The Media and Violence Juncture: Where Ideology
Creates an Empirical Science Myth
A review of
Media
Violence and Aggression: Science and Ideology
By: Tom Grimes, James A. Anderson and Lori Bergen
Reviewed by
Stuart Fischoff, Ph.D.
Online Publication Date: May 23, 2008
Journal of Media Psychology, V 13, No. 2, Spring, 2008
Professor Harold
Hill is the fictional, early 20th century traveling salesman and
charming charlatan in the Meredith Willson musical, The Music
When Professor
Hill sings the wonderful song Ya Got Trouble,
in the span of several minutes of unleashed, foreboding, electrifying lyrics,
Hill inflates parental fears for their children’s wellbeing, and then, like the
savvy social psychologist that con men often can be, he offers the solution to this
hair-raising, dreaded teenage fall into “degggg-ra-dation”--learning to play an
instrument for the River City Boy’s band.
The parents breathe a sigh of relief.
Morality will be preserved. Evil temptation vanquished.
The media takes a
beating in this fictional town in Iowa, and for rather devious reasons—to get
parents to buy uniforms and instruments for their “at risk” children. Professor Hill’s bamboozling formula is
rather simple: Arouse fear. Create a villain.
Offer a solution. Look like a hero.
Actually, popular culture and the media have taken a beating, in one form or another, at least since Plato saw the arts as a source evoking emotions and acts of imitation, acts which violate the moral, ethical standards of the Republic (sound familiar?). Throughout western history, every new media innovation has had concussive impact on the populace and power elites. This has been a consistent patter, from Gutenberg’s printing press to the popularization of all forms of sound recording and films, to radio, the paperback, and television to the new media kid on the block, the Internet. All have raised fears in adults of youth (or the underclass in general) succumbing to blandishments of drugs, sex, aggression and/or rebelliousness.
Once the cry of
concern is raised, elected officials, at one level or another, gallop to the
rescue, legislative remedies in mind or in hand. But just as often the agenda of media danger
is set by politicians and non-governmental religious leaders for their own
political, fund raising, or power-grabbing, power-holding “Fallwellian” ends. In modern times, most municipal government or
religious institutions have, at one time or another, raged against the machine
of media influence. Media innovations have frequently been seen, directly or
indirectly, as real or potential despoilers of minds. Prof. Hill’s bamboozling formula has worked
just as well in arousing the public’s media fears in real life as it did in the
musical, The Music
The seemingly
contagious, sometimes almost hysterical fear of media violence effects is explored
in the book under review, Media Violence and Aggression: Science and
Ideology, and explored in some enlightening detail. The authors, Tom Grimes, James A. Anderson
and Lori Bergen, label as examples of “moral panic,” the social distress
reactions to purported media effects and the endless calls for censorship.
The history of censorship moves against the
entertainment media in the
On the matter of protecting children, the authors make the bold and long overdo argument that the societal perception of childhood as a psychologically and media- vulnerable state is both alarmist and exaggerated, and fed by social, academic, and political agenda-setting influence groups. In effect, they contend that allegations of elevated levels of media anxiety are often more than a little overwrought (recall, for example, Janet Jackson’s Superbowl “nipplegate.”) and they viewed as fanciful the fear that the event might traumatize unsuspecting child viewers. (Incidentally, no data has ever been adduced to support injurious fears over “nipplegate”).
Reading the authors’ disquisition on this subject reminds
one of Helen Keller’s observation concerning parents and their institutional
surrogates trying to shield or protect children from life’s truths, and the
folly to which such intents are heir: "Security
is mostly a superstition. It does not exist in nature, nor do the children of
men as a whole experience it. Avoiding danger is no safer in the long run than
outright exposure. Life is either a daring adventure or nothing at all." -
Helen Keller
The authors meticulously explore and question what
they label as the media violence/social aggression myth (or what I like to call
the elusive media-violence connection), i.e., the fairly universal belief, both
inside and outside of academia, that viewing violence portrayed in the mass news
and entertainment media contributes directly (and sometimes even linearly) to
violence and aggression in society by virtue of viewer arousal and copy cat
impulses to act aggressively. The
authors find the causal or causationist arguments pervasively overstated and
empirically and theoretically burdened.
These same arguments are creatively and refreshingly examined from a
variety of historical, logical, methodological, epistemological, political,
values, and empirical perspectives. The
authors effectively frame, for example the issue of the relationship of media
violence and real life violent behavior historically, in essentially three
ways:
1. Theopolitical: governmental
bodies and religious or citizens’ groups point to media’ portrayals of criminal
or violent behavior as contributing to anti-social behavior. But it may actually be an issue of the
violation of religious-moral standards, not scientific evidence about viewer
aggressive behavior which is the real source of outrage and oft-accompanied veiled
or less veiled threats of censorship.
2. Politicians’ factual inability or simple
political reluctance to either address or correct social forces which are the
demonstrable and principal etiological or causal factors in so much antisocial
behavior (e.g., poverty, neighborhood crime, gangs, birth control,
unemployment, etc.). Instead, politicians
focus public attention away from social conditions and onto the media --an
oft-used political sleight-of-hand strategy!
The authors encapsulate this strategy in symbolic political theory,
where what the government purports to be doing (looking at crime and violence data
and trying to find and attack root causes) is symbolically as important as actual
declines in aggressive or criminal behavior.
No surprise then, that there are periodic hearings on media violence. Free speech, First Amendment issues notwithstanding, ultimately little is actually done to control media fare. In fact, violent sounds and images have been increasing across all media venues and platforms.
Follow the money,
as the saying goes. It is often stated
that the media are plum scapegoating targets for social violence problems because
they have no natural constituency. This
overlooks the fact, however, that the media do have lobbyists and huge cash
reserves for political contributions.
3. Government and
religious organizations work in tandem with a third force, academic researchers
who provide the “data” to back up criticism of media-portrayed violence. Through the mechanism of grants, this data
reportage encourages further research and resultant data. Sincere or cynical
academics find a funding home by endlessly looking at destructive media
effects, year after year, after year, with the same or similar paradigms. The end result: Hundreds of “academically respectable” studies
all converging and pointing in the same direction, offering a formidable war
wagon against media producers and their First Amendment supporters, and easily
arousing public support for the idea of containing or censoring media
violence. It is a comfortable cycle.
But, as the
authors note, the convergence argument rises or falls on the construct validity
of such methodological matters as operational definitions of aggression (throwing
a rock vs. throwing a tantrum) across the wide number of studies frequently
cited or used heuristically to advance media violence theory, research and
predictive hypotheses.
The authors take
strong issue with the notion of convergence as it concerns media violence
research and painstakingly examine the major pitfalls in extrapolating results
from experimental settings to real world behavior, especially e.g., mass murder
and myriad and other acts beyond after-school rough housing and aggression in
competitive sports. They make persuasive
cases for the poor or inconsistent predictive value of so many of the most
hallowed aggression hypotheses and find operational definitions of aggression
often risible, e.g., blowing puffs of air in an adversary’s eye. They also lay out a strong case for why any
truly meaningful social policy cannot be derived from the extant literature on
media and violence.
It is persuasively
noted, in line with what psychologist Fritz Heider once called naïve psychology, that many people,
academics and non-academics alike, after listening to dire warnings about
media-portrayed aggression, reflect on their own developmental experiences with
media violence and conclude that the glove doesn’t fit. That is, they are not ready to convict the
media as readily as are some inside and outside of academia who see media
violence as a major and direct cause of aggressive behavior.
Correctively, the
authors discuss the need to view media effects in a social context. For the vast majority of people, they note,
it is the non-violent response that is far and away the most likely reaction to
viewing media portrayed violence. They
advocate research which separates out the normal response to media
violence/aggression from the demonstrably infrequent, pathological, deviant,
abnormal aggressive response, responses affected less by media images and more by
personality, social expectations of peer groups or even self-radicalizing dyadic
forces, as exemplified in the case of the Columbine High School massacre by teens
Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold.
The recent launch
of Grand Theft Auto IV (
The authors also recommend
that instead of using the same flawed and fatigued research designs which
provide the same corroborating but constructively questionable results, researchers
should utilize research paradigms that separate out an adrenaline high from
watching exciting action and/or exciting violence from the excitation concomitant
with pre-existing chronic anger states or track records of violence jags,
conditions present while watching or gaming the material in products like
All is not perfect
in the book, however. Its strong stress
on normal vs. what they describe as behavioral pathology (reacting to media
violence with personal violence) might be too strenuous a dividing line and too
abnormalizing of much productive or anti-social reactions to, for example,
threat. It’s entirely likely that
reacting aggressively to external stimuli subsequent to observing media
violence may likely be more of what psychologists like Walter Mischel would
describe as a matter of person variables (traits, experiences and related
cognitions, perceptions and expectations) as compared with allegedly eliciting
stimuli such as media content per se. In
other words, it’s likely that it is the perception of the stimulus, not the
stimulus per se, which is the important moderating variable in whether any sort
of stimulus, but especially aggressive ones, will be seen as a call to action
or a call to benign reaction or a just response to a life threat. Pathology
might motivate or mediate some aggressive behavior, but certainly not most.
Perhaps the
authors’ most comprehensive assault on critics of the media and advocates for its
censorship lies with what the authors believe to be the radical change in the
media landscape and the ways in which people self-expose to media content. By this they mean the explosion of cross-platform
availability of information or programming originating in one medium source,
like TV, but available readily on other platforms and venues like telephone- or
Internet- connected PDAs. The authors
make three points about the impact of these technologies on media use:
1.
It is no longer possible to address the contemporary
situation from studies conducted as little as a decade ago since the
mediascapes in which those studies were temporally and technologically located
effectively no longer exist.
2.
It is no longer possible to address the effect of any
particular medium or any medium delivering some specific content since in
reality such separability rarely exists.
Increasingly, programming from one medium is repurposed and found on
other media thereby bypassing most point of entry screening strategies.
3.
It is no longer possible to actually “control” media
content. Media content can be removed
from programming or relegated to cable or subscription channels but the same or
equivalent material is available in other venues, even in countries as
state-controlled as China or Saudi Arabia.
The authors offer
a more plausible hypothesis regarding the media-violence connection: “Exposure
to media violence cannot, itself, induce aggression. There must be both the presence of
social-environmental variables that interact with a psychological
predisposition to aggression as well as the absence of suppressor variables
(such as internal and external behavioral control variables) for the
relationship between exposure and aggression to appear.” (p 201)
The authors of Media Violence and Aggression: Science and Ideology, Tom Grimes, James A. Anderson, and Lori Bergen, are determined to leave no stone unturned, no perspectives unexplored, no names left unnamed of those in the field with whom, on both empirical and theoretical grounds, they strenuously disagree. It is an engaging book that needed to be and is up close and personal. In so doing, they have produced what may be the most comprehensive critique and rebuttal to date of the omnipresent media-violence and aggression argument.