Marketing *Latinidad*: *La Luz* and *Nuestro’s* Search for a Latino Market in the 1970s

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In the 1970s Daniel T. Valdes and Daniel M. López founded the first “national” general interest magazines for all “Hispanic” or “Latino” groups in the United States.\(^1\) In its first edition in April 1972, Valdes’s Denver-based *La Luz* (The Light) boldly announced on its cover the birth of “The First National Monthly Magazine: Serving Ten Million Hispanos in the U.S.A.,” emphasizing both its intent to reach all Hispanics and its pioneering role in doing so.\(^2\) Also, according to Valdes, “McGraw-Hill executives” had recommended that, “it would

\(^1\) Scholars have identified various problems with using the labels “Hispanic” and “Latino” to encompass all Latino groups in the United States. I will not privilege one label over another, especially since the magazines under study used both labels, thus I will use the labels “Hispanic” and “Latino” interchangeably throughout this article. A later section in this paper provides an analysis on the usage of Latino/Hispanic labels and some of its implications.

\(^2\) *La Luz*, April 1972, cover page. *La Luz*’s estimate of the total number of Hispanos that it served changed constantly, for example, in this same issue in its “Publisher’s Statement” column, Valdes claimed that *La Luz* served “this country’s eleven to twelve million Hispanos,” and not the ten million that the magazine claimed in its cover. Daniel T. Valdes, Publisher’s Note, *La Luz*, April 1972, 7. This discrepancy is partially explained by reports that the 1970 U.S. Census undercounted the Hispanic population by a large margin. An official report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights indicated in 1974 that Hispanics had been undercounted by “at least 7.7 percent,” compared to 1.9 percent undercount for whites. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Counting the Forgotten: The 1970 Census Count of Persons of Spanish Speaking Background in the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1974), 2 and 47.
be better for *La Luz* if it were all in Spanish.”³ Valdes and his associates disregarded McGraw-Hill’s advice because they believed that the use of the English language added to the novelty of the magazine.⁴ Exactly five years later, in April 1977, New York-based López’s *Nuestro* (Ours) also claimed to publish the “first” national Latino magazine. In *Nuestro*’s premier issue, López declared that *Nuestro* represented the “first national magazine for Latinos.”⁵ López knew of *La Luz*’s existence from his own experience of providing the cover artwork for *La Luz* when he owned the Washington D.C.-based graphic firm, Nuestro Grafico.⁶ Moreover, in April 1977, the *New York Times* reported that “[u]nlike all other publications aimed at this [Latino] market … Nuestro will be virtually entirely in English.”⁷ But, that too, had already been done by *La Luz*. *Nuestro*’s disregard of *La Luz*’s earlier claims of being the “first” national magazine for Hispanics suggests the problems *La Luz* faced in consolidating a national consumer market, which *Nuestro* also confronted.

The publishers of these magazines had contrasting backgrounds. Daniel T. Valdes, *La Luz*’s publisher, born in Alamosa, Colorado in 1916,⁸ described himself as a “descendent of the 17th Century colonizers of New Mexico.”⁹ Valdes received a Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Colorado in 1964 and served as dean of Humanities at the Metropolitan University in Denver.¹⁰ In the 1940s and 1950s, Valdes held a number of leadership positions in the New Mexico and Colorado chapters of the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC).¹¹ On the other hand, Daniel López, a 37-year-old

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⁴ Ibid.
¹¹ Daniel T. Valdes, From the Publisher, *La Luz*, May 1977, 2. For LULAC’s politics, see introduction of Ernesto Chávez, *My People First! “¡Mi Raza*
“Chicagoan of Mexican-American parentage” occupied Nuestro’s publisher’s position. López earned a degree in chemistry from the University of Chicago, but changed career paths by earning a degree in business administration from George Washington University. After college, López, “worked as a salesman, and was later a marketing and advertising manager in the graphic arts field.” Valdes and López’s different backgrounds, including their generational gap and educational careers influenced their magazines’ management decisions. Despite their distinct business strategies however, both publishers claimed that their magazines represented a business opportunity as well as a space for Latinos to demonstrate their emerging national influence.

Historians of American consumerism and advertising have analyzed the connection between the rise of the consumer market and democratic rights. Roland Marchand contends that the advertising industry, through its representations of the American Dream promised "new and satisfying forms of individualism and equality," in a changing and modern society. By using the political analogy of "citizenship," elaborates Marchand, advertisers excluded “disenfranchised groups,” such as African Americans, whose insufficient buying power barred them from the "consumer republic." Building on Marchand’s work, Lizabeth Cohen claims that American consumerism served women and African Americans, albeit with limitations, as a platform to make demands for social and economic equality. According to Cohen in “the New Deal and World War II eras” women assumed a “citizen consumer” role to publicly voice their demands for government intervention in the “Consumers’ Republic.”

Scholars of African American history have argued that the consumer power of African Americans has supported their claims to democratic rights. Robert E. Weems contends that African Americans’ boycotts of mass consumer products and services in the 1960s proved

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13 Ibid.
15 Ibid., 64.
essential in their successes during the Civil Rights Movement. Jason Chambers argues that in the 1960s, an emerging cohort of African American professional advertisements created "positive or … accurate representations" of African Americans in advertising, which helped them assume their role as “equal consumers and equal citizens.”

M.M. Manring historicizes the image of the mass consumer product “Aunt Jemima” to analyze its ideological appeal, as a white-created image of the black mammy in the "Old South." Manring maintains that this ideological construction of Aunt Jemima has served African Americans as a basis for political protest in the twentieth century.

Mexican-American history scholars have examined Mexican American’s adoption of unique ethnic identities and political strategies to counter racial discrimination or to adapt to American society. John-Michael Rivera argues that Mexican American writers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries created their “Mexican-American” identity through popular magazines’ "stories of Mexican peoplehood.” These stories, Rivera claims, undermined the "contradictory logic of American democratic culture," which discriminated against Mexican Americans, despite their political status as American citizens. George Sánchez argues that during the 1920s and 1930s Mexican immigrants adopted "a new identity as ethnic Americans," thus rejecting a Mexican nationalist or assimilationist identity in their process of adaptation to American society in Los Angeles. Sánchez maintains that Mexican Americans transformed their ethnic identity through their role as “American consumers.”

George Mariscal asserts that in the Chicano Movement, radicalized

20 Ibid., 154.
22 Ibid.
24 Ibid., 11.
Chicanos drew on a “heterogeneous ideological field” to frame their claims for social justice.\textsuperscript{25} Thus, while some Chicanos embraced militant politics, drawing on the revolutionary image of Ernesto “Che” Guevara,\textsuperscript{26} others preferred César Chávez’s non-violent form of protest.\textsuperscript{27}

Mexican-American history scholars’ emphasis on anti-discrimination political activism has largely left unexamined Latinos’ “consumer activism” during the 1970s. As historians of consumerism and advertising have argued, especially in the African American context, disenfranchised groups have used their consumer power to demand social and economic equality. Building on this historiography, this article asks the following questions: what type of obstacles did \textit{La Luz} and \textit{Nuestro}, the “first” two national Latino magazines in the United States encounter in building a national Latino market, and how did they represent major Hispanic groups as one cohesive group? In answering these questions, this article shows these magazines framed their claims for a Latino national market—which they associated with Latinos’ progress towards social equality—around Latinos’ substantial consumer power in the 1970s. Latinos’ consumer activism, at least the one exerted by these two magazines, did not take the form of boycotts or street demonstrations, it nonetheless helps us understand Latinos’ engagement with a particular form of consumer activism in the 1970s.

There are several benefits in using \textit{La Luz} and \textit{Nuestro} to shed light on Hispanics’ efforts at consolidating a national Latino market. First, in the 1970s the Hispanic print and television media remained limited to regional and local areas, thus these magazines provide an opportunity to examine the ways in which Hispanics explicitly stated their goals of creating a “national” Latino market that included all major Latino groups in the United States. In addition, \textit{La Luz} and \textit{Nuestro} are particularly useful because mainstream American media largely ignored the Hispanic population, thus these magazines provide a window into how Hispanic people viewed themselves as a distinct, and emerging national ethnic market. The lack of sources on Latinos’ opinions about these magazines prevents us from knowing the influence that these magazines had on the general Latino population. For the purposes of this article however, the average Latino response is not essential, I focus on these magazines' attempts to secure a national

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 97-99.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 155.
market and the public discourse that emerged from these efforts. I analyze articles and editorials from *La Luz* between 1972 and 1979 and from *Nuestro* between 1977 and 1979. A study of *La Luz*’s early issues illuminates this magazine’s initial goal and obstacles for success, and the overlapping years allow for a comparative examination of both magazines’ goal to consolidate a market.

*La Luz* and *Nuestro* entered an untested national market, thus struggled to secure advertising revenue from national corporations, which represented a major source of financial support. *La Luz* and *Nuestro* sought to demonstrate to advertisers the value of the Latino market by promoting the growth of this market in the music industry. Also, these magazines drew comparisons with the African American market to prove, by precedent, the viability of a minority-based national market. To appeal to Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans and other Latino groups, these magazines portrayed Latinos as a minority unified by their shared cultural heritage, which *La Luz* and *Nuestro* called *Hispanidad* or *Latinidad*, respectively. These magazines also promoted a discourse of individualism by which Hispanics attained success in mainstream society but maintained their Hispanic culture and remained committed to the Hispanic community. The publishers of these magazines hoped the national achievements of Latinos would legitimize the need for a national Latino magazine that appealed to successful Latinos and those who aspired to succeed.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries magazines emerged as sources of mass communication and experienced a ‘Golden Age.’28 A number of related developments conflated to spur the growth of general interest magazines during this period. These developments included: the emergence of transcontinental railroad transportation in 1869; the “technological advances in papermaking and printing[,] the invention of half-tone photoengraving[,] … improved literacy rates[,] … and the Postal Act of 1879, which gave magazines second-class mailing rates.”29 These factors made for-profit and non-profit magazines an attractive and affordable medium to inform and entertain, particularly, the “established middle class” and working classes in a variety of topics, ranging from politics, social reform, labor, and the arts. The rise of national consumer goods in the late nineteenth century offered corporations a valuable space to advertise their products, and

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29 Ibid.
magazines a profitable source of revenue.\textsuperscript{30} In the 1960s, general interest magazines faced fierce competition from television for national advertising dollars, which caused a decline in circulation of general interest magazines. Thus, this period witnessed a proliferation of “specialized interest magazines” such as “Skiing (1958), Car and Driver (1961), [and] Tennis (1965).”\textsuperscript{31} These magazines offered advertisers a suitable alternative to general interest magazines because “specialized magazines could deliver a specific, highly defined audience to their advertisers.”\textsuperscript{32}

The Spanish-language press in the United States emerged in the nineteenth century, but larger city newspapers flourished in the early twentieth century. In the aftermath of the 1910 Mexican Revolution, Mexicans immigrated in large numbers to Los Angeles and San Antonio, Texas.\textsuperscript{33} These cities, along with New York City, became home to the largest Hispanic “big-city daily newspapers” in the United States.\textsuperscript{34} Although these newspapers functioned as commercial enterprises, Nicolás Kanellos argues that the “immigrant print culture” since the nineteenth century, has disseminated a “nationalistic ideology” to defend the community and to avoid immigrants’ “assimilation” or “melting.”\textsuperscript{35} La Luz and Nuestro also functioned along this ideological framework. These newspapers adhered to different political views. For example, Ignacio E. Lozano, a conservative, member of the Mexican elite, founded San Antonio’s La

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\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 110.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 112.
\textsuperscript{33} Nicolás Kanellos, “Recovering and Re-constructing Early Twentieth-Century Hispanic Immigrant Print Culture in the US,” American Literary History 19, 2 (2007), 440.
\textsuperscript{34} Kanellos noted that the largest newspapers were: Los Angeles’ El Heraldo de México (1915) and La Opinión (1926), San Antonio’s La Prensa (1913) and New York City’s La Prensa (1913), Kanellos, “Recovering and Re-constructing,” 441. New York City’s La Prensa was not associated with San Antonio’s La Prensa. The former was founded by José Capumbri “to serve the community of mostly Spanish and Cuban immigrants in and around Manhattan’s 14\textsuperscript{th} Street.” Kanellos, “Recovering and Re-constructing,” 452 n. 9.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 439.
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Perspectives

Prensa (1913) and Los Angeles’s La Opinión (1926). In the early twentieth century leftist newspapers also proliferated, like the anarchist newspaper Regeneración published by Mexican writers Ricardo and Enrique Flores Magón. Kanellos notes that Hispanic immigrant workers founded their own newspapers, especially Puerto Rican and Cuban tobacco workers in Florida and New York. By the late-1960s, regional and local newspapers, including Chicano newspapers such as César Chávez’s farm workers union’s El Malcriado and the Denver-based Crusade for Justice’s El Gallo, continued to characterize the Spanish-language press. At this time though, no general interest “national” Latino magazine existed, until the 1970s when La Luz (1972) and Nuestro (1977) claimed to be the first ones to make such an attempt.

La Luz and Nuestro’s Struggle for National Advertising Revenue

From their inception, La Luz and Nuestro encountered financial obstacles in their pioneering roles in the Hispanic publishing market. La Luz’s founders established their magazine despite their precarious financial situation. In the magazine’s first anniversary number, Valdes commented that La Luz ‘’it’s a business concept as well as a social concept.” La Luz’s business goals largely depended on its ability to attract major national advertisers. Prior to its founding, McGraw-Hill had warned La Luz’s founders that “it would take several million dollars to make the idea [of La Luz] work on a national level.” The founders defied this expert advice, trusting that “McGraw-Hill had underestimated the Spanish speaking market, the response from major advertisers and the ability of La Luz to survive without great sums in the bank.” From the onset, La Luz actively sought the patronage of national advertisers. In its inaugural edition, Eduardo O. Romero, La Luz’s business manager, editorialized that “we are in the process of

37 Ibid.
38 Kanellos, “Recovering and Re-constructing,” 444.
41 “La Luz Story,” 27.
42 Ibid.
contracting with national advertising representatives.”

La Luz optimistically believed national advertisers could not ignore the Hispanic market, which represented a “thirty billion dollar [a year] market.”

La Luz’s encountered significant financial challenges in its efforts to attract national advertisers. The lack of independent market research studies on Hispanic consumer practices became La Luz’s main challenge in garnering the attention of advertisers. La Luz’s founders acknowledged that major “marketing and merchandising corporations know practically nothing about us [Hispanics] save for vague ideas of where we live.” Thus, without the necessary market studies, “the founders acted on their faith in the Hispano market, verified by their own studies.”

But La Luz’s “own studies” failed to convince national advertisers to invest in La Luz. Notably frustrated, Valdes editorialized in 1976 that “after five years of persistent efforts to get our share of the advertising dollar, 99 percent of the companies from whom you [the readers] buy billions of dollars worth of goods and services have failed to advertise in La Luz.”

As an alternative to lacking market research on the Hispanic consumer market, La Luz recruited its readership to support its efforts to attract national advertisers. In a “personal letter” to their “Queridos Lectores” [dear readers], La Luz’s founders pleaded their readership to write or call our advertisers (you don’t necessarily have to buy). But do tell them you saw their advertisements in your magazine [emphasis added].” In addition, La Luz carried out drives to increase the number of paid subscriptions. In its December 1972 issue, La Luz ambitiously announced that it would conduct a “telephone subscription campaign … in the twenty major cities having the largest Hispano population.” These efforts to increase the number of paid subscription directly connected to La Luz’s goal of attracting advertisers, as the founders stated that “advertisers are extremely interested in paid circulation. The greater the paid circulation, the more the advertiser is willing to pay to advertise.” Also, reflecting a grass-roots effort to

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43 Eduardo O. Romero, Editorials and Otherwise, La Luz, April 1972, 24.
45 Ibid., 46 Ibid., 27.
47 “Personal Letter,” La Luz, April 1972, 6. The body of this letter is in English, and it was reprinted in several subsequent issues of La Luz.
increase the number of subscriptions, *La Luz* asked college students to “be a sales representative for *La Luz*” and help with “subscriptions, distribution, and circulation.”

Differently to *La Luz*, López founded *Nuestro* as a small business venture with the support of a government-sponsored association of investors. López sought the support of the Institute for New Enterprise Development (INED) a “Government-financed organization” that assisted small business entrepreneurs who demonstrated a commitment to “provide employment in underdeveloped or economically deprived areas.” Instead of a specific area, López directed his business project at an economically deprived minority. With the help of INED, López contracted the marketing company, Young & Rubicam “to study the Latino market.” After INED designated López’s business project financially feasible, INED assisted López in acquiring “venture capital” from the Minority Enterprise Small Business Investment Companies (MESBIC), which according to the *New York Times*, similar to INED, received support from “the Government’s Small Business Administration,” and specialized in providing investment capital for small business entrepreneurs. López’s strategy to fund *Nuestro* clearly differed from *La Luz* founders’ decision to bypass government assistance and ignore McGraw-Hill’s opinion that their business project lacked financial feasibility because of insufficient market research on the Hispanic market.

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52 Fowler, “Management: Dreamer,” 66.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 One year after its establishment, *La Luz*’s founders commented that they did not receive financial assistance from a “large foundation” or a “large corporation” but that their financial support came from “twenty-five investors who are overwhelmingly Spanish speaking.” “La Luz Story,” 27 and 30.
Despite these magazines’ differing initial funding strategies, Nuestro also faced the daunting task of attracting the attention of national advertisers. López optimistically believed in Nuestro’s capability to draw advertising revenue because of four main reasons: his claim that Nuestro lacked competition from another magazine in the Latino market; the significant size of the “American Latino population [which] total[ed] about 12 million”; the large spending power of Latino consumers which “total[ed] about $30 billion” a year; and the positive “marketing statistics” provided by the Young & Rubicam study.56 La Luz had provided an equivalent rationale for its initial confidence on the economic viability of their magazine, including its contention that “for all practical purposes we don’t have any competition.”57 In contrast to Nuestro however, La Luz did not have an independent market study to support its assertions. But, Nuestro needed additional market studies to substantiate its claim that the Latino market offered a profitable niche market for advertisers. Nuestro’s Editor Charles R. Rivera told the New York Times that “efforts will be made” to increase Nuestro’s circulation numbers “by working with Spanish-speaking grass roots organizations,” because Nuestro, similar to La Luz, also struggled to “mak[e] believers out of media buyers.”58 The New York Times indicated in 1980 that: “Nuestro, now three years old … increased its ad pages 40 percent last year and has, Daniel M. Lopez, the publisher, says, been making money each issue since last May,” thus suggesting that Nuestro made some effective progress in its efforts to raise advertising revenue.59

57 “La Luz Interviews La Luz,” 38.

Figure 2. Cover of first issue of Nuestro, April 1977.
The Latino Market in the Music Industry

La Luz and Nuestro sought to substantiate their demands for advertisers’ recognition of the Latino market by publicizing the growth of this market in the music industry. These magazines believed that Latinos’ increasing importance in this industry would legitimize the need for recognition of the national Latino market. To emphasize the national significance of Latin music, La Luz reported that a group of Latino musicians successfully pressured the National Academy of Recording Arts and Sciences (NARAS) to establish the “Best Latin Recording” Grammy category in 1975. La Luz argued that NARAS could not ignore the “fifty million dollar a year Latin music industry [which] should have a host of Grammies.”60 La Luz underlined the consumer power of Latinos to state its claim for national representation in NARAS, one of the most notable national institutions in the U.S. music industry.

La Luz and Nuestro also publicized the growth of the salsa music industry to emphasize Latin music’s increasing national relevance. For instance, La Luz affirmed that national mainstream publications such as Time magazine, Newsweek, and the New York Times reported on the growing national popularity of salsa music and that “many of these articles … touted salsa as the ‘great, new American music.’”61 The attention afforded to salsa music reflected on salsa/Latin jazz musicians’ dominance of the only Grammy award category for Latinos between 1975 and 1982. After 1982, NARAS expanded its Latin categories to three, including the “Best Tropical Performance” category, which was a more specific category for salsa music.62 Nuestro also contended that salsa music represented the “vital thrust of Latin music at the moment.”63 Furthermore, Nuestro asserted that “it is time to set the record straight: Disco is a Latin thing.”64 It deplored the lack of opportunities offered to Latino musicians in disco music, an industry “worth $4 billion (that’s billion with a ‘b’),” and that, according to Nuestro, owed its origins to salsa music.65 Whether or not Nuestro exaggerated its claim on the origins of disco music, this

61 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
assertion underscores Nuestro’s position that Latinos contributed to a profitable national market, and thus deserved a place in it.

The Latino Market *vis a vis* the African American Market

Beyond promoting the growth of the Latino market, *La Luz* and *Nuestro* sought to associate their efforts with those of the thriving African American market. African American urbanization between 1900 and 1940 significantly contributed “to the group’s enhanced status as consumers,” and in the post-World War II period “white businesses sought to get their ‘share’ of the increasingly lucrative ‘Black market.’”66 In addition, African Americans' militancy during the Civil Rights Movement made national corporations more responsive to African American consumers’ necessities and desires. For instance, in the late-1960s corporations "promote[ed] the 'soul' market … to retain the alliance of black consumers.”67

*La Luz* and *Nuestro* believed that Hispanics, as the second largest minority in the United States deserved the type of recognition that national advertisers afforded to the African American market. Comparing the Hispanic and African American markets, Valdes affirmed that “*Ebony* is the [emphasis in original] magazine for Black Americans and we feel that our people also needed a magazine of that kind, of that quality, of that pervasiveness and that’s the basic concept of *La Luz.*”68 Correspondingly, *La Luz* sought to gain a similar amount of advertising revenue that major companies spent on the African American market. Romero, *La Luz*’s business manager predicted in 1973 that to match *Ebony*’s one million dollar advertising billings per issue, it would take *La Luz* “maybe five to seven years.”69 But, five years later Valdes disappointedly informed its readership that major advertisers, such as General Foods, General Motors, J.B. Reynolds, and American Airlines had:

> [s]pent 500 times as much to promote business among Black Americans than among Hispanic Americans. This is an insult to Hispanic consumers who last year spent over 30 Billion (not million) dollars on consumer goods & services in this country; we have nothing against that kind of advertising dollar spent on Black newspapers, electronic media, and magazines—more power to them.

67 Ibid., 70.
68 "*La Luz* Interviews *La Luz*,” 33.
69 Ibid., 39.
They deserve our respect—they have made big companies recognize the value of the Black dollar. We must learn a lesson from them.\textsuperscript{70}

_Ebony_ had faced similar obstacles in its beginnings, as Weems points out that "following its 1945 founding _Ebony_ experienced difficulty in attracting advertising from large corporations [but] by the early 1960s … had established itself as a major American magazine."\textsuperscript{71} Perhaps, Valdes believed that _La Luz_ would follow _Ebony_’s trajectory to success.

Similarly to Valdes, _Nuesto_’s publisher “credit[ed] _Ebony_ magazine for having a similar impact [to _Nuesto_] on the market for blacks.”\textsuperscript{72} In its premier issue, _Nuesto_ optimistically announced that “Latinos have emerged as a definable market with at least as much spending power per family as Blacks and just as many [consumer] preferences.”\textsuperscript{73} _Nuesto_ also found a lucid resemblance on the thriving African American market, and hoped that corporations would make that same connection.

**Finding Common Ground amongst Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans**

Unlike the ethnically homogeneous African American market, _La Luz_ and _Nuesto_ had to appeal to an ethnically heterogeneous Latino national market, primarily comprised of Mexicans Americans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans. In the 1960s, the population of Mexican descent, the largest Latino group in the United States, mainly lived in the Southwest, “in the region along the U.S-Mexico border: Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas.”\textsuperscript{74} Mexican Americans also established large enclaves in the Midwest, especially “in the Chicago metropolitan area.”\textsuperscript{75} David G. Gutiérrez indicates that “by 1960, nearly 85 percent of Mexican Americans were American citizens

\textsuperscript{70} Valdes, “From the Publisher,” July-August 1976, 6. _La Luz_ reprinted this message on the November 1976 issue.
\textsuperscript{71} Weems, _Desegregating the Dollar_, 73.
\textsuperscript{72} Dougherty, “Advertising: _Nuesto_ Puts Accent,” 50.
\textsuperscript{73} “Here Comes the Latino Era,” _Nuesto_, April 1977, 15.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
by birth,” and that the 1970s witnessed an upsurge of Mexican immigration to the United States.

Historians of Chicano history have focused on Chicanos’ regional or local political activism for social justice, but have largely ignored Chicanos’ efforts to garner national recognition. Ernesto Chávez examines the development of four major Chicano organizations in Los Angeles from the mid-1960s to the late-1970s; the Brown Berets, the Chicano Moratorium, La Raza Unida Party, and the Mexican-immigrant center, Centro de Acción Autónomo. Chávez claims that these organizations failed to forge alliances with other ethnic groups at the local or national levels “because of its [the Chicano Movement’s] essentialistimaginings of community driven by an ideologically bankrupt cultural nationalism.” George Mariscal disagrees with Chávez’s contention, and insists that “Chicano/a militant activists” sought to forge coalitions with other groups including African Americans, despite the superficial appearance that Chicanos adhered to "narrow forms of sectarian nationalism.” Mariscal’s analysis demonstrates that La Luz and Nuestro’s attempts to liken their efforts of consolidating a national market to those of African Americans had a contemporary precedent in the actions of Chicano activists. But the alliances that Mariscal identifies occurred at a local or regional level, rather than the national level that La Luz and Nuestro attempted to reach.

Second to Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans represented another major Latino group in the United States, which added to the diversity of La Luz and Nuestro’s Latino audience. Kelvin A. Santiago-Valles and Gladys M. Jiménez-Muñoz have identified several economic factors in the United States and Puerto Rico that contributed to an upsurge of Puerto Rican migration to the U.S. mainland in the 1945-1968 period. The decrease in agricultural production and the

76 Ibid., 47.
77 Ibid., 62. For an illuminating discussion on public discourses about immigration, as seen through magazine covers, see, Leo R. Chavez, Covering Immigration: Popular Images and the Politics of the Nation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), chapter 8 “Manufacturing Consensus on an Anti-Mexican Immigration Discourse,” deals specifically with the case of Mexican immigration.
78 Chávez, My People First!, 6.
79 Ibid., 120.
growth of “light, labor-intensive, export-oriented industries” during the 1950s created high unemployment rates in Puerto Rico. Unemployed Puerto Ricans found a viable alternative in migration to the U.S. mainland, “especially to the northeast and Midwestern regions” where they found low-wage paying jobs in the manufacturing sector. In the United States, Puerto Ricans, similarly to their Mexican counterparts, concentrated in large numbers in “a series of identifiable barrios.” Puerto Rican barrios fostered cultural cohesion where Puerto Ricans could “maintain their national and cultural affinities with the imagined community of Puerto Rico-as-nation.” According to Linda C. Delgado the retention of the Spanish language among Puerto Rican communities in New York City, "cemented bonds of national and ethnic identification." Like Chicanos in Los Angeles, Puerto Ricans became politically active in New York City in the 1960s and 1970s. Delgado insists that the broader militant milieu of the late 1960s such as the “black power movements, Vietnam War protests … and Chicano and Native American militancy,” influenced Puerto Rican militant responses to community social problems such as, police brutality and inadequate housing.

Cuban immigration after the Cuban Revolution of 1959 made Cubans the third major Latino group in the United States and the most distinct Latino group that La Luz and Nuestro sought to attract. The Cuban elite and professional middle classes largely composed the first wave of Cuban immigrants after the victory of the Cuban Revolution. These Cuban immigrants “perceived themselves as ‘exiles’ rather than immigrants,” because they felt that the “nationalist revolution” had

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Ibid.

Ibid., 92.

Ibid., 97.

Ibid.


Delgado, “Jesús Colón and the Making of a New York City Community,” 82.
dispossessed them of liberty and property. The majority of the ‘exiles’ primarily settled in South Florida for its proximity to Cuba. The second significant wave of Cuban migration, which included working-class Cubans, occurred between 1965 and 1973 via “freedom flights” supported by the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Through an agreement between the Cuban and the U.S. governments, “the U.S. agreed to send chartered planes to Varadero, Cuba twice each day, transporting between 3,000 and 4,000 Cubans each month.” By the 1970s the composition of the Cuban immigrant population also included lower class Cubans, but the racial composition, as in the beginning, continued to be primarily white since most black Cubans remained optimistic about the Revolution’s goals of “racial equality,” and feared racial discrimination in the United States.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the first wave of Cuban immigrants became “obsessed” with maintaining their Cubanidad which “meant to preserve those customs, values, and traditions that they associated with being Cuban.” The “exile generation” embraced Cubanidad because they viewed their stay in the United States as temporary. By the early 1970s, younger Cubans began to shift their perception from “temporary visitor” to “permanent resident,” thus many Cubans began to see the United States as their home. Cuban immigrants, especially the ‘exile’ generation, differed from most Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans in their upper-class composition and perception of the United States as a transitory home. These differences challenged La Luz and Nuestro’s efforts to unite Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans into one cohesive Latino national market.

89 García, “Exiles, Immigrants, and Transnationals,” 149.
90Ibid., 156.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., 172.
93 Ibid., 174.
Since their inception, La Luz and Nuestro stressed Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans and other Latin Americans common cultural roots that united them into one “Latino” or “Hispanic” ethnic group. Writing about Italian immigrants in the first-half of the twentieth century, Thomas A. Guglielmo argues that—despite self- and government recognition of their “whiteness”—Italian immigrants in Chicago adopted an Italian ‘race’ identity to make demands for access to social and political power. The publishers of La Luz and Nuestro similarly sought to assert the ethnic identity of all Latino groups to argue for Latinos’ recognition as a national market. According to La Luz, U.S. Hispanics formed part of a greater “Hispanic world” which included all Hispanic people in Latin America. La Luz explained that Hispanics exhibited a “group consciousness” that “designate[d] the cultural community to which all Hispanos belong, and this community transcends all considerations of patriotism or nationality or race.” Voicing an analogous opinion, Nuestro’s publisher, when questioned by the New York Times on how he would attempt to unite the diverse Latino groups, López answered: “Hispanics are more like each other than any other group in this country, sharing family values, and attitudes toward church and Government, and a basic culture.” La Luz and Nuestro privileged Latinos’ cultural commonalities over their national specificities, as it benefitted their business projects and perhaps to unite these groups for their social and economic empowerment.

La Luz and Nuestro also appropriated ethnic labels that they believed fostered pan-Latino unity. Suzanne Oboler has examined the historical origins of the label “Hispanic” to show how this early 1970s, government-created label has been used to “homogenize” Hispanics in the United States. Oboler contends that ethnic labels are “obstructions of reality,” that can reinforce “false assumptions” about an ethnic group, such as that all Latinos speak Spanish, are Catholic and are from the lower class. Oboler acknowledges that “discriminated groups”

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96 Ibid.
have also adopted ethnic labels to make claims for the equal distribution of “social resources.”

In *La Luz*’s June 1972 issue, Valdes and collaborator Tom Pino elaborated on this subject. They invalidated the use of labels such as Chicano, Latino, Mejicano, and Spanish-speaking people, as too narrow, or vague to encompass all Hispanics. Also, Valdes argued that the term “brown people,” used by “Hispano” radicals, "insulted" some Hispanics because it connoted racial difference and perpetuated the “crippling myth” that the Hispanic people is a distinct and “inferior” race. Valdes and Pino concluded that “Hispano” appropriately encompassed all Hispanics, because all Hispanics, they insisted, shared a common *Hispanidad*: “the essence of Hispanic culture; language, religion, values, [and] customs, common to all [Hispanics] in varying degrees of dominance.”

Given Valdes’s proud Spanish past, it is unsurprising that he favored the label “Hispano,” which originated in New Mexico among self-identified descendants of “pure blooded” Spanish conquistadores. This choice also helps to explain why *La Luz*’s failed to consistently use the label Hispano in articles and editorials, as not all Hispanic groups were likely to identify with this label.

*Nuestro* adopted the label “Latino” as its preferred umbrella label for all Latino groups. Rivera, *Nuestro*’s editor, rejected the use of labels such as, Spanish speaking and Spanish surnamed as inaccurate identifiers of Latinos. Rivera objected to *La Luz*’s preferred label Hispano, which he described as “too Iberian, too colonialist.” Rivera defended *Nuestro*’s choice of the label “Latino” because he “believed,” that the word Latino “captures that knowledge inside of us [Latinos] that says we are of the same clay. It is the word that in Spanish naturally describes the kinship we feel, and that reflects our identity as Americans, whatever Latin nation we have roots in.”

The selection of this label also reflects the more multi-ethnic composition of New Hispanic, Chicano, Latino …? in *Latin American Perspectives* 19, no. 4 (Fall 1992), contains articles on the topic.

101 Ibid., 62.
104 Ibid. According to Oboler, “although heard sporadically before, the term Latino was created ‘from below’ during the1980s and is generally used by progressive, grassroots sectors of the population.” Oboler, *Ethnic Labels, Latino Lives*, 177 n5.
York City, *Nuestro*’s publishing location, in comparison to the Latino population of Denver, *La Luz*’s publishing home, which was predominantly Mexican-American.

**Preserving the Spanish Language through Bilingualism**

These magazines advocated for bilingual education as a way to preserve the Spanish language and reinforce pan-Latino unity. Guadalupe San Miguel argues that in the 1960s “bilingual research findings, the civil rights movement, federal social legislation and the emerging Chicano and Chicana Movement,” helped to make bilingual education an issue of national importance for Latinos, especially Mexican Americans.105 Supporters of bilingual education sought to address the educational underachievement of Spanish-speaking students and students’ need for culturally sensitive education. The passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) and its successor the Bilingual Education Act of 1968 signified the major legislative successes of supporters of bilingual education.106 Gareth Davies contends that in the 1970s, supporters of bilingual education struggled to fund and renew bilingual education programs.107 Bilingual education fitted *La Luz* and *Nuestro*’s agenda of non-assimilation and assisted their efforts to tackle issues of national importance for Latinos.

*La Luz* and *Nuestro* demonstrated their support for bilingual education through their vocal support for government protection of bilingual education. *La Luz* printed many articles supporting bilingual education, for example, it published a piece by U.S. Senator John Tunney in which he commended Hispanics who “have clung to their unique cultural identity,” despite the “American education [system] [which] has gone out of its way to destroy the cultural identity of its minorities.”108 *Nuestro* defended bilingual education from Anglo opponents who criticized it as a “separatist” measure and claimed that bilingual education helped Latinos preserve their culture while also

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107 Ibid., 1406.
learning the English language.\footnote{Reynaldo F. Macías and Gilbert Navarro García, “Back to School: Lessons Latinos are Learning,” Nuestro, September 1977, 43.} Nuestro also asserted that there was “nothing un-American about being able to speak two languages, especially when it addressed the special educational and cultural needs of Hispanics.”\footnote{Reynaldo F. Macías “El Debate Bilingüe/The Bilingual Debate,” Nuestro, February 1978, 36.} La Luz and Nuestro’s staunch support for bilingual education demonstrates that these magazines believed that the Spanish language represented an essential unifying cultural trait for Latinos.

La Luz and Nuestro further emphasized the national significance of the Spanish language as a bounding cultural trait for Latinos by reporting on Jimmy Carter’s use of the Spanish language. In an “exclusive interview” with Governor Carter, just prior to the presidential election of 1976, La Luz asked the Governor if he spoke Spanish, to which Carter responded: “Yes, I can speak some Spanish and so can my wife [emphasis added].”\footnote{Laura Carmelita Valdes Damron, “Jimmy Carter: An Exclusive Interview with the Democratic Candidate for President,” La Luz, October 1976, 4.} After the election, Nuestro claimed that the Carters had “latinophilía,” or a special love for Latinos, an assertion Nuestro based on the First Lady and her daughter Amy’s effort to learn Spanish, and Carter’s "fluency" in Spanish, which according to Nuestro he attained in one year as an extra-curricular activity at the U.S. Naval Academy.\footnote{Andrés Oppenheimer, “The Carters Have Latinophilia: Spanish is Getting to Be the Second Language in the White House,” Nuestro, June 1977, 22-23.} Nuestro also suggested that the sincerity of the Carters’ "love" for the Spanish language remained unclear, as it could mean that they had a real interest in “Latino concerns” or that it served as an a political strategy to attract "a voting bloc.”\footnote{Ibid., 23.} But in either case, Nuestro emphasized that the First Family’s interest in the Spanish language signaled the importance of Spanish for Latinos. Nuestro reported in its July 1977 issue that Spanish-language television broadcasters had petitioned Carter to deliver a brief speech in Spanish to address Latino issues.\footnote{Nuestro, The Washington Word, July 1977, 8.} In support of this petition, Nuestro challenged Carter to “show us how bilingual and courageous you are.”\footnote{Ibid.} Nuestro’s challenge to the President illustrates the magazine’s belief that to demonstrate loyalty to its Hispanic constituents, Carter needed to demonstrate his Spanish speaking abilities. These magazines seemingly exaggerated reporting of Carter’s Spanish fluency

\footnote{109 Reynaldo F. Macías and Gilbert Navarro García, “Back to School: Lessons Latinos are Learning,” Nuestro, September 1977, 43.}
\footnote{110 Reynaldo F. Macías “El Debate Bilingüe/The Bilingual Debate,” Nuestro, February 1978, 36.}
\footnote{111 Laura Carmelita Valdes Damron, “Jimmy Carter: An Exclusive Interview with the Democratic Candidate for President,” La Luz, October 1976, 4.}
\footnote{112 Andrés Oppenheimer, “The Carters Have Latinophilia: Spanish is Getting to Be the Second Language in the White House,” Nuestro, June 1977, 22-23.}
\footnote{113 Ibid., 23.}
\footnote{114 Nuestro, The Washington Word, July 1977, 8.}
\footnote{115 Ibid.}
underscores the significance that La Luz and Nuestro afforded to the Spanish language as unifying cultural trait for Latinos.

Promoting Latinos’ Mainstream Success

In addition to fostering ethnic unity among Hispanics, these magazines promoted the success of Hispanics in mainstream society through a discourse of individualism in which Hispanics maintained a commitment to their community. For example, demonstrating its individualism discourse, López, Nuestro’s publisher, declared that “the biggest part of being successful comes from each individual’s capacity to believe in himself.”¹¹⁶ In the magazine’s special issue on successful Hispanic businessmen, López concluded that with “few exceptions, these Latinos are individualists.”¹¹⁷ “Middle class Latinos, unlike any other groups before them,” added López, “remain vitally concerned with their communities.”¹¹⁸ The group of “Latinos in executive suites” that Nuestro profiled as Latino role models shared a number of common characteristics; married men in their 40s, had between three and six children, attained success through hard work and their ambition to reach the highest levels of the corporate hierarchy, and demonstrated a commitment to their families and to help their communities.¹¹⁹ Similar to Nuestro’s selection of successful businessmen, La Luz’s profiled prominent Hispanics government who exhibited common characteristics; married middle-aged men with an individualist drive for success, and a commitment to their families and service to their communities in education and small business formation.¹²⁰ La Luz and Nuestro promoted a discourse of “good, old-fashioned U.S. individualism,” because it presented an appealing avenue for achieving economic success.¹²¹ These magazines associated successful Latinos’ commitment to their communities with their commitment to maintain their Hispanic culture. In their view, the economic success of Latinos helped them legitimize their efforts to promote a national Latino market.

The case of Joseph Aragón, a Carter appointee as Special Assistant to the President, further exemplifies this discourse of individualism and the expectation of commitment to the Latino

¹¹⁸ Ibid.
¹²¹ López, “Publisher’s Letter,” September 1979, 5.
community. *Nuestro* reported that Aragón came from a large working-class family in Arizona, but that through hard work and dedication he had received academic degrees from Yale, Harvard and the University of California, Berkeley.\(^{122}\) To underscore the magnitude of his success, *Nuestro* stated that “no Latino has ever come close to that kind of clout” in the White House.\(^{123}\) The article emphasized that Aragón and Carter had clarified that Aragón would not become Carter’s “in-house Mexican” and that although he could advice the President “on matters dealing with the Hispanic community … such matters will represent a small portion of my time, perhaps 5%.”\(^ {124}\) *Nuestro* seemed understanding of Aragon’s refusal to become the unofficial spokesperson of Hispanic issues in the White House, but in an editorial advocated for a “broadening of Joe Aragon’s responsibilities so that he is given an adequate number of people on his staff to spend 100% of their time on Latino affairs.”\(^ {125}\) Clearly, *Nuestro* expected Aragon’s dedication to the Hispanic community. In his White House exit interview, Aragón confirmed that he spent most of his time dealing with non-Hispanic issues and that he directed Latino individuals or organizations’ petitions to the appropriate department concerning their requests.\(^ {126}\) In an editorial commenting on Aragón’s departure from his post, *Nuestro* hypothesized that Aragón had “spent far more than 5% of his time working on Latino concerns,” despite Aragón’s insistence on his limited role in working on Latino issues.\(^ {127}\) *Nuestro* praised Aragón for setting an example of “Latino participation in decision-making that goes beyond narrow Latino issues.”\(^ {128}\) Even though Aragón insisted on his restricted support for the Latino community, *Nuestro* still reiterated Aragón’s commitment to this community, as such complemented *Nuestro*’s discourse of the successful individualist who proved his *Latinidad* by remaining committed to his community.

Benjamin “Ben” Fernandez also exemplified *La Luz* and *Nuestro*’s model of Hispanic success in mainstream America. In 1977, *La Luz* named Fernandez “Mr. Hispano Republican” because he held the distinction as “the only Hispanic ever to serve on the Republican


\(^{123}\) Ibid., 15.

\(^{124}\) Ibid.


\(^{128}\) Ibid.
National Committee.”  

Furthermore, *La Luz* argued that Fernandez succeeded as a businessman because, “he was always highly individualistic, competitive, high spirited, aggressive and in love with the capitalistic spirit and with America.”  

In 1978, *La Luz* again christened Fernandez, this time as the “father of the Hispanic financial industry,” because he led the establishment of Hispanic-owned and operated Savings and Loans Associations (S&Ls), including smoothly and single-handedly founding of the first Hispanic-owned S&L, in San Fernando, California.  

A report by *La Luz* four years earlier however, indicated that the founding of this S&L involved “ten individuals from the community” and faced “many meetings and obstacles, doubts and outright lack of communication.”  

This inconsistency indicates *La Luz*’s committed efforts to portray Fernandez as an individualist successful Hispanic. *La Luz* also highlighted Fernandez’s service to the Hispanic community, as it reported that he helped “under-capitalized Hispanic businessmen obtain loans for expansion purposes” through the National Economic Development Association, which he founded in 1970.  

*Nuestro* also praised Fernandez for being the first Latino to run for President of the United States and encouraged “Latinos, whatever their political leanings” to wish this Republican candidate well.  

Similarly to *La Luz*, *Nuestro* described Fernandez as “the classic American success story,” who despite his humble origins attained economic success.  

*Nuestro* acknowledged the slim chances of Fernandez’s candidacy, but commended his campaign for “help[ing] to make both Anglos and Latinos more aware than ever of the growing power of our people,” thus portraying Fernandez’s success as a service to the Latino community.  

Despite their efforts, *La Luz* and *Nuestro*’s aspirations to become a national force in the publishing market for Latinos were

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131 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
136 “¿Que Pasa?: A Férnandez for President?” *Nuestro*, June 1978, 6.
137 Ibid.
short-lived. By its December 1974 issue, La Luz shifted its rhetoric of wanting to become the magazine for Hispanics,138 when it claimed that “LA LUZ is not planning to outdo other raza magazines or publications. The raza (Chicano/Boricua/Cubano) community in the United States is a diverse one, and no one publication can ever hope (or should hope) to be the single voice of that community.”139 Most importantly on its March-July issue, Tom Pino, La Luz’s Marketing Manager, assumed the publisher’s position and announced that “Dr. Daniel T. Vandes, a founder of LA LUZ, and long-time President, Publisher, and Editor, has resigned and will no longer be active with LA LUZ.”140 La Luz did not survive long after Valdes’s departure and ceased publication in 1981.141 By 1980 Nuestro seemed to prosper as its advertising revenue continued to increase, but by 1984 Nuestro also bowed out.142

Given the short publication runs of these magazines, it might be tempting to simply dismiss them as “failures.” On September 28, 1980, Rudy Garcia, former executive editor of New York City’s El Diario-La Prensa wrote in the New York Times that Latinos did not have “anything resembling a national Hispanic press” to serve the nation’s “Spanish-speaking minority” “either in Spanish or English,” thus implying the failure of La Luz and Nuestro.143 Garcia noted that Blacks, on the other hand, had various national publications, including Ebony magazine, “that provided a national forum for blacks” and that “no comparable Hispanic publications in this country,” existed to serve the Hispanic market.144 La Luz and Nuestro did not achieve the commercial success their publishers had hoped for, and ceased to exist after only a few years of publication. But, designating their efforts at consolidating a national market simply as “failures” ignores the historical context that thwarted the development of a national Hispanic market in the 1970s. These magazines’ strategies of emphasizing Latino’s consumer power and the African American precedent proved insufficient in the face of other obstacles, such as the lack of marketing research on the Hispanic

139 Daniel T. Valdez, Publisher’s Note, La Luz, December 1974, 2.
140 Tom Pino, Publisher’s Statement, La Luz, March-July, 1979, 2.
144 Ibid.
market and the difficulty of appealing to the diverse groups that these magazines encapsulated in the labels “Hispano” or “Latino.”