David Jamison

Founded in 1957, and comprised of the most acclaimed minds in the field, the African Studies Association (ASA) was, by all accounts, the preeminent African Studies professional organization in America. In 1969, African American historian John Henrik Clarke helped engineer a schism within the ASA that saw the emergence of a splinter group called the African Heritage Studies Association (AHSA). The schism was caused, in part, by a deep-seated culture of competition that was nurtured by ASA founder Melville Herskovits, and this fracture would eventually discourage both government and private sources from funding African Studies programs. Though many criticized his adversarial approach to the world of academia, Herskovits never forgot that his benefactor, the Carnegie Corporation, was just that: a corporation. Steeped in the capitalist culture of the free market, the Carnegie Corporation managed gift-giving foundations the same way a corporate CEO would manage for-profit ventures. There is but one engine that motivates American corporate culture: competition. Bearing this in mind, Herskovits would compete by building a “corporation” of university-trained academics aimed at controlling the very concept of African Studies.

The schism between the younger generation of black Africanists and the older generation of white Africanists concerned fundamental divergences in philosophy. Many black scholars came to believe that as a moral imperative, members of the African diaspora
were uniquely qualified to transmit information regarding their experience. The model of 1960s protests had found its voice throughout the decade that saw the incorporation of African Studies. In fact, the model of 1960s protest was designed to engage with the corporate model. One could consider Clarke’s AHSA as following a countercorporate model within the corporate model of Herskovits’ ASA.

Though the divide was implicitly along racial lines, black and white scholars occupied both sides of it. The younger generation included an older contingent of black scholars as well as a few outspoken white radicals, while the old guard contained mostly white scholars along with a few of the more conservative blacks. The younger group (referred to hereafter as “revolutionaries”) distrusted the complicity between the old guard (“patriots”) and the U.S. government, principally because of the belief that scholars should disseminate African Studies only in the interests of the African diaspora. Patriots, on the other hand, held that scholarship on Africa should be transmitted for the benefit of humanity in general, and implicit in their assertion was the belief that the U.S. government was likewise committed to the benefit of humanity in general.

The ideological shift that accompanied the Civil Rights Movement and Vietnam War put these generations on either side of a philosophical divide regarding complicity with the U.S. government. It raised a variety of questions that are still being debated today. Should African Studies focus on the African diaspora or just the continent itself? And what part of the continent? Sub-Saharan Africa? Does Muslim Africa demand its own field? And what is African Studies, anyway? Wasn’t the whole concept of “Africa” just a geographical idiosyncrasy conceived of by the U.S. State Department?

The ASA’s newsletter, the *African Studies Bulletin* (ASB), is an invaluable source for tracking the development of the African Studies intellectual paradigm because of the prominence of its editors and its early role in documenting the personal and political alliances of the paradigm’s prime architects throughout the 1960s. The terms revolutionary and patriot are used here because, though diametrically opposed, they both have a distinctly American

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connotation, for the story of the ASA is the most “American” of success stories.

To understand the schism requires some historical background at the dawning of the ASA. The Cold War provided the impetus to institutionalize the field of African Studies. In 1957, Kwame Nkumrah led Ghana to its independence from Britain, and most scholars believed it was only a matter of time before the entire continent was beset by a wave of new republics that would soon embrace either capitalism or communism. Considering Russia’s proximity to Africa, the U.S. government sought to establish an ideological if not political foothold in Africa, necessitating the recruitment of interpreters, analysts, and cultural liaisons.3

Private donor organizations such as the Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY) and the Ford Foundation both began funding initiatives to “train Americans in key disciplines as experts on African affairs.”4 The CCNY was an early patriotic institution, particularly after World War II. According to the CCNY’s official historian, many CCNY board members were previously employed by the departments of State or Defense, or they took federal posts after their foray into the world of charitable gift-giving.5 CCNY

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5 Lagemann, p.xii. Despite her having portrayed them in sometimes less-than-glowing terms in Private Power for the Public Good: A History of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (1983), the CCNY asked her to write this one.

Frederick Osborn, who joined the CCNY board in 1936, was an old friend of Franklin Roosevelt and Secretary of War Henry Stimson, who asked Osborn to chair the Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation. When Osborn needed an assistant, he tapped Francis Keppel, CCNY President Frederick Keppel’s son. When Osborn needed seed money to transform his committee into the Information and Education Division of the War Department, he got it from the elder Keppel; David Southern, Gunnar Myrdal and Black-White Relations (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987): 3. Keppel himself had worked in the War Department as an assistant to Secretary of War Newton Baker before heading the CCNY; “During the war, the Carnegie Corporation was most closely connected to…‘experimentalist’
historian Ellen Lagemann recounts that each period of the CCNY’s history “demonstrates resonances between foundation and government concerns.”

In 1945, under a new directive, the Ford Foundation selected four U.S. universities to begin curricula development in African Studies: Boston, Howard, UCLA, and Northwestern. In 1948, the CCNY granted Northwestern University the money to establish their African Studies program. The Ford Foundation and the CCNY had been collaborating for years. “At times, Ford and Carnegie planned educational initiatives together and shared their cost; at times, they financed distinct but compatible endeavors.”

Page three of the first issue confirms that representatives of each of the Ford-sponsored universities were on the ASA’s inaugural eleven-member board.

In 1958, Congress passed the National Defense Education Act (NDEA), Title VI of which granted fellowships, contracted for research, and established language centers of study for higher education. James McCann considers the NDEA, “The most significant event to shape the institutional landscape for African Studies in the post-war years,” and Gwendolen Carter claims that, “the most extensive support for African Studies has come through Title VI because of its government-supported focus on regional studies.”

Founding ASA president Melville Herskovits was also a dyed-in-the-wool patriot. The year after he founded the ASA, he delivered a “Statement on Africa” before the U.S. Committee on Foreign Relations. The following year, he prepared a report for Congress with policy recommendations entitled, “United States Foreign

research…within the Information and Education Division of the War Department.”

Lagemann, 12.
McCann, 31.
Lagemann, 181.
McCann, 31. Title VI provided funds for institutions to set up centers for the study of African languages, this being the primary area the government knew most Americans were deficient in and in which, should the need arise, policymakers would need the most assistance. One of the first wave of Language and Area Center gifts was awarded to Howard. A mid-1960s second round awarded Northwestern. Carter, 2-3.


Policy in Africa.”\textsuperscript{12} In his younger days, however, Herskovits also published in the \textit{Crisis} and in the Urban League’s journal, \textit{Opportunity}.\textsuperscript{13} Herskovits, the first editor of the \textit{ASB}, had a stellar career as an academic. He first secured a position at Howard University in 1925, and in 1927, he became a professor of anthropology at Northwestern University. There, he founded the first African Studies department in America in 1961. He is widely renowned as the “godfather of African Studies.”\textsuperscript{14}

An aggressive architect of the African Studies curriculum, Herskovits has been criticized for “freezing out” his contemporaries. Revolutionary writers Michael West and William Martin clearly illustrate the divide between the older and younger generations of scholars. They infer that Herskovits attempted to frustrate W.E.B Du Bois’ Encyclopedia Africana project in order to intellectually monopolize the field. They hold that the post-Sputnik era saw a rise in the demand for area-studies specialists, and the one way for people like Herskovits to validate their position was to invalidate the work of others.\textsuperscript{15} Clearly, however, West and Martin used a poor example to illustrate this causation, as Du Bois’ meeting with Keppel took place twenty years before Sputnik was launched. While the intellectual monopoly of the African Studies field was indeed an effect of Herskovits’ efforts, it was not due solely to Cold War paranoia. Sandra Greene, a patient revolutionary, posits that it was simply a matter of identity politics. Herskovits simply could not bear the idea of defining himself as anything other than America’s foremost scholar on Africa.\textsuperscript{16} This point of view portrays Herskovits as a remarkably small and petty man. If he was truly concerned only with his personal role as a scholar, surely he would have eschewed assembling an association of brilliant minds with whom he would be in continual competition.

Former ASA head and patriot-revolutionary Gwendolyn Mikell submits that the reason for Herskovits’ actions might lie in the fact

\begin{threeparttable}
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\textsuperscript{13} Robert Harris, “Segregation and Scholarship: The American Council of Learned Societies’ Committee on Negro Studies, 1941-1950,” \textit{Journal of Black Studies} 12, no. 3 (March 1982): 315-331  \\
\textsuperscript{14} Even ubervolutionary Skinner acknowledges this honorific. Skinner, 58.  \\
\textsuperscript{15} Michael West and William Martin, “A Future with a Past: Resurrecting the Study of Africa in the Post-Africanist Era,” \textit{Africa Today} 44 (Summer 1997): 311.  \\
\end{tabular}
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that he thought black scholars could not be objective about Africa because of the “American experience of slavery.” One might argue that Herskovits truly feared that misinformation in his beloved field might be disseminated via inherently subjective scholarship. What, then, would motivate him to subject himself to the frustration of working at a historically black university like Howard? Mikell’s husband, iber-revolutionary scholar Elliot Skinner believed that it came down to one issue: Herskovits and others realized that the growing popularity of Africa during the Cold War would claim its share of university courses, research grants, and scholarships, in other words, money. And Herskovits wanted to ensure his fair share. But if Herskovits’ was the first African Studies program to receive a grant from the CCNY, he would be less likely to help form the ASA and give prominence to competing Africanists. Though Herskovits left no memoirs explaining his actions at the time, I argue that he was following the corporate model of his funding source.

It is possible to look at the actions of the anthropologist as those of a man using astute business acumen. Revolutionary scholar Henry Louis Gates reminds us of the vast amount of scholarship done in the African Studies field before 1957, listing nineteen books written since 1826 with titles such as A Text Book of the Origin and History of the Colored People and History of the Negro Race In America from 1619 to 1880. Since the late nineteenth century amateur black writers, who did their research at the local library or at their neighborhood Negro college, if they were lucky enough to attend one, had dominated African Studies. Most of them attempted to vindicate the African experience in light of the negative imagery of blacks that pervaded American culture. But many white colleagues did not consider their work up to appropriate academic standards, though that was more of a presumption than a conclusion borne out by a measured reading of it. This marginalization of amateur historians can be considered the “debrowning” of African Studies.

Du Bois explored several funding opportunities with people from whom he thought he would command respect and trust. As Gates relates, Du Bois petitioned the CCNY to fund his idea as early

18 Skinner, 61.
20 Skinner, 59.
It should come as no surprise to learn that it was Herskovits who lobbied for CCNY President Keppel to deny funding to Du Bois. Things might have been different if Du Bois was the type to toe the company line and take a mainstream academic position, but Du Bois was intransigent that his project had to be staffed primarily by blacks.

In 1938 the CCNY tapped Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal to lead a project that would become a landmark work in black studies, *An American Dilemma*. Keppel chose a foreigner because “Americans had too many prejudices to write an objective study,” but at first the CCNY, “compiled a long list of American and European scholars who might meet the demands.”

In the article “Segregation and Scholarship: the American Council of Learned Societies’ Committee (ACLS) on Negro Studies,” Robert Harris recounts the story of how, in 1939, the ACLS asked Herskovits to organize a conference on Negro Studies to counter CCNY’s *American Dilemma* project. “It wasn’t long before some of the black members Herskovits selected to be on the committee started clamoring for a greater black representation.” Harris was resolutely revolutionary. He noted among the committee a growing influence of black committee members…. Although its personnel had often changed, Herskovits remained chairman throughout the committee’s existence, and its black membership was always outnumbered…. Because he was losing his influence, Herskovits even thought of dismissing the whole panel…they agreed [some] would be replaced by more ‘cooperative’ members.

Herskovits’ “inability to harness the group” led to a state of “unmanageability.” When Gunnar Myrdal decided to ignore

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21 Gates, 213. “So convinced was Du Bois that his project would be funded that he invited [assistant editor] Rayford Logan to wait with him at his office for the phone call that he had been promised immediately following the Carnegie board meeting. A bottle of vintage champagne sat chilling on Du Bois’ desk in a silver bucket, two cut-glass champagne flutes resting nearby. The phone never rang.”

22 Gates, 213.

23 Gates, 204. “‘The real work,’ he confessed, ‘I want done by Negroes.’”


25 Harris, 325-326, 329.
Herskovits’ theory of African survivals in his study, Herskovits went on to recuse himself from doing any reviews of the project.26

George Eaton Simpson’s biography Melville J. Herskovits presents a necessary counterpoint to the Herskovits story. He sees the esteemed scholar as someone who, “tried to combat the confusions which are rampant in the United States and the world concerning the biological social and cultural aspects of [black people].” He portrays Herskovits as, “Brilliant, but at times obdurate; competitive, but extremely generous to friends; confident when he was in control of a situation, but sometimes insecure when he was not; amiable, witty, and salty, but disdainful of those who did not meet his standards or who disagreed with him on questions about which he felt strongly.”27

An Africanist of the late 1960s looking back at the history of the ASA would be leery of their early agenda. The print run of the African Studies Bulletin revealed causes and indications of the conflagration to come. The first issue in April of 1958 leaves two distinct impressions. First, the CCNY was a magnanimous benefactor of African Studies to whom dozens of scholars owed a world of debt. The very first page of the first issue says as much in a Letter from the Editor written by Herskovits.28 In it, he thanks the CCNY for helping the cause of African Studies with sponsored research trips. Second, the issue devotes seven of its thirty-one pages to listing graduate students who received Ford Foundation grants.29 But it is doubtful whether Ford was a pre-eminent enough grant-giving institution to merit this exclusive and extensive treatment. Neither the CCNY’s connection with Northwestern nor Ford’s connection with the ASA is fully disclosed within the pages of this issue.

Page three of the ASB’s first issue is the one that would get the ASA into so much trouble eleven years later:

the participants at the [1957 New York] conference felt that the purposes of the Association should be:

26 David Southern, “An American Dilemma after Fifty Years: Putting the Myrdal Study and Black-White Relations in Perspective,” The History Teacher, 28, no. 2 (February 1995): 233-239. Frazier claimed that Myrdal, to his credit, “Didn’t indulge in a lot of foolish talk about the peculiar contributions of the Negro and his deep spirituality.”
27 Simpson, 7.
To facilitate communication among scholars interested in Africa;
To collect and disseminate information on Africa useful to its members;
To stimulate and facilitate research on Africa in ways appropriate to a scholarly organization;
To hold such meetings dealing with the general topic of African Studies as shall be deemed appropriate for its purposes.30

Nowhere is there any mention of using the information disseminated by the association to help the federal government gain more knowledge of sub-Saharan Africa in light of Soviet encroachment, but many revolutionaries would suggest that that was exactly what was taking place.

Every year, the ASB published a listing under the heading “African Studies in the United States” of all the African Studies programs including faculty that submitted their curricula before print time. While we cannot presume this to be an exhaustive list, many of the schools listed were among the first institutions to receive either private or federal grants for African Studies. The faculty lists and the Ford Foundation grantees read like a who-is-who of luminaries-in-the-making.

Columbia alum Immanuel Wallerstein was one of the few graduate students listed in this issue as a grant recipient in consecutive years.31 Wallerstein went on to become a prominent figure in the ASA, as well as the innovator of world-systems theory, a concept now ubiquitous in the social sciences. Listed in this first issue of the ASB among Ford Foundation grantees as a doctoral candidate at Columbia University, Professor Skinner went on to join Wallerstein and L. Gray Cowan on the faculty. Cowan was ASA president when John Henrik Clarke engineered the 1969 schism.32

There were indications that the rising revolutionaries and the established contingent of patriots might meet on common ground. The December 1959 issue of the ASB featured a lengthy article called “A Social Scientist in Africa,” by founding board member and new ASA president Gwendolen Carter, presenting her thoughts

30 Ibid., 3.
32 Ibid., 27.
about Africa’s independence movements. Carter was a patriot who proffered suggestions on how African countries could transition to populist democracies. At best a gradualist, she endorsed “limited” democracies that espoused “majority rule which is balanced by respect for minority rights.” Carter’s position on native rule is significant, as the AHSA would later justify their decision to break away by citing the ASA’s refusal to endorse African independence movements. One senses that if dissatisfied revolutionaries had opened up a dialogue with the more liberal patriots, many similar paths of thought would have been revealed, possibly avoiding the schism altogether. Carter’s article deftly avoids offending anyone in the corporate hierarchy while leaving room for some progressive thought.

In the May 1961 issue, the University of Wisconsin’s inaugural faculty listing features Philip Curtin, heretofore a colonial historian of some renown. Curtin is legendary among patriots as the historian who undertook the arduous task of trying to count exactly how many slaves were brought across the Atlantic, using import figures and adjusted slave population calculations. A generation of students has since explored Curtin’s conclusions.

Unfortunately, Curtin is best known among revolutionaries as the author of the infamous 1995 article, “Ghettoizing African Studies,” which was essentially an editorial-length gripe about the fact that his white colleagues were being passed over for jobs in favor of black Africanists. The article is mentioned in at least three pieces of revolutionary literature on African Studies written since its publication, and it became an icon of the divide between the two generations of African scholars.

The cover of the December 1962 issue features a personal letter from John F. Kennedy acknowledging the growing importance of

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36 Ralph Austin, review of Africans in Bondage: Studies in Slavery and the Slave Trade edited by Paul Lovejoy, The Journal of Economic History, 47, no. 3 (September 1987): 869. Africans in Bondage was written “in [Curtin’s] honor…and deals with slavery from different angles.”
Africa in world events. The president also emphasized the significance of the ASA’s role in encouraging understanding between America and the countries of Africa. An enormously patriotic indicator, the letter must have been quite a professional distinction for the members of the ASA. The letter achieves special poignancy since the President would be assassinated within a year, having never seen his hopes for the association realized.

Almost presaging the debacle to come, Margaret Bates laments the sorry state of relations the ASA has developed with Africa in a Letter from the Editor in the October issue. She lists a number of measures the ASA could take to erase an image she feels is becoming too aligned with American imperialism. The letter depicts a passive organization disconnected from its subject area, encumbered by a collection of teachers who have done little to teach Africans or Americans about the continent, and directed by a mostly white elite who are among the first to recognize a global trend of white demonization. The ASA was now a self-identified apolitical organization that, nonetheless, had become identified with the ruling class. “Vietnam changed everything,” says noted classical historian Stanley Burstein. “After Vietnam, intellectuals were far less willing to be perceived as working with the U.S. government.”

At the 1965 Philadelphia meeting of the ASA, Dr. P. Chike Onwauchi, a Nigerian scholar, “bitterly complained to Afro-American [sic] members of the ASA about white intellectual arrogance in regard to African affairs.” In April of 1968, the assassination of Martin Luther King ignited physical and psychological firestorms. In October of that year, a few intellectuals sought redress at the annual ASA meeting in Los Angeles. Onwauchi, esteemed “amateur” historian John Henrik Clarke, and Leonard Jeffries, a doctoral student of Elliot Skinner and L. Gray Cowan at Columbia, formed the Black Caucus of the ASA.

The Black Caucus inaugurated their formation by calling upon the general body of the ASA:

To render itself more relevant to deal with the conditions of black people in Africa and the African diaspora;

To increase the number of blacks in policy-making positions in the organization;


40 Skinner, 62.
To address itself to the youth of the country;
To seek out African and Afro-American scholars to direct
the emerging Afro-American Studies Centers.\textsuperscript{41}

Two of the leaders of the movement, Skinner and Clarke, differ
on the terminology in their recounting of these tumultuous days.
Clarke states that the purpose of the 1968 meeting was to “demand
decision-making positions within the ASA.”\textsuperscript{42} Skinner finds that the
ASA was “called upon” to address the Caucus’ grievances.\textsuperscript{43} Were
the caucus members simply inviting the ASA to reform or were they
making demands of them? This is a very important distinction, as
one speaks to reconciliation, while the other speaks to revolution. It
is likely that members of the ASA already considered themselves
part of quite the progressive organization. Both a woman and a
person of color were on the inaugural board of directors in 1957.\textsuperscript{44}
Also, they eschewed any sort of segregationist invitation policies in
their annual meetings.

At the opening session of the Montreal meeting the next year,
the Black Caucus had forged a new brand: the African Heritage
Studies Association. But instead of patiently working out their
differences with the committee that President Cowan had appointed
to resolve the situation, “a group of black American students seized
the microphone from Senegalese ambassador Gabriel d’Arboussier,
demanding that ‘the ideological framework of the ASA, which
perpetuates colonialism and neocolonialism…be changed
immediately,’” according to Jane Haynes of the journal \textit{Africa Report}.\textsuperscript{45} The language is unequivocal that the time for invitations
had passed. When French sociologist George Balandier got up to
speak, “he had the microphone snatched away by black militants.”
The next four days can best be described as barely-controlled
chaos. Haynes reports scenes of black nationalists shouting verbal
abuse during scheduled panels and films. She evokes harrumphing
scholars who had been looking forward to a vacation in French

\textsuperscript{41} Skinner, 62.
\textsuperscript{42} John Henrik Clarke, “The African Heritage Studies Association: Some Notes on
the Conflict with the African Studies Association and the Fight to Reclaim
African History,” \textit{Issue: A Journal of Opinion}, 6, no. 2/3 (Summer/Autumn
\textsuperscript{43} Skinner, 62.
\textsuperscript{44} \textit{African Studies Bulletin}, 1, no. 1.
\textsuperscript{45} Jane Haynes, “ASA Meeting Disrupted by Racial Crisis,” \textit{Africa Report}, 14, no. 8
(December 1969): 16.
Canada. On the third day, a motion for racial parity on the ASA board was put down 104 to 93, and John Henrik Clarke asked all blacks present to walk out peacefully. ASA patriots must have been surprised to see former Herskovits student Johnetta Cole comply, and then resign from the board.\textsuperscript{46} The association was in tatters.

It is useful to note Immanuel Wallerstein’s shift of focus following the events in Montreal. Prior to 1974, the scholar wrote almost exclusively of African politics. After Montreal, he only wrote one more book on Africa before beginning his work on world-systems theory. This controversial philosophy is an anti-imperialist critique of the capitalist/corporate structure along Marxist themes of global economic oppression. Writing in retrospect, he claimed that 1968 saw a “world-revolution,” that consisted of “a denunciation of the world-system dominated by the United States, in collusion with its rhetorical opponent the U.S.S.R. and a critique of the Old Left for its failures, and is spectacular for the fact that its multiple movements had become mere avatars.”\textsuperscript{47}

The first generation of the ASA did not see themselves as “collaborators.” Indeed, they were raised in an era when it was one’s civic duty to aid their government if possible. Herskovits knew that he personally would not receive all the money from funding sources—nor would Northwestern—but he suspected that the member universities of his ASA, his corporation, definitely could.

One of the scholars Herskovits excluded from his corporate structure was African American leader W.E.B. Du Bois. He was not a “company man,” and so, in true market tradition, he had to be eliminated. The ASB provided commercial plugs for the ASA’s two biggest benefactors, both of which were likely receiving funding suggestions from the federal government. But by decade’s end, the Vietnam War would find many Americans questioning previous convictions about the moral rectitude of the U.S. government and institutions tied to it.

Margaret Bates’ letter in the ASB speaks to ideological diversity growing within the ranks of the ASA. Martin Luther King had written his “Letter from a Birmingham Jail” the year before, and would March on Selma only a few months after Bates’ letter

\textsuperscript{46} Skinner, 65.
appeared. Bates continues the debate Carter began five years before. Call this her “Letter from a New York City Brownstone.”

Right away, forming a black subdivision of an African Studies organization should have occurred to someone in the Black Caucus as the height of absurdity. Such an organization should at least be able to approximate Dr. King’s dream of racial congregation. The Black Caucus’ immediate impulse was not to open a dialogue, but to form a separatist coalition that excluded all people born of a different skin color, and then start a dialogue. They, in fact, began to incorporate. But the prestige the ASA had earned by this point would indicate that they were not the type of organization to take demands very well. Unfortunately for this conflict’s resolution, the Black Caucus’ model was Black Nationalism, and that model was no compromise. Its motto was “Stick it to the Man!” and “Get Whitey!” and it did not abide by patient deliberate discussion. It was justified for Dr. King to presume racism within a given power structure; he was fighting against the entrenched legacy of the Deep South, where white masculinity was bound up in the control of black people. Was such a mentality predominant in the ASA? Maybe. No one ever bothered to find out. The Black Caucus was following a model.

It is important to quote the media report of the 1969 meeting in Montreal because that was what school administrators who were not at the meeting were going to read. That was what the State Department officials who controlled Title VI purse strings were going to read. Representatives from Ford and Carnegie were all going to read about a bunch of young black men “seizing” and “snatching” things and they were by now familiar with that paradigm. But it is unlikely these students were really black militants. They were more likely upper- to middle-class blacks looking forward to holding lucrative university positions someday.

Though some scholars (notably, female) did attempt to build bridges between patriots and revolutionaries, these lines of communication were not pursued satisfactorily. By 1969, the competitive instincts of both sides had created a divide a mile wide. Coming together at that point would have been tantamount to Coke and Pepsi coming together to form the “perfect cola.” It was not going to happen. Revolutionaries were not interested in compromise; patriots were not interested in listening. They both

48 This assertion is borne out by Skinner’s rather smug assessment that “many of the whites did not seem to be aware of the tensions among blacks,” Skinner, 63.
simply wanted to “win, “and there is nothing more American than that. Maybe the revolutionaries were true patriots after all.

Gwendolyn Mikell and Sandra Greene both blame the political turmoil and negative media coverage of Africa as the reason for the downturn in federal and foundation funding of African Studies in the 1970s and 1980s. But the Cold War was far from over, and “political turmoil” meant allies could still be won or lost. Jane Guyer believes the government became more interested in training African scholars in practical skills than academic research. This is likely, but if the scholarship has also lost vitality, it follows that policy makers will look elsewhere for funding. One might point to the conflict within the field itself as a funding deterrent. Why would State Department officials and Keppel’s successors at CCNY feel motivated to contribute money to a field experiencing an identity crisis? How would it know what to do with such funding?

In Montreal white radicals circulated a publication called African Studies in America: The Extended Family—Who They Are, Why to Fight Them. It is a profoundly cowardly work, primarily because no one involved in its publication had enough temerity to sign their name to it even though they called out Africanists like Carter and Wallerstein by name. In it, the old guard of African scholars are taken to task for collaborating with the government in trying to extend the white man’s hold over the African intellectual domain. Though Wallerstein has been criticized as being at best “out of tune,” and at worst “imperialist” and “Eurocentric,” many do not give enough credit to the profound ideological shift the events of the late 1960s had on his work.

The Extended Family letter serves as a sobering counterpoint to Herskovits’ letter of boundless optimism printed only eleven years earlier. How can a fracture like this be repaired? Perhaps Greene said it best when she stated that in order for the association to reverse its status as irrelevant to those in the policy world, “it will require an openness, a commitment to dialogue and communication

49 Mikell, 11; Greene, 6.
50 Guyer, 5-10.
not only with others, but among ourselves as well."53 That would be a more appropriate way to honor Dr. King’s legacy, perhaps.

53 Greene, 12.