the popular myth that “everything wrong with America” is the result of a grand deviation from the founding fathers’ intentions, Lepore suggests that the founding fathers lived in and discussed a different culture than we do today. She argues that the greatest accomplishment of the founding fathers was not a unified vision of America, but rather the construction of the Constitution as a living document to be continually adapted and be applied over time. To Lepore, it is only within the fabricated bounds of antihistory, that a unified American national identity and ideology exists.

Although Lepore’s arguments about the nonlinear nature of history mirror previous historical theorists like Michael Foucault and Benedict Anderson, Lepore’s application in current political discourse deviates through her discussion of antihistory as a separate area of study. Demanding that the reader rethink the use of history, Lepore provides a framework through which scholars can discuss other areas of historical use and misuse. Focusing primarily on political discourse, she leaves the door open for further study into areas, such as public schooling or the legal system, arenas where antihistory continues to play an important role in constructing ideologies.

Lepore’s challenge to the use and misuse of history in current political debates may interest academic scholars specializing in early American history, political science, international relations, and legal history. In addition, beginning graduate and undergraduate students as well as non-academics interested in politics will find Lepore’s clear writing style appealing. Altogether, Lepore writes an engaging book that allows a wide audience to reflect on how various events in history, such as the American Revolution, do not have a static and singular interpretation.

Julia Devin


A Long Goodbye, by Artemy Kalinovsky explores the reasons behind the Soviet Union’s intervention in Afghanistan beginning
in 1979 and why it took ten years to withdraw. Kalinovsky, an Assistant Professor at the University of Amsterdam, states that the objective for writing this book is to understand the reasons for Soviet withdrawal and the obstacles they encountered. By examining the Soviet Union's decision-making process on foreign policy, Kalinovsky pieces together the factors that led to such a long and unsuccessful intervention. The lack of communication, overconfidence, and opposing goals established by the Soviet Politburo, military, KGB, and the government in Kabul led the Soviet Union to make a series of errors that extended their stay in Afghanistan much longer than they initially predicted.

Kalinovsky begins the book by explaining the reasons for Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. Intervention began with a coup by the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in 1978. In order to maintain power and proceed with plans that would rapidly modernize the country, the PDPA called upon Moscow to send troops to help stabilize the new government. Geographically, this was in the interest of the Soviet Union since they shared such a long and porous border with Afghanistan. Due to the Cold War, the Soviet Union also had a strong interest in securing support for its communist ideology in third world countries. In addition, Soviet Officials worried about President Carter’s decision to move naval forces into Iran after its Islamic revolution. However, shortly after entering Afghanistan, it became clear that the Soviet Union could not readily control the situation.

Intervention by the United States through their funding of an opposition group known as the mujahadeen made withdrawal for the Soviet Union considerably more difficult. The Soviet Union feared that a premature removal would harm their power and prestige in other third world countries as well as show weakness to the United States. Kalinovsky argues that despite all the issues detailed above, the overarching reason for such a slow withdrawal was Soviet officials' stubborn belief that they could stabilize the communist government in Kabul. In their view, they represented a super power with tremendous resources and Afghanistan was as just another third world country.
In order to make these claims, Kalinovsky examines declassified documents from the Soviet Union and the National Security Archive in Washington D.C. as well as interviews with key Soviet military and party leaders. Kalinovsky's assessment of the Soviet Union's withdrawal process from Afghanistan is not without its shortcomings. Throughout the book, Kalinovsky argues that Afghan officials repeatedly sabotaged the withdrawal attempts made by the Soviet Union but fails to support this claim. Despite the need of some clarification, Kalinovsky's insightful analysis of the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan is valuable and significant. Students or historians interested in Soviet military history, Cold War history or modern war history should read this book. It is by no means the whole story of the withdrawal process, but it is an important contribution to the larger historiography of the topic.

Elizabeth Fragosa


Upon first contact with Latin America, many Europeans poured over its beautiful, lush, and wondrous landscape, equating it to Eden. Spanish conquistadors emphasized this myth in their quest for gold in the lost city of El Dorado. Disease decimated the indigenous population, inspiring belief of an untouched paradise. People exploited Brazil’s fertile soil to satiate global appetites for exotic products like sugar. Wars erupted over possession of Peru’s wildly profitable guano-covered coastal islands. Shawn William Miller, Professor of History at Brigham Young University, incorporates these and other events alongside various themes into a survey and synthesis of environmental history in Latin America. Environmental historians like Miller study the complex relationship between people and their environment, reinforcing nature’s active role in shaping the human experience. His book is not a historical monograph, but an evaluation of method utilizing historical events. It is a discussion of ideas, a