August 19, 1993
Ron Harris
Dear Mr. Harris:
Thank you for your comments on my paper on volition. Here are some thoughts in response. I should say the basic problem is that you have dropped the context of the issue involved: "a positive theory of volition". That is, the question addressed in my paper is not: "Is volition possible?" but "How is volition possible?" Thus your re-statement of the traditional argument against determinism doesn't really address the question. Let me turn to a few specifics.
Appeal to the stone: The classic argument against the determinist has the form:
p1 If knowledge is possible, the knower is non-deterministic. [I take this to have been proved.]
p2 You are a knower. [By your own assertion of knowledge, viz, that you are deterministic.]
c Therefore knowledge is possible, and you are non-deterministic.
(This of course telescopes some syllogisms to save space.) Clearly there are some problems already with p2, since what the determinist "knows" is false! But if the claim of determinism is on a stone, the argument fails totally, since the stone is not a knower. You quite correctly point out that a better formulation is:
p1 If knowledge is possible, the knower is non-deterministic.
p2 I am a knower. [because I can understand the question; or, indeed, because I can understand that there is a question]
c Therefore knowledge is possible, and I am non-deterministic.
The first formulation is insufficient because, as one logic text puts it, it "refutes the arguer but not the argument". This is illustrated by the engraved stone example. The second formulation, while valid, appeals to pure introspection. I take it, as you do, to be a sufficient proof of non-determinism. But there remains the issue: Assuming non-determinism to be equivalent to volition, what is volition?
Contradiction: You wish to reserve the term "self- contradiction" for statements of the form < S is not [definition of S] >. Presumably you would also admit the form < p implies not-p >. Since such flagrant cases are almost never met with in actual practice, it seems rather inefficient to reserve a special term for them. Real-life self-contradictions, even when "obvious", usually involve a fairly long chain of reasoning. As an exercise, you might try formally proving that a sphere does not have eight corners. See if you can do it in fewer statements than the classical proof of the irrationality of the square root of two . . .
Chance and randomness: It can be argued that coin flips are deterministic. So I say (p. 77), "or, to be more rigorous, checks whether a radioactive atom has decayed". Now, you may wish to challenge even this, as you suggest the possibility that "we can show there is no such thing as metaphysical chance". This strikes me as a rather ambitious program; I declined to attempt it myself (p. 69). However, even if you can carry it out, my point that determistic action is merely a special case of stochastic action remains valid.
Wholes and parts: Here again the context is dropped. "How can the whole possess the property of volition . . ." (p. 74) [emphasis added]. I'm well aware of the fallacy of composition, thank you. There is no denial here of emergent properties; the issue is, how do they emerge?
The (pseudo)thought experiment: Once more the context is dropped. Of course the experiment presupposes the existence of volition. Its purpose is to develop a definition -- a non-subjective, non-introspective definition -- of volition.
Predictions and probabilities: Regrettably, my own discussion of the prediction issue was edited out of the paper; you might have found it more clear. Briefly: The business of physics may be expressed as: Given a system of physical entities in some initial state, predict the future state(s) of the system.
Now, when I say such a prediction can be done "in principle" I mean: if the system is sufficiently well characterized, and if the mathematical model used is actually congruent to the reality, then the future state(s) can be predicted to within sufficient accuracy. One need merely be a sufficiently good mathematician and have sufficient time and calculating resources.
In general it can be shown that if the model contains no singularities the system is deterministic and non-chaotic and its behavior can "in principle" be calculated. Existence theorems can be used to show that there is a solution; methods such as continous analytic continuation can approximate it to a desired degree of accuracy.
For systems which cannot be represented without resort to singularities, determinism breaks down. Now one cannot predict the actual behavior of the system; one can only calculate (even "in principle") probabilities. Such systems are, in general, stochastic.
So. One may argue over such issues as whether any actual phenomenon can be really stochastic (as mentioned above). Still there must be some maximum extent to which physical phenomena (actual or hypothetical) are predictable ("in principle"), given a set of physical laws and the appropriate system conditions. But, as Goedel's Theorem shows, there must still be some possible physical phenomena which cannot be predicted even under these assumptions (or more precisely, which can be predicted but not from the laws of physics), and it is these phenomena which I identify with volitional action.
Knowledge: I certainly cannot agree that absolute truth "is far more than limited man can ever hope to achieve." Why should it be? I know a great many absolute truths, from the Law of Identity to the reactivity of certain rhodium complexes with oxygen.
Contradictions in reality: Again it ought to have been clear from the context that the "laws of physics" referred to are the real laws, not some approximation or partial formulation such as Newtonian mechanics.
I'm glad you found my paper stimulating, and I thank you for taking the time to write such an extended critique.
Sincerely,
Ronald E. Merrill
cc: S. Boydstun
April 6, 1994
Ron Harris
Dear Mr. Harris:
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to further clarify my thoughts on the volition issue.
As I mentioned at the beginning of my paper, there is inevitably a problem in dealing with any philosophical issue when there remain unresolved questions at deeper levels. Ideally, one would never take up a question in epistemology or ethics without first having accomplished a complete elucidation of the field of metaphysics, on which they conceptually and logically depend. But of course this is not practical. The difficulties you cite arise because I had perforce to take certain principles at these deeper levels for granted in writing a short paper on volition. Let me see if I can clear up some of these issues.
Let me begin with your statement that "the fact of volition is pre-eminent among facts". As an Objectivist, I cannot accept this. The fact of existence is pre-eminent among facts. This is not to deny that volition is axiomatic, so that nothing in reality can contradict it. If anything we observe appears to rule out the possibility of volition, we must resolve the contradiction by improving our understanding of what we observe. And indeed, that is exactly the object at which I aimed in my paper. There are those who claim that the observed facts of physics are incompatible with volition; what I show is that this is not the case.
But existence is primary. What you call "absolute scientific truth", and physicists call "God's equation list", is not a "seemingly plausible fiction"; it is not "postulated". Existence exists; that is axiomatic. Entities obey the laws of logic and behave in distinctive ways according to their nature; that also is axiomatic (the "axiom of causality"). The specific patterns of causality in reality, at the most fundamental level, constitute physics ("absolute scientific truth"), and that portion of these patterns that we currently understand constitutes known physics. I emphasize again that the existence of what I am calling physics ("absolute scientific truth") is not something that we extrapolate or guess to be true from known physics. We know a priori that it is "there" to be discovered. We can be certain of it because it is implied by the axioms of existence and causality; just as we can be certain of volition because it is implied by the axiom of consciousness.
Let me take up a couple of other points. I can see that I have left some confusion about scientific "fact" and "theory". This arises simply because I do not believe facts, at least above the purely perceptual level, can be known in the absence of "theory" or interpretation. Thus in order to know the "fact" that gravity exists, we must have an interpretation of perceptual phenomena. We have already put in theoretical content when we made the preliminary conclusions that certain objects are "falling" or that the reason we do not float off the ground is that there is a "force" holding us down. If we remove all the "theory" searching for a "pure" fact, we remove all the meaning and are left with nothing but raw sense data which tell us nothing specific. In other words, I (more or less) agree with Quine and others that all observation is "theory-laden"; but unlike them, I don't consider that this implies a relativistic or subjectivist position in epistemology.
The more significant issue you bring up, if I understand you rightly, is the question of reductionism. That is, can everything be explained in terms of physics? The difficulty arises here because we use "explain" in two senses. Let's take them in turn.
We may construe "explain" in a conceptual sense, so that the question may be rephrased: Can we understand everything in terms of physics? To answer this "yes" is to take a position of epistemological reductionism. Generally speaking, epistemological reductionism is incorrect. As I am here using the term, "physics" refers to the primary or elementary causal relationships in the universe. Other parts of science study more complex, composite forms of causality. Although concepts from physics are sometimes useful in other fields such as biology, in general this is not so. Because knowledge is heirarchical, concepts must be adapted appropriately to the level of complexity one is working with. Thus we use chemical concepts in chemistry, psychological concepts in psychology, and so on. Furthermore, "emergent" properties, almost by definition, cannot be handled in concepts below their level of emergence.
But we may also construe "explain" in a causal sense. Then the question may be rephrased: Do all causal connections in reality ultimately consist of, or reduce to, physical causes (ie, causes which lie in the domain of physics)? To answer this "yes" is to take a position of metaphysical reductionism. Generally speaking, metaphysical reductionism is correct. We now understand that reality is and must be a seamless causal whole. If there were any part of reality which had its own set of causal connections, unattached to the rest, it would constitute a separate universe which we could not perceive. Thus, for instance, vitalism (which held that the causes of biological action could not be reduced or connected to chemical causality) could have been ruled out of court a priori, even before experimental results proved it false.
Now, volition has seemed to be an exception to metaphysical reductionism. But this cannot be. Volition is an axiomatic truth--but so is causality. The only resolution of the apparent contradiction is to take volitional causation to be fundamental in itself--that is, to take volition to be part of physics as I have above delimited it. To do so must of course prevent completion of any program which envisions organizing all of physics under an "axiomatic" system. (That is, a system in which all truths are logically derivable from a finite number of basic principles or "axioms"--not axioms in the Objectivist sense.) But, as I point out, no such program could be carried out anyway; we know this from Goedel's Theorem.
Let me say this again in a different way. What causes the choices made by sentient beings such as humans? In the traditional view, these choices have been regarded as the result of composite causality, the outcome of a very complex structure of primary causal interactions at the level of physics. Thus my choice to eat vanilla ice cream could in principle be accounted for in terms of electrons taking on certain energy levels, atoms and ions and molecules moving among various cellular structures, and so on. But this view must regard volition as an emergent property, and no plausible mechanism for its emergence has been proposed. What I pointed out in my paper is that we can avoid this dead end by recognizing that the causes of volitional choices are themselves primary and not composite causes.
Turning to another subject, I would like to challenge the idea that there is any inherent difference between philosophical and scientific facts or questions. Science, broadly defined, refers to learning about reality by applying logic to observations. But of course this is how we know everything that we know. In common discourse we apply the term "science" only to the systematized study of reality. And we commonly, by convention, exclude "scholarly" fields such as history as well as philosophy. But this is only convention. In practice, to the extent that we practice these disciplines as a means of knowing, we treat them as sciences. Thus, for instance, in ethics, which is considered a philosophical field, Objectivism relies on specific empirical facts about human biology and psychology. You seem to say that "the existence of volition is not a scientific fact" because it can be shown from an a priori position; viz, that its negative, determinism, cannot be self-consistently asserted. But this is also a method used in science. For instance, Newtonian physics was abandoned ultimately because it could be shown not to be self-consistent. That is, it not only was not consistent with experimental facts; that could have been, and often was, explained away. What really killed the Newtonian worldview was the demonstration that, being non-self-consistent, it could never be consistent with fact.
Finally, with regard to the issue of metaphysical chance: The argument of Peikoff which you cite does not really address this issue. To see this, consider a human being such a myself--for I am an entity, just as much as a balloon is. I can choose, under certain circumstances, to eat vanilla ice cream, or chocolate chip. Sometimes I will do one; sometimes the other; in this I am unlike the helium-filled balloon, which always does the same thing. Does this indeterminacy invalidate the law of causality? Not at all, I think Peikoff would agree. The indeterminacy of my action is caused (formal cause, not efficient cause) by my nature as volitional being. Now consider a radium atom. It can decay, or not decay, in any given time period. Does this indeterminacy invalidate the law of causality? No; we can simply say that radium atoms have the nature of showing stochastic behavior in their radioactive decay.
Now, I am not totally satisfied by this line of argument. There is something unsatisfying--and, experience has shown, treacherous--about saying that an entity shows a certain behavior simply because "that is its nature". But this leads us into the problem of primaries and very deep waters indeed!
I appreciate your apology; please do not concern yourself too much. Being, as I am, a scientist, I am accustomed to the rough and tumble of scientific discourse. In exploring unfamiliar subjects I have frequently gone in over my head and--if I may mix metaphors--had my head handed to me by persons expert in the field. It is painful but educational. A willingness to take such risks in the pursuit of knowledge is no bad thing in a student; and those most advanced will most appreciate it, for we too are students.
Sincerely,
Ronald E. Merrill
ps: If you have access to the Internet, you may want to join the conference there on Objectivism. Email Jim Wales at:
ayn-rand@iubvm.ucs.indiana.edu.
REM
May 10, 1994
Michael Badnarik
Dear Mike & Susan:
It was a real pleasure to have you visit us. We don't often get the chance to meet other Objectivists, so we really enjoyed the chance to talk about ideas.
The sky-diving tape was great. I remember some years ago Durk Pearson showing me a tape of his sky-diving debut--clearly an ecstatic experience. Definitely not for me, but I can easily see Emily taking it up. Not till she's 18, though!
We've returned the tape under separate cover, along with a copy of Ideas of Ayn Rand.
E-mail me a note about the Glendale group if you run across the contact's number, would you?
Although I'm not able to travel much these days, I hope to see you again. Give us a buzz if you're going to be in the L.A. area.
Cordially
Ron & Yoon Merrill
July 16, 1993
Mark Plus
Dear Mr. Plus:
Sorry to be so slow responding to your letter; I have been very ill.
I'm glad you found New Venture Handbook useful; thanks for your kind words.
Branden's generalization about Russian and English fiction (really limited to 19th-century work) has limited validity. Looking at, say, Austen or Trollope or Collins or Thackeray, it is hard to see that their characters are "determined" by their social positions. Certainly their actions are greatly influenced by status considerations, but so are those of Russian characters; look at Anna Karenina and Vronsky, for instance. As for philosophical premises--well, Reverend Crowley is just as obsessed with his moral situation as is Raskolnikov, though of course in a very different way!
Rand and Conrad make an interesting comparison; it might be most intriguing to contrast how two brilliant writers facing rather similar situations came out differently due to belonging to opposite sexes.
I have to say that I see little analogy between 1984 and Atlas Shrugged. As discussed in IAR, it seems most productive to see 1984 and Anthem as two responses to the challenge presented by Zamiatin in We.
Sincerely,
Ron Merrill
August 27, 1993
Susan Kegg
Citation/Location Center
Rutgers University Libraries FAX: 908-932-7579
Dear Ms. Kegg:
Regarding your inquiry about publications cited in The Ideas of Ayn Rand:
"Confessions of a Randian Cultist" by Rosalie Nichols is a pamphlet (i + 39 pp.) in the form of an open letter to Ayn Rand, dated October 27, 1971. This seems to be a rather rare item; I know of no other extant copy. The title page reads "Published by Brian Eenigenburg/January 1972". My copy is signed by the author and rubber-stamped "#93". The address of the author is given as 2861 37th Avenue, Sacramento, CA 95824; of course, this is over twenty years old.
"The Sociology of the Ayn Rand Cult" by Murray Rothbard is available as a pamphlet from Liberty Publishing, PO Box 1181, Port Townsend, WA 98368. It costs $4.00. The back issue of Liberty which contains Rothbard's "My Break with Branden and the Rand Cult" can be purchased from the same source for $5.50.
I hope this information will be helpful to you.
Sincerely,
Ronald E. Merrill
May 10, 1994
Peter Torch
CANADA
Dear Mr. Torch:
Thank you for your letter. Objectivist philosophy is of course a matter of great interest to me. However, my interest doesn't always extend to arguing the merits of Dr. Peikoff's or Dr. Binswanger's positions, which sometimes differ from my own.
I'm inclined to leave technical analyses of concept-formation to professional epistemologists unless they produce insights relevant to scientific research or other practical applications. So refinements of Dr. Peikoff's schema aren't a high priority to me. As for the issue of the big bang and the infinity of time, general relativity offers several ways of resolving this paradox; personally I find the model proposed by Hartle and Hawking most elegant.
If you have specific ideas you would like to bring up I'd be willing to take a look at them. I am not currently in a position to enter into any extensive correspondence, but I'll do the best I can.
Sincerely,
Ronald E. Merrill
July 21, 1995
Nicholas Dykes
ENGLAND
Dear Mr. Dykes:
Many thanks for your kind words about The Ideas of Ayn Rand. I would not directly compare the book to Peikoff's Objectivism, which is a competent summary of the philosophy despite some flaws. My own objective was quite different: to clarify Rand's positions from a new perspective, and to stimulate Objectivists to pursue some of the problems she left unsolved.
There was never any doubt in my mind that David Ramsay Steele was vigorously opposed to Objectivism. And that was an asset in editing the book. I wanted to grapple with the strongest arguments that could be presented against Objectivism, not against straw men; for only in that way could I make my own arguments fully persuasive to the reader. David is a superb editor. We had many vehement disputes over the text, but oddly enough the real issue turned out to be: How dare I, a mere scientist, presume to criticize the reasoning of professional philosophers?
Regarding the epistemological question, I point out that in real life, one sometimes cannot be sure that the facts really are facts. Often one can evaluate the theory more reliably than the evidence; for if the theory really is self-contradictory, it cannot be true. Indeed, this epistemological "poser" is part of the theme which drives the plot of Atlas Shrugged.
If you have issues you would like to explore in more depth, I would be happy to hear from you. Again, thanks for your generous praise.
Sincerely,
Ronald E. Merrill
September 14, 1995
Nicholas Dykes
ENGLAND
Dear Mr. Dykes:
Thank you for your letter; I'm afraid I cannot produce a response of the same length, as my schedule these days is frightful.
The arguments you make seem to lie along the line developed by Hayek, who placed great emphasis on "spontaneous order." You might want to look into his work in some depth. Also, besides the Tannehills' book, you might want to (if you haven't already) read some of the other persuasive works on anarcho-capitalism, including Murray Rothbard's For a New Liberty, David Friedman's The Machinery of Liberty, Rational Anarchy by Richard & Ernestine Perkins, and Eric Frank Russell's famous novelette "And Then There Were None."
But note that The Market for Liberty, for instance, was written 25 years ago--and anarcho-capitalist theory has made zero progress in that period. Advocates have done nothing to address the objections raised to their approach--above all, the "free rider" problem in financing defensive measures. And, as I pointed out in IAR, any solution to this problem would cause the fundamental argument against the possibility of coercive monopolies in the free market to fall to the ground.
As you perceive, I am ambivalent on this issue. The anarcho-capitalist position is moral, but clearly impractical. The limited-government position--with taxation--is practical, but immoral. As an Objectivist, I can not accept either side of this apparent antinomy. But I do not yet have the right solution.
On the historical issues, I am skeptical of the idealized portraits of the Hurons, the old Icelanders, etc., that are currently in vogue. I suspect that, like Margaret Mead's account of happily promiscuous Samoans, these pretty pictures will prove a great deal darker on more careful examination.
Sincerely,
September 23, 1995
Nicholas Dykes
ENGLAND
Dear Mr. Dykes:
Thank you for the interesting review of the book on the Yanomamo tribes. Regarding the question of historical models for anarchic social systems, let me clarify my position. There is no question that small groups can function well--indeed, generally function best--when run on the basis of custom rather than formal or coercive government. Leave aside any historical or ethno- graphic evidence; we can see this clearly in the functioning of small groups within our own society. But what happens when organization on a larger scale is needed? Here the empirical evidence is far from convincing. Can we really draw firm conclusions about the political arrangements of the Hurons from a few contemporary accounts written by amateurs--who generally had their own agenda to push? Incidentally, on this issue, the 9/16 issue of The Economist discusses a study of Somalia by the London School of Economics which suggests that that society should be considered as a functional anarchy.
I knew Harry Binswanger when we were students together at MIT, but have not spoken to him for many years. I don't know his policy on responding to queries. As for Karl Popper, I don't have much direct acquaintance with his work, though I have long meant to read some.
As for the issue of government: The problem here is to develop a positive theory of government. The anarcho-libertarian critique has been debated to death over the past 30 years and nobody has been saying anything new for most of that time. Each side keeps refuting the other with the same old (and quite valid!) arguments. Your challenge, if you wish to work in this area, is to come up with something new to say. In particular, if you want to advocate the anarcho-libertarian position, you need to develop some convincing proposal for how national defense could be financed and organized on a realistic basis.
Sincerely,
October 21, 1995
Nicholas Dykes
ENGLAND
Dear Mr. Dykes:
Thank you for sending me your essay on Karl Popper, which I read with interest. This kind of assessment is very useful, and I would like to see a number of such articles on various philosophers anthologized.
Regarding the political issues you raise: First, the problem of "insolence of office" in a monopoly government is, of course, an old one. The intense discussion in the debate over the U.S. constitution remains the fundamental work on this topic. It should be noted that the American Founders did not agree with Rand's idea of the government having a "monopoly of force." They saw an armed citizenry as a fundamental protection against tyranny; indeed, Jefferson suggested that an actual insurrection every generation or so would be necessary to keep the government in line. While I don't know that I would go that far, I think the basic insight is valid: No scheme that assumes citizens simply delegate responsibility for use of force to some outside entity--whether a "government" or a "defense agency"--can succeed. The objective is a system under which the government is strong enough to confront hostile nations, and to deal with individual criminals or gangs, but nonetheless physically unable to overcome any significant fraction of the population if they choose to resist.
On another issue, I certainly agree that "defense would hardly be an issue" if there were no coercive governments. But, as we say here in the States, that's "nice work if you can get it." I do not believe (for reasons too complex to go into in a short letter) that the world, or even any country, will ever adopt Objectivist ethics on a large scale. But in any case, we cannot assume such an ideal situation as a prerequisite.
Sincerely,
October 27, 1995
David Kelley, Executive Director
Institute for Objectivist Studies
82 Washington Street, Suite 207
Poughkeepsie, NY 12601
Dear David:
I enclose a copy of a letter to Karen Reedstrom, which I think pretty much speaks for itself. If you have any further problems with this issue, I should be glad to hear from you directly. Communications through a third party always tend to promote misunderstandings.
I plan to be at the IOS event in San Francisco next month, and I look forward to the opportunity to meet you in person.
Sincerely,
Ron Merrill
enc
October 27, 1995
Dear Karen: [Reedstrom@aol.com]
I am very upset to find that what ought to have been a quite minor point on a follow-up question has been blown up into some sort of controversy with David Kelley.
Let's review the facts. Even while the manuscript was being edited, David Ramsay Steele began expressing qualms--repeatedly--about publishing a book by an author without academic credentials as a philosopher. (If this is challenged I could, I suppose, go out into the garage and dig out his letters to me.) And in fact, *IAR* was ignored by mainstream reviewers; indeed, even *Reason* and *Liberty* refused to review it.
As the final straw, IOS, which might have been expected to welcome such a book, panned it. Moreover, their review specifically and pointedly criticized Open Court for publishing it. I know that this message reached them, because David wrote me at the time (no doubt he has forgotten it), that IOS was sending a copy of the review to Open Court.
So: You asked that I speculate on the reasons Open Court lacked interest in a second edition. I ascribed it to fear of losing face over publishing an author who lacks the "correct" academic credentials; and pointed out that being attacked on these grounds *even by IOS* must have reinforced their misgivings. Based on the above facts, you'll perhaps agree that I have not crossed the bounds of plausibility.
The additional quotes from the Hicks review that David provides simply reinforce the above account. In fairness I should note that he does not do justice to himself; he ought to have quoted this also: "The point, of course, is not that one has to be an academic philosopher to write about Rand's philosophy for publication." This caveat, however, does not modify Hicks' complaint that *IAR* ought not to have been published by Open Court.
But I have a very serious problem with the proposal to insert these Hicks quotes as David suggests. Like any truly professional writer, I do not, as a matter of policy, publicly debate reviews of my books. Writers must simply put up with reviewers, as fire hydrants put up with dogs. However, if this kind of attack is published as part of an interview with me, I cannot and will not allow it to go unchallenged.
To be specific, I object strenuously to the implication that I attempted to write a scholarly account of Rand's work and failed due to a lack of professional competence. In the Preface to *IAR* I made it crystal clear that the book was *not* a scholarly monograph and was never intended to be. I stated explicitly that the book was aimed at the lay reader, not the professional philosopher. I laid out my aims for the book--which were congruent, incidentally, to those stated in my original proposal to Open Court. I achieved those aims.
In response to your request for support of my assertion, I provided a quote from Hicks that clearly and accurately illustrated the point at issue: his (and by implication IOS's) position on Open Courts' publication of *IAR*. I did not include the additional text cited by David for the simple reason that I am too much of an Objectivist to promote attacks on myself.
Now, what is to be done? I suggest it will save a lot of wear and tear on all of us if this question is simply omitted from the interview. It is hardly important enough to justify the trouble that has been taken over it already.
I will be writing you separately about final editing of the interview.
Sincerely,
Ron Merrill
cc: David Kelley
November 3, 1995
Nicholas Dykes
ENGLAND
Dear Mr. Dykes:
Thank you for your latest essay. Though I have cogent reasons to believe Objectivism will never become a widespread philosophy, they are far too complex to cover in correspondence. I hope someday to write a major paper on the subject.
Problems with the Objectivist ethics is another subject on which I intend to write. I have, I think, a rather different perspective from yours. To begin with, I think you underrate the importance of Rand's solution to the "is/ought problem." This is one of those problems that look easy--once you know the answer!
In broad terms, I see the difficulty thus: Objectivist ethics is "biocentric"; it derives ethical principles from the biological nature and needs of human beings. But the biological background which Rand assumed was based on very poor science.
Specifically: (1) Unlike Rand, no modern biologist would give a second's consideration to a definition of "life" that omitted reproduction as an essential characteristic. (2) The "tabula rasa" model of human development was very popular in the Thirties and Forties, when Rand was formulating her system. Today it is totally outmoded. (3) Concepts of evolution and development are crucial to modern biology; Rand, like the science of her time, basically ignores them. (This, by the way, is very relevant to the issues about Kantian ethics you raise.)
In general I think the issues of choice, value, and survival that you raise can be resolved with a little tightening up of Rand's arguments. On the issue of rights, I quite agree that most current discussion is very fuzzy. For good background, you might want to look at Machan's two books on the subject. My own opinion is that a right should be defined as "an enforceable moral obligation."
I hope to have the opportunity to write at more length on these subjects, but as there is no likely venue for publication, I am unable to give them very high priority.
Sincerely,
November 17, 1995
David Kelley, Executive Director
Institute for Objectivist Studies
82 Washington Street, Suite 207
Poughkeepsie, NY 12601
Dear David:
It was a real pleasure to finally meet you in person. The conference was well organized and I had a great time there.
For our next L.A. area Objectivist potluck, I have put the issue of expanding and formalizing our activities on the agenda. I will keep you posted on the results. Any suggestions you may have would be welcome, and I hope that IOS can play a role in whatever comes out of this.
I've just read Dr. Lennox's review of the Sciabarra book. As you know if you've been following the discussion on MDOP, I have been heavily critical of Chris's theories myself, but perhaps not in quite the same way. There seems to be quite a debate developing, and you might want to organize something about it under IOS auspices.
Karen Reedstrom has agreed to remove from my interview the question which caused all the fuss. Let me again express my appreciation for the temperate way in which you handled this dispute. I wish it could serve as a model for certain other Objectivists.
Cordially,
Ron Merrill
November 22, 1995
Karen Reedstrom
Full Context
1175-D Kirts Blvd.
Tory, MI 48084
Dear Karen:
I received with pleasure the published interview in Full Context. Overall I think it came out quite well, and I hope your readers will find it of interest.
A copy of the release form for the use of the interview in your book is enclosed. My only stipulation is that I want to check final copy before publication. A couple of errors crept into the text as it stands. Also, though I'm normally not too finicky about copy-editing issues, in a couple of places your editorial changes altered my meaning subtly. I'd like the opportunity to satisfy your aversion to m-dashes in ways that will preserve my exact sense.
Meanwhile, I would like to hear more about your book. Do you have a publisher lined up?
Best wishes for the holidays.
Sincerely,
Ron Merrill
December 28, 1995
Jan Dupree
JAPAN
Dear Mr. (or Ms. or ?) Dupree:
Thank you for your kind words about my interview. I didn't realize that Full Context has readers in Japan. It's a country in which I have long been interested; I vacationed there a couple of years ago, in Kyoto and Kochi.
As for your question: Some sympathetic people have passed along to me quotations from sources, such as Stubblefield's Internet group, in which low-ranking members of the Peikoff wing attack me in virulent terms. The leaders, however, seem to be following the Toohey policy and have totally ignored me so far as I know.
I myself have ordered products from Second Renaissance, subscribed to the Atlantean Review, and joined the Association of Objectivist Businessmen, without encountering any obstacle or comment. I am told by acquaintances that the policy at these organizations is that accepting money from their "enemies" is not considered "sanction."
Best wishes.
Sincerely,
Ronald E. Merrill
May 20, 1996
Nicholas Dykes
ENGLAND
Dear Mr. Dykes:
Congratulations on the publication of your pamphlet on Popper. It is an excellent critical summary of the work of an important and influential thinker, with a clearly reasoned dissection of Popper's fundamental premises and their deficiencies. And you can quote me on that.
I like your discussion of "fallibilism." Popper deserves credit for pointing out how pseudoscience operates by using "theories" that actually say nothing because they can "explain" anything. Thus creationists, when confronted with the fossil evidence, simply assert that God created the fossils too in 4004 BC! The falsifiability test provides a useful detector for this sort of thing; but that does not justify elevating it into the basic criterion of science and thereby blasting the foundations of epistemology.
Regarding the "via negativa," you touch upon a point that I've been meaning to write a paper on. Popper, like other philosophical skeptics, assumes a privileged position for certain types of assertions: statements of the form "X is possible" or "We do not know whether Y is true." Such propositions are considered not to bear any burden of proof (at least in the context of philosophical generalizations); they are automatically to be considered true unless proved false. This is what Rand is attacking when she dismisses the "arbitrary."
My book On Moral Dilemmas is currently in rough draft. I have suspended work on it, as Open Court, which I thought would be a likely publisher, shows no interest in it. Instead my philosophical writing time is devoted to a couple of papers intended for Objectivity--one on the implications of modern biology for Objectivist ethics (a topic which I've mentioned to you in prvious letters), and another on current problems in causality and whether they can be addressed by restoration of Aristotle's notions of causality. I'm also writing a lecture on "Eddie's Enigma"--the problem of human irrationality.
Sincerely,
June 18, 1996
Nicholas Dykes
ENGLAND
Dear Mr. Dykes:
Many thanks for your offer to introduce me to prospective British publishers for On Moral Dilemmas. I took a look at the manuscript, which I have not worked on for some months. At this stage it's about 15,000 words, so a great deal of work remains to be done, though the basic line of argument has been laid out. As it stands, the manuscript is unbalanced by a fairly substantial discussion of misconceptions about Social Darwinism, a topic I got engaged with while writing the introduction.
As I mentioned in my last letter, I have some other writing projects on the fire right now, and even they have been pushed to the back burner by the need to concentrate on a major consulting assignment. However, I will see if I can generate a revised proposal about On Moral Dilemmas.
Lately I've also undertaken some reading projects. Toland's biography of Hitler I found a useful update, as historical thinking on that era has changed considerably since the Churchill-Shirer-Bullock model I grew up on. Another useful historical work is Dark Sun by Richard Rhodes, a very readable and thorough account of the development of the atomic and hydrogen bombs both in the US and the USSR. The influence of espionage on the latter is clearly brought out. And I've got an edition of the complete short fiction of Trollope. It's interesting to see how different it is from his typical novels, both in subject matter and in tone.
Sincerely,
Ron Merrill
May 14, 1997
Institute for Objectivist Studies
82 Washington Street, Suite 207
Poughkeepsie, NY 12601
Dear Sirs:
I enclose an update for the Scholars Directory.
For your current activities column in IOS Newsletter, you may want to mention that I gave a lecture, "The Radicalism of Objectivism," for the REAL Forum at Reed College, in Portland, Oregon, on April 26.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Ron Merrill
May 21, 1997
Ken West, Editor-in-Chief
AOB News
P.O. Box 370
Beverly, MA 01915
Dear Mr. West:
Thank you for taking the trouble to clear up the question of my membership. I will look forward to seeing my name on AOB's membership list. A check for $40 is enclosed.
Address information is on my letterhead. GreenChem's primary business is pharmaceutical/chemical consulting.
Sincerely,
Ronald E. Merrill
President
enc
October 23, 1997
Nicholas Dykes
ENGLAND
Dear Mr. Dykes:
Thanks for passing along your paper on Objectivist and Libertarian politics. I fear I am not much in agreement with it, however. Although I've criticized Rand's political writings myself, I think you fail to do her justice.
The fundamental point (it was David Kelley who straightened me out on this) is that Rand was not, repeat not, a contractarian. Although she approvingly quotes Jefferson on "the consent of the governed," she is far closer to the original, Lockean meaning that the Founders attached to this phrase: that government is morally justified because it protects rights, and rational men will therefore consent to it. The idea of an actual consensual contract between government and citizen is more recent, originating perhaps with Spooner. Note that Locke specifically avoided this conception of government.
Rand, I think, would have objected that you are setting up a false dichotomy between "authoritarian law," which is arbitrary, and "customary law" (what is usually called the common law). She advocated a rational statute law that would be based on natural law. The common law certainly demonstrates the potential of Hayekian spontaneous order. Unfortunately it also demonstrates its defects, particularly the accretion of obsolete and irrational elements, and the constant struggle to torture some sort of logical consistency out of a constantly growing mass of mutually contradictory precedents.
Rand, as you point out, glosses over her argument for a "monopoly of force" very superficially. Nonetheless, I think it deserves a more generous consideration than you give it. We can easily set aside the issue of multiple jurisdictions. It was, I'm sure, as obvious to Rand as to anyone else that different units of government may be defined to have jurisdiction in different kinds of cases. Courts in Canada handle Canadian cases, courts in the U.S. handle U.S. cases. Murder within the city of Los Angeles is handled by the LAPD, within LA county by the county Sheriff's office, on Edwards Air Force base by the Military Police, and so on.
However, for any given case--a court case, a police arrest, etc.--there must be a rule that determines who has jurisdiction. For what the government function is about is using force. A and B have a dispute and are about to settle it with guns. So the police arrive to settle it properly, using force if necessary. Clearly if there are two police forces arriving, who have different ideas about how to settle it, we do not want them settling their differences with guns. Can't they settle it by mutual agreement? Just as much so as A and B can! Rand's point is that this has got to end somewhere. Someone--ie, the government--has a monopoly in the sense of having the final authority to settle--by force, if necessary--who has jurisdiction in a dispute.
The market process does not apply here because the market presupposes that force has already been ruled out. It is assumed that sellers and buyers freely choose what deals to make, and with whom. But if the transaction involves the use of force, this is no longer true; so a single objective law enforcement mechanism is required. When it comes to the application of force, one cannot rely on spontaneous order; the spontaneous order that emerges is fascism or feudalism, depending on the current level of military technology.
Rand does not, explicitly or implicitly, use an "end justifies the means" argument for government. She adopts, what a lawyer would call, a "reasonable man" argument.
Suppose you, a rational person, were to find yourself, whether by birth or immigration, a citizen under a Randian government. It provides protection from criminals and foreign powers, offers courts administering justice under objective law, and, above all, protects rights. And it demands a monopoly of force, in that you are not allowed to set up your own police force, catch and punish criminals, or run courts and enforce their decisions, in opposition to the government's legal system. (Obviously you could run a private security system or a business arbitration service, just as you can under present governments. Moreover, you could possess weapons and use them in self-defense--which your present government does not allow.)
Rand would argue--and I have to agree with her--that your rights are not being violated by her government. You retain your rights to life, liberty, property, etc.; indeed, the government, by hypothesis, is protecting them. You have "lost" only the opportunity to run a government; but this is not a right.
Now, some of Rand's followers have taken positions that might not be so defensible. Peikoff, for instance, has made statements that sound very much like he would deny the right to personal self-defense. Others have advocated the use of taxation to support government, which, as you know, Rand did not. However, I think the basic Randian position on government is sound--despite the deficiencies of her style of argument, which you cogently criticize.
To repeat, what is fundamental here is that Rand does not accept the contractarian model in which government is legitimized by some sort of social contract. Her perspective was that this was ethical subjectivism; it makes government good because people approve of it. For Rand, government was good to the extent that it objectively protected rights. Rational people would approve of, and consent to, such government; but neither their approval nor their consent would actually legitimize it; it could be legitimized only by its objective virtue.
When it comes to the merits of anarcho-libertarianism, I return to the point on which you quote me at the start of your paper: If it is going to be a viable political theory, somebody is going to have to work on its unanswered questions and its manifest problems. Your own defense, while eloquent, does not make any important points that were not made by Rothbard and his followers back in the early 1970s. And neither they, nor you, have yet addressed the key practical obstacles to the anarcho-libertarian program.
1. National (or if you like, social) defense: Look at some of your own examples, Iceland or Ireland for instance. It's debatable whether they were ever true anarchies, but assume they were. Historically, they were conquered and oppressed by nearby governments. In fact, the story of every allegedly anarchic society has the same, monotonous ending: conquered by a government. The burden is on you to show that you can devise a mechanism by which an anarchic society can defend itself. Rothbard & followers, when they mention this at all, come up with military proposals that are utterly infantile. Can you do better?
2. Financing: Defense, police, and court functions involve considerable expense. The idea that they are going to be covered by charitable contributions is about as plausible as Marx's withering away of the State. (An objection which applies just as strongly to Rand's government financing proposals.) Market mechanisms will not suffice because of the free rider problem, which is particularly notable for national defense. If you propose that the free rider problem will be solved by mechanism X, then opponents of freedom can rightly respond that under laissez faire Bill Gates or whoever will use mechanism X to set up a successful cartel and economically enslave the people.
I have of course heard the argument that we can't predict how the market will solve these problems, but it will--somehow. There's a joke that's relevant here: "How many Libertarians does it take to replace a light bulb?" "None. The market will take care of it."
The Framers of the U.S. constitution I think gave us a better model. Their problem was much the same; they were proposing a new and unprecedented system of government. Like anarchism today, the constitutional republic was widely considered impractical (at that time, it was thought that large nations could not form stable republics). They set out in detail what system they were proposing and how it would work. What we need to see is a Federalist Papers for anarcho-libertarianism.
Summing up, I find Rand's basic argument to be theoretically sound, and the contractarian approach to be unsound, for the reasons discussed above. What I object to in Rand is her airy dismissal of the practical problems of government financing without taxation, and of setting up mechanisms that will keep limited government limited. This is not "a task for a distant future," it's a task for right now. In Rothbard & Co. I find the same refusal to confront real life. "The market will take care of it, in some way that we cannot even imagine."
1997 has been a pretty productive year for me. I finished my paper, "Objectivist Ethics: A Biological Critique" (now in press at Objectivity) and also "Sufficient Reason and Causality," which I have just submitted. I delivered a lecture, "The Radicalism of Objectivism," at Reed College, and wrote another, "Eddie's Enigma," on the causes of irrationality. Some of my fiction has appeared on the Web (on the Objectivism site, and on Monadnock). Unfortunately the exigencies of earning a living, and some book projects, make it unlikely I can keep up this pace.
Best wishes for your new projects.
Sincerely,
Ron Merrill
November 7, 1997
Nicholas Dykes
ENGLAND
Dear Mr. Dykes:
If you wish to quote from my letter of October 23, I have no objection--it being noted, though, that these are informal comments. I wouldn't want to "officially" ascribe specific positions to Ayn Rand without taking more care to check texts and document my assertions.
On the subject of common law and natural law, you might want to look at Richard Epstein's Simple Rules for a Complex World, which I am currently reading. He gives a very clear exposition of basic legal principles and how they arise out of a straightforward utilitarian or pragmatic analysis of the requirements for constructing a peaceable society.
In general I am in agreement with his analysis so far as I have read. I do have some reservations about his willingness to override the rights of an individual in exceptional cases, in order to preserve the integrity of the legal system. To my mind, the system ought to admit of exceptions where needed. My principle: There ought to be legal, moral, and social norms. Since no a priori norm can anticipate and correctly handle every case, there ought also to be generous provision for exceptions. However, all parties must accept that an exception is an exception and cannot be invoked as a challenge to the norm.
Best wishes for your project.
Sincerely,
Ron Merrill