* remembering,” and so on (for example, see Husserl 1950, pp. 184–189). According to Husserl, the substantive portions of such formulations articulate the “noematic sense” (for example, “the perceived *as* perceived”). The “*as*”-portions articulate the so-called “thetic quality” of the noema, and correspond to the “thetic-character” of the noesis (for example, “*in* perceiving”). In other words, the “thetic-character” of an intentional act posits a corresponding “thetic-quality” in the noema, thus subjecting that noema to the doxical modalizations of the noesis.⁶ And that would make Husserl's characterization of noematic *Sinn* especially un-Fregean, since for Frege, *Sinn* just is “thought” articulated by linguistic signs that can serve as the concept of definite descriptions (Frege 1962, esp. fn. 5). Indeed, Frege puts the matter quite tersely: “If thought [i.e., *Sinn*], which I express in the Pythagorean theorem, can be recognized as true

by others just like it is by me, then the thought does not belong to the content of my consciousness; though I am not its beholder and yet I can still recognize it as true” (Frege 1966, p. 42). For Frege, *Sinne* constitute “a third realm” distinct from both corporeal things and psychological “*Vorstellungen*” (Frege 1966, pp. 43–45). In short, Frege would never permit anything like the noesis to influence the content of *Sinne* as Husserl ostensibly does. Consequently, what Husserl calls *Sinne* cannot be construed equivalent to what Frege calls *Sinne*. Thus compatibility between Frege and Husserl on this point rests with Frege’s *Sinne* and Husserl’s *Bedeutungen*. So how did Husserl himself understand the difference between *Sinn* and *Bedeutung*?

Husserl introduces his own distinction in *Ideen I* §124 as follows: “We will attend exclusively to *Bedeuten* and *Bedeutung*. Originally, these words had only a relationship to the linguistic sphere, to that of ‘expression’ For the sake of distinctness, we want to reserve the word *Bedeutung* for this old concept, especially in the complex locution, ‘logical’ or ‘expressive’ *Bedeutung*” (Husserl 1950, p. 256).⁷ Accordingly, *Bedeutung* is reserved for the logical and conceptual component of the noema, whereas *Sinn* is applied “to the entire noetic-noematic sphere. . . thus to all acts, *regardless of whether these [acts] are entangled with expressive acts or not*” (Husserl 1950, 256; my italics). Based on the illustration Husserl then quickly furnishes, I think it safe to claim that by the highlighted clause Husserl means at least some non-conceptual content.

The illustration Husserl provides is as follows: “in perception, an object with a determined sense is monothetically placed in determined fulfillment [*Fülle*]” (Husserl 1950, pp. 256–257). The perceptual process (which I assume is exemplary of “the entire noetic-noematic sphere,” for which the application of the term *Sinn* has been reserved), Husserl then adds, “demands not in the least anything of ‘expression,’ neither in the sense of articulation, nor in the sense of linguistic meaning” (Husserl 1950, p. 257). But as soon as the content of the perceptual process is “thought” or “articulated,” “a new layer. . . bound with the purely perceptual ‘meant as such’” is introduced that lends expression to the entire perceptual process, which is then “lifted into the realm of ‘Logos,’ the conceptual and therewith the ‘universal’” (Husserl 1950, p. 257). Clearly, then, Husserl intends that conceptual layer of *Bedeutungen* to lie over and above the process of perception, which need not be entirely conceptual, since Husserl stipulates something distinct from that conceptual layer of *Bedeutungen*.⁸ From *Ideen I* §94, it can be safely inferred that such a conceptual “layer” of *Bedeutungen* just is what gets articulated by a “predicative judgment.” In this light, that conceptual layer of *Bedeutungen* may be interpreted as “judgment-noema” [*Urteilsnoema*] (Husserl 1950, p. 194). Just as predicates themselves are not perceived, but may be ascribed to the propositional subject based on perceived properties of the corresponding object, there is no reason to believe that the “judgment-noema” can be

perceived. Nevertheless, just as a predicate would not be construed exhaustive of the corresponding object, the judgment-noema need not be exhaustive of the corresponding perceptual noema either.

That, in the perceptual process, there should be some non-conceptual content involved is clear. The so-called “hyletic data,” the sensory “stuff” with which representational content is constituted, (Husserl 1950, pp. 204–205) just are non-conceptual (Husserl 1950, pp. 171–173). However, I think it also makes sense to say there is something non-conceptual about the noema itself in perception. I will offer some systematic reasons for what I claim is Husserl's dualism about non-conceptual content in the context of a contemporary discussion among some analytic epistemologists (see below). For the moment, I want to focus on one particular use of the term *Sinn* in Husserl that suggests such noematic non-conceptual content.

Husserl draws a distinction between two kinds of “content in the *objective sense*” (my italics): namely, “content as intending sense or as sense, meaning simpliciter,” and “the content of fulfilling [*erfüllender*] *Sinn*” (Husserl 1984, p. 57). Of this “fulfilling sense” Husserl writes

Where the meaning intention is fulfilled on the basis of a corresponding intuition, or when the expression in actual denomination is related to the given object, the object is constituted as “given” in a certain act, and moreover it is given to us in it. . . in the same way, in which the meaning is meant. In this unity between meaning and meaning fulfillment corresponds the meaning, as the essence of meaning, the correlative essence of the meaning fulfillment, and this is the *fulfilling*, and – as one can also say – that through the expression expressed, *sense* (Husserl 1984, p. 56).

Somewhat less abstrusely, Husserl explains what this fulfilling sense does.

We have in the *First Investigation* contrasted *Bedeutung* with *erfüllender Sinn*, in which we indicated that, in the fulfillment the object is intuitively given in the same way. . . We took that which coincides with the meaning, ideally conceived, as the *erfüllender Sinn* and said, through this coincidence the mere meaning-intention, namely the expression, wins reference to the intuitive object (Husserl 1984, VI, p. 625).

The contrast of this fulfilling sense (as opposed to the fulfilled or “*erfüllter Sinn*” [Husserl 1950, §136]) to conceptual *Bedeutung* is made clear when Husserl tells us that:

In the transition from a signitive [that is, the “empty” and merely conceptual] intention to the corresponding intuition we undergo not only a mere augmentation, like in the transition from a pale picture or a mere sketch to a fully vivid painting. Rather, the signitive representation lacks for itself any kind of fulfillment whatsoever. It is the intuitive representation that supplies [the fulfillment]; then, through the identification, incorporates [that fulfillment]. While the signitive intention merely ostends the object, the intuitive makes [the object] representational in the pregnant sense *by providing something from the fullness of the object itself* [*bringt etwas von der Fülle des Gegenstandes selbst*] (Husserl 1984, IV, p. 607).

In this light, the fulfilling sense is that which “*provides something from the fullness of the object itself.*” For the sake of illustration, let’s say I am talking to a friend of mine in the country, who suddenly points over my shoulder and exclaims, “Hey, look at that horse!” Insofar as I understand what he means, I have the concept of “horse” (say, for the sake of argument, in my head). However, this conceptual meaning or “ideal unity” is, according to Husserl, “empty” or “emptily intended” (see Husserl 1984, pp. 606–610; Husserl 1974, pp. 255–256). But as soon as I turn around and look at the horse, this empty meaning gets “filled out” by the fulfilling sense. Since the fulfilling sense is *objective* content and not subjective, it cannot be noetic and, thus, it cannot be equivalent to hyletic data. Thus, the fulfilling sense must be noematic. Because Husserl further distinguishes the fulfilling sense from “the content *as object*” (Husserl 1984, p. 57), the fulfilling sense cannot just be the perceptual object itself. Moreover, since distinguished from the conceptual *Bedeutung*, the fulfilling sense must be non-conceptual. I think, as applied “in the broadest way,” the term *Sinn* is often used by Husserl in this non-conceptual yet noematic sense, and is, I suspect, related to his uses of the term “*Sinnlichkeit*” or “sensibility” in the usual, non-conceptual way, though still distinguished from hyletic data. If it is right that that is how Husserl (at least sometimes) intends the term *Sinn*, that would make Husserl a dualist about non-conceptual content as I have been suggesting.

Singular concepts

In his 1969 paper, Føllesdal also claims: “To one and the same noema, there corresponds only one object” (Føllesdal 1969, p. 683).⁹ If that is correct, and noemata just are concepts, then noemata must be *singular* as opposed to *general* concepts. Traditionally, there are of course three sorts of individuating concepts: definite descriptions, proper names and indexicals. While Føllesdal himself is otherwise silent on this point, Smith and McIntyre offer interpretive approaches based on both the model of definite descriptions as well as that of indexicals like “this” or “that.” In my view, neither option can provide a satisfying interpretation of the noemata of perception. That is because the noemata of perception are typically too *fine-grained* to be adequately captured by either definite descriptions or even indexicals like “this.” In turn, that is because the noemata of perception are themselves perceived; indeed, perceptual noemata are all we ever perceive. And perception typically provides more information than exhaustible by concepts.

When introducing the definite description model of the noema in their 1971 paper, Smith and McIntyre write “The *Sinn* expressed by the description will be identical with the noematic *Sinn*” of the perceiver’s perception, “if, and only if, it picks out the object of the act exactly in accordance with

those aspects or respects which" the perceiver "perceives of the object – in short, the description must be synonymous with that description under which" the perceiver "perceives the object" (Smith and McIntyre 1971, p. 548). Meanwhile, in a revealing footnote, they concede "There are important qualifications to this claim" of linguistic exhaustibility "dealing for the most part with the richness and evidential "fullness" of sensory intuition. . . that without further modification . . . our present characterization of noemata is unable to account for" (p. 547, fn. 10). Some ten years later, the concession is even more baldly made: "the thesis does not claim that every Sinn has actually been expressed. *Nor does it claim that actually existing natural languages – or even humanly possible languages – are rich enough to express every Sinn*" (Smith and McIntyre 1982, p. 88). Then in *Husserl and Intentionality*, Smith and McIntyre admit that "perception," which is paradigmatic for Husserl of intentionality, "poses a special problem" for their definite description model of the noema.

The stress of their approach thus revealed can be traced, I think, to their unquestioning acceptance of Føllesdal's main thesis, namely, that noemata just are concepts. For instance, having just cited Husserl's distinction between *Sinn* and *Bedeutung* from *Ideen I* §124 (Husserl 1950) that I glossed, above, they write in their 1971 paper: "Husserl generalizes the notion of Sinn so that it is no longer exclusively (or even primarily) a linguistic notion." Yet, having just conceded that Husserl's *Sinn* is not "even primarily linguistic," they jump to the claim that "the noema of an act is the meaning (proposition) expressed by an appropriately constructed sentence describing that act," adding: "Every noema as a whole. . . is also in principle expressible linguistically." How can something that is not "exclusively" or "even primarily a linguistic notion" be exhaustively (i.e., "as a whole") "expressed linguistically"? The most obvious answer is that it cannot be.

To begin with, there is an important sense in which the only person who can report on the content of "the perceived as perceived" is the perceiver herself (compare: Peacocke 1992, pp. 67–74). That is, the conceptual content of the noema would be relative to the wealth of the perceiver's repertoire of perceptual concepts. If the conceptualist were correct, for a conceptually impoverished perceiver, the content of her perception could be restricted to a mere fraction of what may be available. For example, when encountering a castle, a perceiver lacking the concepts "battlement" and "brick" must be said to not perceive those features of the castle. But that would be implausible. Even if it cannot be said that she perceives those features *as such* without their corresponding concepts, she must still perceive something analogous to those features. On the conceptualist line, however, that plausible intuition would be placed at risk.

But I think a more serious objection is that the whole notion of a definite description was designed to pick out individual objects *in toto* with the

use of a cluster of generic concepts (sometimes involving singular terms like proper names¹⁰). But even Russell concedes that such clusters of concepts are ultimately based on acquaintance and cannot substitute an instance of acquaintance (see Russell 1959, pp. 48, 58; Russell 1985, pp. 53–55, 65–66; Russell 1948, pp. 87–93; Evans 1982, pp. 105–112). For instance, a description like “the person who discovered that water is H₂O” is definite; but when a perceiver should meet the reference of the description, the said scientific genius would (from any perspective) definitely be a lot more than the information the description (despite its success in singling him out) provides. As Hume aptly puts it: “All the colors of poetry, however splendid, can never paint natural objects in such a manner as to make the description be taken for a real landscape” (Hume 1988, p. 63). Feeling the stress faced by their definite description model, Smith and McIntyre retreat to modeling the noema on the semantics of indexicals.

Because Smith and McIntyre’s indexical model emerges from a somewhat eccentric interpretation of what Husserl calls “*der Gegenstand-X*,” (Husserl 1950, pp. 270–273) it is not very clear if they mean the indexical to ostend an abstract object stipulated analytically¹¹ as identical to itself, or the immanent profile of a perceptual object (Smith and McIntyre 1982, pp. 213–219). In any case, I will entertain both options.

If an indexical like ‘this’ or ‘that’ is used to stipulate reference to a putative object itself, then such an indexical would obviously ostend no particular noema. Regardless of whether or not they are perceived, Smith and McIntyre agree that a noema is singular and relative to the point of view of the perceiver. Consequently, it is agreed on all sides that no single noema can be construed as exhaustive of an entire three-dimensional object. If “that” is then stipulated to designate what cannot be exhausted by any particular noema, then “that” would designate *more* than any particular noema. Thus the noema would be more fine-grained than the conceptual content of “that” (entire object).¹²

If, instead, the “that” is used to designate a particular noema of perception, then whatever “that” ostends cannot be anything entirely conceptual. This is so simply because, on Smith and McIntyre’s own concession, a perceptual noema cannot be exhausted by a definite description. (And presumably, that would be the case even if Smith and McIntyre are correct, and the perceptual noema cannot be perceived.) So when used to designate a particular noema, what “that” ostends must be at least partially non-conceptual.

A possible rejoinder, as proposed by John McDowell (McDowell 1994/1996, pp. 56–60, 170–173) – though not entertained by Smith and McIntyre – might be to supplement an indexical like “that” with a generic concept like “red” or “shade.” The idea is to compensate for the poverty (relative to perceptual content) of one’s conceptual repertoire by allowing provisionally precise exploitation of whatever concepts one does possess. For instance, let’s

say I possess only the crude concepts “shade” and “red” for capturing all different shades of red. So, when seeing an Aston-Martin of an especially exotic shade of red I have never previously encountered, the desire for a more specific concept than I can muster from my conceptual repertoire may be provisionally satisfied by uttering “that shade (of red).” As McDowell acknowledges, however, the ability to articulate such a supplemented indexical may not be “recognizable as a conceptual capacity at all” without insisting “that the very same capacity to embrace a colour in mind can in principle persist beyond the duration of the experience itself” (McDowell 1994/1996, p. 57). Otherwise, one would be stuck pointing to the color of the Aston-Martin and saying, “That is that shade (of red).” Since the supplemented indexical is supposed to show off the conceptual content involved in perceiving the Aston-Martin, what would get rid of the circularity of the said proposition would remain non-conceptual. So the conceptualist will need to show how “that shade (of red)” may be detached from the reference to defuse the circularity otherwise than by appeal to non-conceptual content.

McDowell says the desired detachment can be achieved by memory. McDowell writes: “A person can retain a capacity to recognize things as having that shade, and while this recognitional capacity persists, possibly for quite a short period, the subject can embrace just that shade in thought” (McDowell 1994/1996, p. 172). If that should work out, when seeing the Aston-Martin for the second time, in saying “That is that shade (of red),” the second encounter tagged by “that” would be equated with “that shade (of red),” which would now be a concept expressive of the first encounter. So the circularity would be temporally defused while the identity-claim remains ostensibly preserved. Since “that shade (of red)” has been established as a concept, should the identity-claim be sound, the perception of “that” must have been conceptual all along (see Brewer 1999, pp. 152–154).

To preclude more obvious counterexamples, McDowell slaps on the following external constraint. The extension of “that shade (of red)” is restricted to instances that must preserve the identity-claim (McDowell 1994/1996, pp. 170–171). So if some perceived shade of red thought to be “that shade (of red)” turns out discriminable from “that shade (of red),” then the perceived shade of red would be excluded from the extension of “that shade (of red)”. That I would have thought the perceived shade of red was “that shade (of red)” is to be diagnosed as symptomatic of a “lapse” in the “putatively recognition-based conceptual capacity” (McDowell 1994/1996, p. 171).

I think the following counterexample resists suppression by this constraint. After the initial encounter with the Aston-Martin, I may turn around to walk away, thinking to myself: “My Subaru would look great in that shade (of red).” To make sure, I then turn around to look at the Aston-Martin again. At the second encounter, I may feel surprised or disappointed. On McDowell’s

account, this sense of surprise or disappointment should be construed a telltale symptom of a “lapse.” Nevertheless, if with the use of the provisional concept, I can pick out a match from a paint catalog at the body shop so that I can get my Subaru painted in “that shade (of red),” I should feel reassured of the reliability of my provisional concept. McDowell himself suggests such a criterion: the possession of such a provisional concept would be “like checking things for match in colour with, say, a paint manufacturer’s sample, except that here the sample is before an inner eye” (McDowell 1994/1996, p. 173).

In such cases of success, let’s say the provisional concept retained sufficed for my recognitional capacity to be “reminded” by encounter with the matching color chip. How might I be so reminded? Let’s say, when seeing the matching color chip, my recognitional capacity registers the surprise or disappointment undergone during the second encounter with the Aston-Martin. And this keeps on happening every time I encounter “that shade (of red),” so that surprise or disappointment becomes a reliable indicator of “that shade (of red).” What I am saying is that the sample of the original perceptual encounter need not be substitutable by the sample “before an inner eye”¹³ for the latter to count as concept for the former, so that the latter may be canonical without being exhaustive. For I think it still conceivable that, in a third encounter with the Aston-Martin, I will again feel surprise or disappointment¹⁴ even with the same provisional concept held before my “inner eye.” Yet it is the surprise or disappointment that gets me the match, since holding the provisional concept before my inner eye gets me neither surprised nor disappointed. In other words, provisional concepts like “that shade (of red)” may satisfy most criteria for qualification as a genuine concept and still fall short of McDowell’s constraint. On the Husserlian line, that would be because the conceivable discrepancy is not one between the provisional concept and the encounter (thus, to be diagnosed as a “lapse”), but one between the hyletic data with which I paint the provisional concept before my mind’s eye in memory, and the fulfilling sense of the noema itself in the encounter. Such hyletic-noematic discrepancy need not keep a provisional concept from remaining constant. Keeping with the Husserlian line, I think what is really going on in such cases described by McDowell is that a generic concept, simply “shade” or “red,” is used to retain the information of the original encounter, which I try to fill out with hyletic data (more on that below). And this can be understood in the classical sense, in terms of “vividness” or “vivacity” that distinguishes a perceptual encounter from the sort of mental photo that Professor McDowell calls “concept,” even though the provisional concept may be otherwise retained with constancy, so that a found match can always be determined by a “Hey, that is *that shade (of red)!*”

In summary, what slips out of a definite description, is finer-grained than a perceptual object picked out by an indexical, and even finer than what provisional concepts like “that shade” can freeze-frame, may be regarded as

what Husserl considers both non-conceptual and noematic. Before getting into a more detailed discussion of such noematic non-conceptual content, I want to defuse one last temptation offered by Smith and McIntyre.

Smith and McIntyre propose the so-called “thetic-quality” of the noema to serve the non-conceptual role that I have in mind (Smith and McIntyre 1982, pp. 130–133, 185–186). I do not think that can be the case. When one tracks Husserl’s use of this locution in *Ideen I*, the thetic-quality of the noema seems primarily to serve the function of referring the noema to an object [*Gegenstand*] that belongs to a putative transcendent “actuality.” Thus, Husserl speaks of a “thetic actuality” for the assumption that a perceptual object is really out there in nature above and beyond whatever side may be available to me at any given time (Husserl 1950, p. 183). That putative reference of a noema to an actual object, however, may be “questioned,” “doubted,” considered merely “probable,” (Husserl 1950, pp. 214–215, 233–234) “affirmed” or “negated” (Husserl 1950, pp. 218–219, 237) by further “thetic qualities” imposed or “posited” on that noema. In this light, we may think of the thetic-quality of a noema in analogy to a second-order predicate¹⁵: I affirm, deny, doubt, consider probable, and so on, the entire noema (thus with all its constituent properties) as it refers to a putative transcendent object. Accordingly, it seems likely that the term “thetic” is nothing more than the adjectival form of that “Thesis” whereby in the so-called “natural attitude” we simply presuppose an existent transcendent actuality (Husserl 1950, p. 94). In any case, such a thetic-quality would be a highly abstract and thoroughly conceptual component of the noema – or, more precisely, a quality of the entire noema. Consequently, the thetic-quality of the noema cannot be considered the non-conceptual component.

The duality of noema

What Husserl calls “hyletic data” are analogous to what contemporary philosophers call the “quale of experience” (see Block 1990, pp. 53–79) or what Thomas Nagel calls “the subjective character of experience,” (Nagel 1974, p. 436) the *what it is like* to experience anything at all.¹⁶ And, on any reading, hyletic data must be construed non-conceptual. Since they are considered noetic, (Husserl 1950, p. 175) hyletic data cannot enjoy articulation through the noematic conceptual layer of *Bedeutungen*. Since they have in themselves “nothing of intentionality,” hyletic data are only “sensual stuff” that must be animated by the noesis (Husserl 1950, pp. 172–173). However, when thus animated, hyletic data do contribute to the constitution of the noema. What I want to say is that when it comes to *perceptual* noemata, *and only perceptual noemata*, hyletic data alone would be insufficient to make up the non-conceptual content of the noema. And that is because, in his talk of “adumbration” [*Abschattungen*], (Husserl 1950, pp. 74–83, 202–205), Husserl

recommends veridical import to perception and, thereby, allows for something close to what McDowell calls “external constraint.”

To begin with, I think it makes sense to say “presentifications” [*Vergegenwärtigungen*¹⁷] of either memory or fantasy involve hyletic data but possess no veridical import. In remembering the house I used to live in, I can presentify an image of a red house in my head. The shape, the color and other physical details of that house must be “filled in” by hyletic data. Now let’s say I used to, in fact, live in a blue house and not a red house. There is, however, no veridical import to the presentifications of my memory until confronted by the corrective perception. Indeed, it is by virtue of the veridical import in perception that my memory can be judged mistaken and, thus, be corrigible at all. Similarly, there is no point talking about the veridical import in the presentifications of fantasy (in the ordinary sense of daydreaming or what Locke calls “reverie,” and not in the sense of synthetic *Einbildungskraft*, just in case *Einbildungskraft* contributes to perception [see Husserl 1980, pp. 16, 29, 85, 112, 150; Drost 1990, pp. 569–582]). If I am color blind, whenever I imagine a golden mountain, the color of that mountain may appear to *me* like the color of the ocean. Nevertheless, as far as I am concerned, I would still be imagining a golden mountain.

Borderline cases are, of course, dreams, hallucinations, perceptual errors, and the presentifications of the contents of other people’s mental processes (see Husserl 1959, p. 135). Let me start with the latter, what Husserl calls “empathy” [*Einfühlung*]. For our present purposes, the only relevant instances of presentifying the contents of other people’s mental processes are those pertaining to the intersubjective shareability of perceptual objects. According to Husserl, part and parcel of my constituting a three-dimensional object is the claim that, at least in principle, someone else can confirm my expectations about the perceptual object on the other side of that perceptual object (Husserl 1963, pp. 148–149; see also: Kojima 1978, pp. 61–66; Zahavi 1996, pp. 228–245). Thus, ultimately, I think such instances of presentification are parasitic on what I am calling the veridical import of perception. As for the other three instances, I want to claim this: when I am dreaming, hallucinating or perceptually deceived, I have mistakenly construed nothing more than hyletic data for the noematic non-conceptual content. Put another way, I have indeed constituted a noema, but what has filled in the noema thus constituted is nothing but hyletic data. In contrast, a perceptual noema offers additional non-conceptual content. Though non-conceptual, this noematic content does possess veridical import. Nevertheless, precisely because it is non-conceptual, this noematic content can serve no role in either explanation or justification. Moreover, if I am right, this noematic content has been disconnected from the “natural” world by the phenomenological reduction; and, consequently, though “given,” there would be nothing mythical about it since it could not

be invoked as a "cause." After all, under the reduction, the temptation to talk of any kind of causal interaction has been "suspended" along with the rest of the natural world.

To whet our intuitions, let me offer the following illustration.¹⁸ Let's say you and I are put in a blacked-out room and made to stare at a red dot projected against the wall. And one of us is a color-spectrum invert. That means, though conceptually normal, if you can get into my head, what I call "red" and what you would (also) call "red" would, however, appear to *you* green. Since people cannot get into each other's heads, however, neither one of us can be corrected by the other, nor even diagnosed as somehow "abnormal." Nevertheless, such an inversion is conceivable; or, in Husserlianese, the inversion can be *presentified*.

Given such a scenario, Husserl would say the following. Each of us constitutes the meaning of the same concept (that is, "red") correctly applied to determine the same object (that is, the dot) but with diverse hyletic data. And as long as we agree on the concept, there would be no dispute despite this conceivable hyletic difference. Without any friction, then, from either of our first person perspectives, based on *what it is like* to see red, the object is constituted as *looking* red. This would be a straightforward, and I think familiar, rendering of a frictionlessly idealistic version of what Husserl calls "constitution."

Now, let's say while we were asleep, our captors inserted a pair of spectrum-inversion contact lenses over the eyes of one of us. Next day, we would then have a dispute. Though hyletic data would now be the same, there would now be two competing concepts (that is, 'green' and 'red') determinative of the same object. That is, despite the identity in hyletic data between the two of us, one of us would now be wrong. But note well, this would be the case *regardless of which one of us is wearing the inversion lenses*. What makes either one of us wrong, then, cannot be hyletic data; since our hyletic data would now be in accord. It cannot be the competing concepts either, since their meanings would still be properly (in the frictionless sense) constituted. Therefore, what makes either one of us wrong must be "*something from the fulfillment of the object itself*." And that must be something noematic *and* non-conceptual.

If that is correct, it seems only perceptual sorts of noemata can possess non-conceptual content. As noted above, presentifications of memory and fantasy only require hyletic data since the issue of truth does not emerge except by recourse to perception. Husserl's own explanation can be cashed out in terms of adumbration vis-à-vis "disappointment" [*Enttäuschung*].

According to Husserl, I "pretend" a three-dimensional object through hyletic data once the object has been determined by a concept like "yellow." For instance, based on the yellow front-side of a banana, I am motivated by the determinative application of the concept "yellow" to the entire three-dimensional banana to project *what is it like for me* to experience yellow in anticipation of

the back-side just before that back-side shows up. However, when a discrepancy emerges between the hyletic data with which I pretend and the emergent perspective of the object (because, say, it turns out green), I am disappointed (Husserl 1966, pp. 26–29, 33–36, 65–67, 211). What friction compels me during disappointment to switch hyletic data from “yellow” to “green?” If I am right, what compels the switch is noematic non-conceptual content. Accordingly, what is missing in the Fregean interpretation is an account of what cannot be captured by either a definite description or an indexical, yet motivates self-corrective cognitive behavior.

I think the reason why non-conceptual noematic content should obtain in noemata of perception is simply because perceptual noemata can themselves be perceived. That is because the noemata of perception just are the immanent profiles of perceptual objects under the *epoche*. If so, then perceptual noemata must be all we ever perceive.

According to Husserl, there is a natural discrepancy in perception between what he calls “immanence” and “transcendence” (Husserl 1950, pp. 73–78, 80–83). What is immanent in perception is that profile of a perceptual object available to perception at T_1 ; in contrast, the transcendent is that profile unavailable at T_1 (Husserl 1950, pp. 80–83). For example, when I look at a McIntosh apple in my hand, the front-side of that apple is immanent, while the backside of the putatively identical object is transcendent. But by “immanence,” Husserl also wants to insist on something like this: the immanent profile of a perceptual object is a part of the perceiver’s “stream of consciousness,” along with other internal items like beliefs, imaginings, memories, moods, sensations, and so on, which are also considered immanent (Husserl 1950, pp. 85–87). Husserl’s famous (or infamous) methodological procedure, the “*epoche*” or the phenomenological reduction, is the proposal to restrict discussion of objects to their immanent profiles. Husserl’s justification on this point is straightforwardly Cartesian (Husserl 1950, pp. 85–87): we can be sure of such immanent items in a way we cannot be sure about the backsides of apples and the goings-on on the other side of the horizon.

After performing the phenomenological reduction in *Ideen I* §97, Husserl writes

[T]o the essence of the perceptual experience in itself belongs “the perceived tree as such,” namely the full noema, which is not touched by the exclusion. . . The color of the tree trunk, purely as perceptually conscious, is precisely “the same” as that which we took as that of the real tree before the phenomenological reduction. . . Now *this color*, set in parenthesis, *belongs to the noema* (Husserl 1950, p. 202).

Though one has, under the reduction, suspended judgments about the transcendent object of perception, the “color of the tree trunk” remains exactly “the same” as it did prior to the reduction. As Husserl says of the phenomenological

“residuum:” “we have, in fact, lost nothing;” (Husserl 1950, p. 94) we simply restrict our discussion to immanent data in the representational content. So if Husserl means by “this color” just that immanent color left over after the reduction, and “this color. . . belongs to the noema,” then we must perceive “this color” in the noema. So the noema must be perceived. Yet, Husserl continues, this color “does not belong as a real [*reelles*] component to the perceptual experience” (Husserl 1950, p. 202).¹⁹ Since if anything is not a real component of the perceptual experience then it can be neither noetic nor hyletic (Husserl 1950, pp. 180–183, 201–205), “this color” must be a “noematic or ‘objective’ color” (Husserl 1950, p. 202). Because “this color” is, nevertheless, perceived in the perception of the corresponding noema, and concepts cannot be perceived, “this color” cannot be conceptual. It is, therefore, non-conceptual yet noematic.

If so, then it may appear as though Husserl is subscribing to a kind of foundationalism; and that would seem to make Husserl subject to the Sellarsian critique of the “Myth of the Given.” Husserl appears to be saying that, in perception, one encounters a particular “anything whatever” [*Etwas überhaupt*] that compels us to say of it, that it “is *p*” or “is not-*p*,” based entirely on how the particular “looks” or “seems to be.” Since Husserl also (at this point, definitely) insists on non-conceptual noematic content, his vulnerability to such critique appears exacerbated. Content that is non-conceptual, thus lacking inferential linkage, thus “non-epistemic,” seems invoked as causal stimulant of inferentially viable propositions. And how that might happen in a conceptual vacuum, without further explanation (that is, a network of inferentially linked propositions) of the putative causal interaction itself, would have to count as symptomatic of Sellars’ “Myth.” As Sellars puts it, “if there is a logical dimension in which other empirical propositions rests on observation reports, there is another logical dimension in which the latter rest on the former” (Sellars 1997, p. 78). Or, in a similar vein, Davidson writes: “nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief. . . a causal explanation of a belief does not show how or why the belief is justified” (Davidson 2001, pp. 141, 143).

However, what Husserl calls “givenness” [*Gegebenheit*] is not straightforwardly foundationalist. In fact, I do not think Husserl would object to the claim that perceptual encounters must be mediated by a repertoire of supporting concepts. In *Experience and Judgment*, Husserl writes “When, in an act of judgment, one links on to a past judgment, this past judgment is therefore treated exactly as any substrate that enters into a predicative judgment as a subject, namely, as the object of simple apprehension. This implies that it must have been preconstituted as such and that this is the function of the preceding judgment” (Husserl 1973a, 1973b, p. 238). In *Formale und Transzendente Logik*, Husserl baldly claims that the *objects* of perceptual encounters serviceable as the reference of a judgment can “only be propositional

[*urteilsmäßig*]” (Husserl 1974, pp. 107, 69, 102). The suggestion, as Henry Pietersma points out, (Pietersma 2000, pp. 40–49) is an epistemic coheren-
tism: the reference of a belief is just another belief, inferentially mediated
over time by memory. After all, at no point has it been denied that the noema
is partially conceptual, that it bears a conceptual layer of *Bedeutungen* that,
when articulated, gets “lifted into the realm of ‘Logos,’ the conceptual and
therewith the ‘universal’.” The only question is whether that conceptual layer
of *Bedeutungen* is exhaustive of the noema. And we have so far seen that
Husserl resists the identity between the conceptual and the noematic, at least
when it comes to perceptual noemata.

Once articulated, that conceptual layer of *Bedeutungen* may be regarded as
a local explanans, which is not only buttressed by but also feeds back into an
extraneous battery of concepts pertaining to other noemata, of other objects
in other times and places (compare: Sellars 1997, pp. 43–45). According
to Husserl, such progressive circulation between local and global conceptual
economies informs the natural sciences and is governed by a “regulative idea of
reason” [*Zweckideen der Vernunft*] (see Husserl 1974, pp. 23, 48, 100; Husserl
1950, pp. 297–299; Husserl 1973b, p. 669). However, since premised only on
the principle of coherence, (Husserl 1974, pp. 48, 52, 59, 168) not even such
a grandiose regulative idea can ward off suspicions of relativism. After all,
historically, there have been instances of internally coherent scientific theories
(for example, the Keplerian paradigm) that have collapsed under the weight
of the world. So the desire for “external constraint” remains.

What I have been claiming is that, in response to this desire, Husserl
offers noematic non-conceptual content. But here is the catch: the natu-
ral sciences emerge from the so-called “natural attitude,” whereas noematic
non-conceptual content is registered in the “phenomenological attitude.” The
epoche imposes a sharp segregation between these two ways of regarding the
world. Accordingly, just because noematic non-conceptual content should be
manifest in the phenomenological attitude does *not* warrant its invocation to
justify a belief held in the natural attitude. Just because something *looks red*
does not entail that anything *is red*. But in the natural attitude, we want to
say that something *is*, in fact, *red*. A foundationalist would say that some-
thing *is red because something looks red*. But, because of the segregationism
entailed by the *epoche*, the phenomenologist does not, indeed *cannot*, say
that. Instead, what would justify such a claim about a putative transcendent
object (that is, something *is red*) in the natural attitude are just other beliefs
and propositions, reinforced by the capacity to recognize red things under the
right conditions, memories of past success under similar circumstances, as
well as the conceptual ability to invoke such conditions and circumstances to
further strengthen the justification. What cannot feed into such a conceptual
economy is non-conceptual content “*constituted*” or *construed as immanent*,
thus no longer construed as the property or the quality of any *thing* in the

transcendent world at all. So, to give into the acute temptation of the empirical foundationalist to invoke the bald *looking red* to justify the inferentially viable proposition "*S is red*," would be for Husserl a kind of categorical mistake.

By the same token, the phenomenologist *cannot* seek out a causal explanation of representational content (Husserl 1952, pp. 288–297, 343–344, 356–358). More favorably phrased, the phenomenologist is *not obligated* to offer an explanation of a putative natural causal process, since she has "bracketed" such a causal process from the scope of phenomenological relevance. So even if there should be non-conceptual content in perception, its veridical import for phenomenology will not be parasitic on the claim of any casual impingement. Similarly, the empirical psychologist would be obligated to explain Husserl's noetic non-conceptual content, or hyletic data, as the wiring of sub-personal organic hardware. But such an explanation would also have to count as a theoretical construct of the natural attitude, thus also excluded from the phenomenological purview.

If my interpretation is correct, then it seems the phenomenologist would be exempt from confronting the choice between what McDowell calls "a frictionless spinning in a void" and "the Myth of the Given." If so, then the phenomenologist may be able to provide an alternative to McDowell's startling view that there is no non-conceptual content to perception or, conversely, that "the content of experience is conceptual" (McDowell 1994/1996, pp. 25, 28, 34, 40–41, 46–65; McDowell 1998, pp. 451–470). The phenomenologist's response would be that the choice is one forced only in the natural attitude. In the phenomenological attitude, however, since the very notion of a causal interaction has been "suspended" by the *epoche*, there would be nothing causal to explain at all. Instead, there is a duality of non-conceptual content, frictionless on the noetic side (hyletic data) but veridically stubborn on the noematic side. And it is this veridical stubbornness that provides us with something like the desired "external constraint." Since, however, the noematic non-conceptual is not inferentially viable, it cannot figure into an explanation or a justification sought for the empirical propositions of the natural attitude. Yet it is there, frustrating while tempting the very philosophical desire it should have satisfied.

Conclusion

The Fregean interpretation cannot be correct since the noema need not be entirely conceptual. The noema need not be entirely conceptual because some noemata (namely, the perceptual sort) are, in fact, perceived, and non-conceptual content obtains in perception. On my interpretation, Husserl not only allows for noetic non-conceptual content, but noematic non-conceptual

content as well. Since the claim that, there is noematic non-conceptual content, amounts to the claim that there is something non-conceptual about representational content, I have channeled Husserl to respond to some more recent conceptualist objections. On the Husserlian line, the search for veridical brakes beyond the confines of an internally coherent theoretical system cannot be satisfied without egress from the natural attitude. However, the restriction of discussion to immanence in the phenomenological attitude forbids invocation of such veridical brakes in justifying the coherent theoretical system of naturalist explanations. Accordingly, instead of either a coherentism or a foundationalism, Husserl seems to wind up advocating a kind of cognitive segregationism between beliefs on the one hand and, on the other, the living through of experiences [*Erlebnisse*].

Notes

1. An earlier version of this paper was delivered at Fordham University on the occasion of the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Husserl Circle. I am grateful to Prof. Steven Crowell who, in his capacity as respondent, offered incisive and helpful commentary. I also thank Prof. John J. Drummond for organizing the meeting, and all those present during my talk; as well as two anonymous reviewers for *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, who offered helpful questions and comments.
2. Thus, in many ways, my interpretation is revisionary of the one by Aron Gurwitsch in *The Field of Consciousness* (Gurwitsch 1964, pp. 228–279, 231–234, 275–279). Incidentally, even some detractors of Føllesdal's views seem to agree that noemata are never perceived. For example, see (Langsdorf 1984, p. 776).
3. A similar view has been suggested by Donn Welton. See Welton (1983, pp. 126–127, 180–183, 204–211). Welton, however, addresses this issue in terms of the “concrete noema.”
4. That is how I am taking Husserl's talk of “ideal unity” in Husserl 1984, p. 49.
5. On the inextricable correlation between noesis and noema, see: Husserl 1950, pp. 189, 193 and 265.
6. For Husserl's uses of the term “thetic,” see Husserl 1950, pp. 183, 214, 229, 233–237, 242–243, 258, 268, 279, 289, 321. Based on these passages, I think it safe to claim that Husserl's uses of the term “thetic” relate to what he calls the “thesis of the natural attitude” (Husserl 1950, p. 94): the assumption that there are independently existent objects in the natural world. Accordingly, the thetic-character of an act is that component of an act that pertains to the assumption that the object of the act is either actual or problematizes that assumption. The noematic correlate of the thetic-character of the act, Husserl then calls the “thetic quality” (Husserl 1950, p. 268).
7. Føllesdal cites this passage as well in support of his interpretation; then again in Føllesdal 1990, pp. 268–269.
8. An interesting analysis of this particular passage can be found in: Brown 1990, p. 66; and, Brown 1991, pp. 59–60. To the extent that Brown emphasizes the priority of non-conceptual content in Husserl's theory of perception (Brown 1990, pp. 65, 68–69), I am very sympathetic. However, the connectionist model based on Cussins' with which Brown proposes to channel Husserl's theory of cognition is somewhat suspect, since, as Brown himself admits: “Husserl's firm conviction that the interesting aspects of cognition are consciously accessible and, given proper methodological constraints, can be described in

phenomenological reflection" would be incompatible with that "the structures of cognition which make their way into cognitive science models are theoretical constructs" (Brown 1990, p. 71).

9. Though I find Føllesdal's claim plausible on exegetical grounds, I myself have not found any passage where Husserl explicitly says this about the *noema*. Systematically, however, even if Husserl should have maintained such a position, I think a counterexample can be conceived. A possible counterexample might be this: your head is fixed at a certain angle to the back of a chair, and you are made to stare at metallic ball-A, whose front-side is (on my reading) the noema. At some point, you are blindfolded and metallic ball-A is replaced by metallic ball-B that, as far as you could tell, would look exactly the same as ball-A. In such a scenario, wouldn't the noema (a) be identical and, yet (b) refer to two different objects? Donn Welton has offered an interesting attempt to defuse such counterexamples by introducing temporal constraints (see Welton 1983, pp. 221–228). Once one introduces temporal constraints, as Welton suggests, even if you were looking at the same metallic ball at T_1 and T_2 , there would be involved two different noemata. Though each would refer to just the one and same metallic ball, even if otherwise identical, the noemata would be distinguished from one another by diversity in temporal indexicals. To best appreciate Welton's "genetic account," it is important to keep in mind that Husserl's conception of the "Now" is *not* like the frame of a Bergsonian film reel, thus vulnerable to the Hegelian critique of temporal indexicals. Instead, the Husserlian "Now" is partially submerged in the past and partially projected into the future. Thus, one can say that the noema of ball-A at T_1 would already be in the process of sinking into the past by the time noema of ball-B comes into the picture at T_2 . But on such a stripped down model, an overlap between noemata of ball-A and ball-B might be conceivable, in which case the noema of the temporal overlap may refer, at least partially, to both ball-A and ball-B. My point is simply this: even with a 'temporally extended' conception of the noema, it seems hard to come up with a consistent rule to draw the line between two noemata with the exact same representational content except, perhaps, by introducing an externalist model of representational content, whereby the identity of a particular noema is bound to a temporal indexical. Nevertheless, generally under normal circumstances, a noema should refer to just the one object.
10. Which on Russell's view can be translated into finer definite descriptions.
11. That is, if an "anything whatever" [*Etwas überhaupt*] at all, then must be identical to itself and cannot bear contradictory predicates. See Husserl 1974, pp. 128, 168, esp. 271–272. From these passages, I am afraid Husserl is dogmatic about this bit of rationalism.
12. Something like this seems to be what Gurwitsch has in mind with his talk about a "system of noemata" making up an object (Gurwitsch 1964, pp. 184, 223). In further support of Gurwitsch's interpretation, see: Husserl 1950, pp. 72, 75, 88–89. Smith and McIntyre challenge this interpretation (Smith and McIntyre 1982, p. 158), which in my view is quite sound.
13. I am guessing this odd formulation relates to the subjective or first person quality of possessing such sensational concepts, as McDowell suggests: "what is in question is accounts of what it is to possess concepts" (McDowell 1994/1996, p. 167).
14. I am not talking about the disparity in contours between an Aston-Martin and a Subaru that may better dramatize the color, since I can feel the same surprise or disappointment looking at my newly painted Subaru. On the former, "object-dependence" of secondary qualities like colors as what exhibits non-conceptual content, see Kelly 2001a, 2001b, pp. 606–608.
15. Canonically, for Gassendi, Frege and Russell, "existence" would be such a second-order predicate, a predicate of predicates.

16. At least one advantage of reading hyletic data as analogous to experiential quality is that it helps Husserl avoid the critical accusation of constructivism as directed by Merleau-Ponty (1962, pp. 3, 9, 27–34); an accusation sharply channeled in: Bell 1990, 174.
17. Usually translated in English as “presentation” or “presentification,” *Vergegenwärtigung* is when one makes available by imagination an image either no longer available (memory) or has never been but can be available (fantasy), or cannot be available because inaccessible (someone else’s first-person perspective). Accordingly, it is very analogous to McDowell’s talk of holding a “sample before an inner eye.” I will use the terms “presentification” and “presentify” in the following.
18. The following illustration is stylized from Shoemaker 1981, pp. 357–381; and Block 1990.
19. For a thorough discussion of this claim, see Banchetti 1993, pp. 81–95.

References

- Banchetti, M. P. 1993. Føllesdal on the notion of the noema: A critique. *Husserl Studies* 10: 81–195.
- Bell, D. 1990. *Husserl*. London: Routledge.
- Block, N. 1990. Inverted earth. *Philosophical Perspectives* 4: 53–79.
- Brewer, B. 1999. *Perception and Reason*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Brown, C. S. 1990. Husserl, intentionality, and cognitive architecture. *Southwest Philosophy Review* 6(1): 65–72.
- Brown, C. S. 1991. Problems with the Fregean interpretation of Husserl. *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 22(1): 53–64.
- Davidson, D. 2001. A coherence theory of truth and knowledge. *Subjective, Objective, Intersubjective*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Drost, M. 1990. The primacy of perception in Husserl’s theory of imagining. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 1(3): 569–582.
- Føllesdal, D. 1969. Husserl’s notion of noema. *The Journal of Philosophy* 66: 680–687.
- Føllesdal, D. 1990. Noema and meaning in Husserl. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 50(Suppl.): 263–271.
- Frege. 1962. Über Sinn und Bedeutung. In: G. Patzig (ed), *Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck.
- Frege. 1966. Der Gedanke. In: G. Patzig (ed.), *Logische Untersuchungen*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck.
- Evans, G. 1982. *The Varieties of Reference*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Gurwitsch, A. 1964. *The Field of Consciousness*. Pittsburgh: Dusquesne.
- Hume. 1988. *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*. La Salle: Open Court.
- Husserl. 1950. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Band I: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie. In: W. Biemel (ed), *Husserliana* III. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Husserl. 1952a. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie II: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution. In: M. Biemel (ed), *Husserliana* IV. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Husserl. 1952b. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie Book III: Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften. In: M. Biemel (ed), *Husserliana* V. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Husserl. 1959. Erste Philosophie II: Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion. In: R. Boehm (ed), *Husserliana* VIII. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

- Husserl. 1963. Cartesianische Meditationen. In: S. Strasser (ed), *Husserliana* I. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Husserl. 1966. Analysen zur Passiven Synthesis. In: M. Fleischer (ed), *Husserliana* XI. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Husserl. 1973a. In: J. S. Churchill and K. Ameriks (trans), *Experience and Judgment*. Evanston: Northwestern.
- Husserl. 1973b. *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*. In: I. Kern (ed), *Husserliana* XV. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Husserl. 1974. *Formale und Transcendentale Logik*. In: P. Janssen (ed), *Husserliana* XVII. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Husserl. 1980. *Phantasie, Bildbewußtsein, Erinnerung*. In: E. Marbach (ed), *Husserliana* XXIII. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Husserl. 1984. *Logische Untersuchungen Zweiter Band*. In: U. Panzer (ed), *Husserliana* XIX/1–2. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Kelly, S. D. 2001a. The non-conceptual content of perceptual experience: situation dependence and fineness of grain. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 62(3): 601–608.
- Kelly, S. D. 2001b. Demonstrative concepts and experience. *The Philosophical Review* 110(3): 397–420.
- Kojima, H. 1978. The potential plurality of the transcendental ego of Husserl and its relevance to the theory of space. In: Nitta and Tatematsu (eds), *Analecta Husserliana*, VIII. Dordrecht: Reidel.
- Langsdorf, L. 1984. The noema as intentional entity: A critique of Føllesdal. *The Review of Metaphysics* 37: 757–784.
- McDowell, J. 1994/1996. *Mind and World*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard.
- McDowell, J. 1998. Having the world in view: Sellars, Kant, and intentionality. *The Journal of Philosophy* 95(9): 431–490.
- Merleau-Ponty. 1962. In: C. Smith (trans), *Phenomenology of Perception*. London: Routledge.
- Mohanty, J. N. 1964. *Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Nagel, T. 1974. What Is It Like To Be A Bat? *The Philosophical Review* 83: 435–450.
- Peacocke, C. 1992. *A Study of Concepts*. Cambridge, MA: MIT.
- Peacocke, C. 2001. Does perception have a nonconceptual content? *Journal of Philosophy* 98: 239–265.
- Pietersma, H. 2000. *Phenomenological Epistemology*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Russell. 1948. *Human Knowledge*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Russell. 1959. *The Problems of Philosophy*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Russell. 1985. *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*. La Salle: Open Court.
- Sedivy, S. 1996. Must conceptually informed perceptual experience involve non-conceptual content? *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 26: 413–431.
- Sellars, W. 1997. *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard.
- Shoemaker, S. 1981. The inverted spectrum. *The Journal of Philosophy* 74 (7): 357–381.
- Smith, D. W. and McIntyre, R. 1971. Intentionality via intensions. *Journal of Philosophy* 68: 541–561.
- Smith, D. W. and McIntyre, R. 1982a. *Husserl and Intentionality*. Dordrecht: Reidel.
- Smith, D. W. and McIntyre, R. 1982b. Husserl's identification of meaning and noema. In: H. Dreyfus (ed), *Husserl: Intentionality and Cognitive Science*. Cambridge, MA: MIT.
- Welton, D. 1983. *The Origin of Meaning*. The Hague: Nijhoff.
- Zahavi, D. 1996. Husserl's intersubjective transformation of transcendental philosophy. *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 27: 228–245.