
In *The Terror Presidency*, Jack Goldsmith, a Harvard Law School Professor, offers insight into the Bush administration’s terrorism policies from the point of view of the head of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), a post he held for nine months. He portrays the internal struggles of the administration, primarily through the tension between their obligation to prevent another 9/11 and to avoid having criminal charges brought against them. He was critical of the administration; not for their controversial actions, but for the way they legitimized these actions. Goldsmith maintains that the administration was so fixated on expanding presidential power that they disregarded the historical examples of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Abraham Lincoln’s presidencies that could have cautioned them against their unilateral approach. As a result, he argues, the Bush administration left the presidency weaker than before taking office.

Goldsmith emphasizes that he is a conservative lawyer, who often agreed with Bush’s policies, but soon after he became head of the OLC, he found that many of the legal opinions the administration was relying on, particularly around “enhanced interrogation,” were inherently flawed. He describes these as bad law, not bad policies. Goldsmith withdrew many of the existing legal opinions, something that had never been done before, and replaced them with stronger ones that would not restrict the President’s powers, but was only able to do so after arguments with David Addington, Chief of Staff to Dick Cheney, the Vice President.

Throughout the book, Goldsmith describes Addington and Cheney as holding an idiosyncratic view of the presidency, which fueled the approach of the entire administration. They believed that post-Watergate and post-Iran-Contra, the powers of the presidency had eroded, and wanted to restore the office to what they believed it should be. Goldsmith claims that when anyone recommended that Bush go to Congress to put policies on a stronger legal foundation, Addington asked why they were trying to give away the President’s power. Goldsmith contends that this unilateral approach vastly differs from the way Lincoln and Roosevelt governed. Goldsmith shows through his comparisons with Lincoln and Roosevelt that it is not out of the norm for presidential powers to be expanded during times of crisis, but unlike his predecessors, Bush did not work with members of the other party, Congress, or the American people on his most controversial polices.
Although much of the information in the book was already public knowledge, Goldsmith’s perspective departs drastically from the popular discourse around the Bush administration’s relationship with the law. Whereas the administration was often portrayed as acting in disregard to the law, he describes a hypersensitivity to the law that, at times, bordered on obsession. From Goldsmith’s account, it seems as though every time the law “restrained” the administration, the administration depended on lawyers to redefine the laws. This is consistent with Addington’s statement that the administration acted in the manner they saw fit until a “larger force” stopped them, and this “larger force” rarely did (126). Instead of accepting the domestic and international laws around torture, the administration became obsessed with changing the definition of torture so that the administration could approve the “enhanced interrogation” techniques. The administration used OLC opinions to ensure that they would not be prosecuted, and were not concerned with the quality of the opinions because it would be difficult to prosecute anyone who was acting under one.

Even Goldsmith, despite his repeated use of history to justify many of the events, believed that 9/11 was a new starting point and that everything before this event could not apply because we were in unprecedented times, became distressed by the Bush administration’s view of presidential powers. While Goldsmith emphasizes the administration’s desire to avoid another terrorist attack, he concedes that it led to a situation in which lawyers became policy makers. However, the rest of his book illustrates that the administration was also afraid of losing power. In other words, the administration appeared more obsessed with the idea of potential prosecution and not giving away any of the President’s power than actually securing the country. Goldsmith’s account provides an illuminating glimpse into the legal policies and motivations of the Bush administration, which would be a valuable asset for any contemporary historian interested in the War on Terror.

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Since the publication of the genre’s first academic history in 1968, Bill Malone’s canonical *Country Music, U.S.A*, the historiography continues to grow more sophisticated. Diane Pecknold’s new essay collection on the African American presence in country music and a forthcoming