Phil 327 Intersectionality

Crenshaw “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex”

(1)    We distinguish discrete features on the basis of which somebody might be oppressed (e.g., race, ethnicity, nationality, language, sex, sexual orientation, class etc.). In treating these features as discrete (singular, individual), we don’t notice that sometimes these features are so entirely blended together that they are merely different aspects of the same form of oppression. For example, if black women are denied employment because they are black women, then we can say that the two features of discrimination (race and sex) are interlocking. They cannot be separated. (NOTE: Crenshaw does not use the term ‘interlocking’. I borrow it from Collins and Lugones).

(2)    By focusing only on features as discrete (singular, individual), we erase the possibility of interlocking oppression, and therefore fail to deal with such forms of oppression. Consequently the experiences of those who fall prey to interlocking oppression are rendered invisible (i.e. erased). 

Note: By ‘erased’ I mean that something (or someone) is left off of the ‘cultural map’. They are not included in ‘our’ understanding of things. For example: The assumption that somebody is either gay or straight erases the possibility of bisexuality.

(3)    According to Crenshaw, black women can be discriminated against (a) on the basis of race alone, (b) on the basis of sex alone, (c) on the basis of race and sex (as distinct features), and (d) on the basis of race/sex as interlocking. For example: A black woman may be vulnerable to sexual harassment (as a woman) as well as racial slurs (as a Black human being). She may also be vulnerable to sexual harassment/racial slurs that are blended together into one thing.

(4)    According to Crenshaw, when we focus only on features taken as discrete (singular, individual), we end up privileging those who do not experience interlocking forms of discrimination, and who only experience single-feature discrimination. In this way, a white woman’s perspective of sexism may be taken as representative of sexism in a way that a black woman’s perspective is not. (The thought is: What does race have to do with sexism?). ‘But for’ sexism, a (white) woman would not experience discrimination. ‘But for’ racism, a black (man) would not experience discrimination. Both attempts to single out discrete features requires that certain perspectives be privileged.

(5)    According to Crenshaw, this ‘top-down’ approach of helping people who would be ok ‘but for . . .’ only leaves in place a system of privilege. Thus, the racial privilege of white women is ‘hidden’ (to white women) when we focus on sexism as ‘but for sex’. Thus, the sexual privilege of straight black men is ‘hidden’ (to straight black men) when we focus on racism as ‘but for race’. According to Crenshaw, we need to start by taking interlocking oppression seriously, and focusing first on those who have been victims of this kind of oppression.