Ronald E. Merrill, The Ideas of Ayn Rand (Open Court, 1991)

Ronald E. Merrill and Henry D. Sedgwick, The New Venture Handbook (second edition; AMACOM, 1993)

Ronald E. Merrill and Gaylord E. Nichols, Raising Money: Venture Funding and How to Get It (AMACOM, 1990)

You have here on disk a rather long pamphlet, or a very short book. It is highly specialized; I think it will be of interest to only a small group of people: those who consider themselves Objectivists, or in any case those who are very interested indeed in Objectivism, the philosophy of Ayn Rand. It is an analysis of the problems that Objectivism faces as a philosophical and social movement, with my detailed recommendations as to how it should be revived and reconstituted.

This document is an experiment in electronic samizdat. I ask that you handle this disk somewhat as you would an item of shareware. Feel free to make copies as you wish and to pass them along to other people who might be interested. You can of course make printouts for your convenience. In return I ask of you the following:

Don't modify my text. If you wish to pass on any commentary of your own to other people, please put it in a separate file. Please note that although permission to copy is granted, this work is under copyright and may not be reproduced for sale.

If you feel you got honest value from this document (which is not the same thing as agreeing with what I write, or "sanctioning" my position!), send US $15.00 to me at P. O. Box 4060, Torrance, CA 90510.

The document exists in three formats. The first is an ASCII text file, which should make it accessible to all users on IBM-compatible systems. The document, however, is much more readable when formatted, so I also have included the same text as a Windows Write file. In addition, there is a third file in WordPerfect format (version 4.2). If you have obtained this document by download, you probably have only the ASCII file. If you want the document in the other formats; or if you have any doubts as to the authenticity of the text on your disk; send me an additional $5.00 and I will send you a disk directly, which will incorporate any revisions or additions I may have made in the meantime. (Be sure to specify 3.5" or 5.25" disk.)

I should explain that this essay comes out of the scientific, rather than the scholarly, tradition. It is not a finished monograph. Think of it rather as a report on work in progress, or as a "preprint." My objective is to present some new perspectives and provoke discussion of certain issues. Feel free, therefore, to send me any comments you may have. I cannot guarantee to answer all correspondence, but I will try.

Ronald E. Merrill

ronmerrill@bix.com

[Windows and Windows Write are trademarks of Microsoft Corp. WordPerfect is a trademark of WordPerfect Corp.]

The foundation of morality is to have done, once and for all, with lying.

Thomas H. Huxley

Once there was a movement called Objectivism. It created a great stir in its time.

I was a part of this movement, in a very small way, and I can testify to the excitement it created both among its members and its enemies. Most of us were college students, and for us Objectivism was not only a great intellectual adventure, but a structure around which we could organize our adult lives. We read and re-read the works of Ayn Rand, studied philosophy and political economy and psychology, and of course discussed, debated, and argued these ideas far into the night.

As for our enemies--basically the entire intellectual establishment--they were livid. Objectivism was the most radical attack on academic convention they had ever encountered, and they fought back with everything they had. Professors were especially disturbed that many of the brightest and most creative students were drawn to Objectivism. They regarded us with an almost awe-stricken horror--mixed, oddly enough, with a tinge of admiration. For we were people who believed in ideas, and cared about them, and committed ourselves to them, in a way that very few ever do, even among professional intellectuals.

Intellectual leadership of the movement was provided by Ayn Rand and her protege Nathaniel Branden, with a small monthly journal called The Objectivist. The Nathaniel Branden Institute offered lectures on Objectivism and related subjects in dozens of U.S. cities. Though most of us were college students during the day, evenings we voluntarily sat cramped together on folding chairs in the local representative's living room to listen to tape-recorded lectures and take notes.

The movement was growing. Every year there were more of us. We became more knowledgable and sophisticated in our understanding of the philosophy. Networks began to form of people who had met at NBI lectures, and we created student clubs and discussion groups to advance Objectivism on campus.

Then, in 1969, came a bitter schism between Ayn Rand and Nathaniel Branden--not, unfortunately, over a point of doctrine, something which we could have handled. Although we didn't have many facts at the time, it soon became apparent that our heroes had fallen out over a squalid sexual affair. The Objectivist movement disintegrated and its demoralized remnants gradually dwindled.⁽¹⁾

Does it matter?

We who were college students in the Sixties are now, in our forties, well-to-do professionals. Successful in our careers, living comfortable, prosperous lives, we feel little inclination to put ourselves out, far less to take risks, to reform the society in which we live. Sure, we are outraged by what we read in the morning paper, and sometimes troubled by a wistful memory of youthful idealism. But after all, we now know better than to believe in the heroic; life isn't like that.

This is not to say that we have all lost interest in Objectivism. Far from it. Many of us continue to read on philosophical and political subjects. A small cadre of Objectivist intellectuals attempts to develop academic respectability for Ayn Rand's ideas. And we cheer when some concept of Objectivism creates a stir when presented by a non-Objectivist author, although he carefully omits to credit Ayn Rand for the insight.

The fact is that intellectual leadership in modern American society has been taken over by Conservative thinkers. There are no Objectivist journals, or even Libertarian journals, of significant circulation. The closest approach to a Libertarian journal of ideas, Reason, has long since reverted to the kind of placid coffee-table journalism in which comfortably familiar arguments from the Sixties and Seventies are deployed to argue against current government initiatives. To mention the name of Ayn Rand in its pages is, it appears, virtually prohibited.⁽²⁾

The real intellectual excitement is now to be found in, of all places, such Conservative journals as National Review and the American Spectator. While by no means neglecting the political issues of the day, these magazines are engaged with ideas in a way that has become foreign to the Objectivist/Libertarian press. Not only politics, but political theory, philosophy, history, and esthetics are passionately argued in their pages.

At the same time, the most innovative political, social, and moral thinkers of our time owe allegiance to Conservatism. Think of people who have shaken up the establishment and the names that come to mind are George Gilder, Richard Epstein, Charles Murray, Paul Johnson, James Q. Wilson, Thomas Sowell. The emerging paradigm of social organization is being shaped by these men--Conservatives all, even if mostly from the "libertarian wing" of the movement.

Well, perhaps it doesn't matter. After all, some key ideas from Objectivism are being brought to the fore, even if Rand never gets any credit for them. Though the trend to statism continues as strong as ever, there is a reaction against it, which ought eventually to have some effect even though it is led by Conservatives.

What, then, of those of us who consider ourselves Objectivists? Are we leading the "good life?" Are we really?

Those of us who are successful have, in this rich American society, whatever within reason money can buy. We have satisfying work and are respected by our colleagues; we have pleasant homes and are friendly with our neighbors. Many (though surprisingly few) of us have families and take joy in them. It cannot be said that we are suffering.

Our lives have everything except meaning. Now, I do not mean to say that one can find meaning in life only by losing oneself in a crusade such as the Objectivist movement! Far from it. I will go further: I assert that Rand's implication that meaning in life comes from devoting oneself to a career is equally silly. Productive work is immensely satisfying, but it is an activity, not a substitute for a real self.

The real power of Objectivism lies in its ability to offer an integrated life. One's day should be more than just a collection of good and bad events: a task well accomplished at work, a snarl on the freeway, a pleasant dinner with one's wife, and so on. In the Objectivist vision one's experiences are absorbed into one's life as an organic whole; they are not merely items on a balance sheet to be totted up at the end of the day.

But because man, as Aristotle realized, is a social animal, one cannot attain this integration as a detached individual. To be fully human is to be part of a family; to be part of a neighborhood; to be part of a polis in a broad sense. All this is necessary to be fully engaged with life. But it cannot be achieved when one is immersed in a society that is radically in conflict with one's fundamental values. To be an Objectivist in isolation is to be alienated; to be alienated is to miss out on what life has to offer.

All this rambling prologue has been leading up to a recantation. In The Ideas of Ayn Rand I concluded that "an 'Objectivist movement' was not, and is not, a very good idea." I was wrong, and I have changed my mind. A renewal of the Objectivist movement is essential, and for two very good reasons.

First, one cannot truly live as an Objectivist in isolation. This is a major theme of both The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged.⁽³⁾

Each of us has an intense need, repressed though it often is, for the comradeship of people who share our beliefs. Only with those who possess a common worldview can we truly communicate and feel real empathy; with others, there is always a nagging feeling of something missing, the voice of Prufrock saying, "that is not what I meant, at all."

Neither can we live fully as we would wish without the supporting institutions of society that others take for granted. Can one truly get the most out of discussing music or literature in a group with a different standard--or no standard--of what is good art? How does one handle the constant stress of working with colleagues whose ethical precepts are not up to one's own? And what does one say to a six-year old daughter who comes home from school and asks, "Johnny's family are Catholics; what are we?"

Second, I remain stubbornly unable to accept the facile optimism that sees mankind progressing to an inevitable future of freedom and dismisses the daily advances of statism as temporary setbacks. In the confusing turmoil of day-to-day politics and world events it is not trivial to decide where the winning trend lies. But at best the struggle for freedom remains an intense one, with the issue very much in doubt. The recent propaganda successes of Conservatism may be cheered; yet their intellectual house is built upon the sand and may yet collapse when it is most needed. Moreover, even should the Conservatives win the current battle, we may be sure it will be their worst principles and people who will then come to the fore, not the best.

Thus I very much fear that, unless we can revive a successful Objectivist movement, we are doomed at the minimum to live out our lives in alienated isolation. And it may well be, unless we take action to stop it, that statism will triumph fully and that we, or our children, will be stripped of our comfortable existence and set to trudge through our days in wretched slavery.

What, then, do I propose?

First, I am going to argue that Objectivists ought to be very alarmed (or even more alarmed than they are already) at the state of the world. In particular, I shall assert that the totalitarianism that has dominated the history of the Twentieth century, far from being defeated, is poised for a comeback in new and more virulent forms. I shall go on to explain that the theory of history explicated by Ayn Rand in her essay "For the New Intellectual" is inadequate to our needs, and suggest that we need to incorporate other ideas with it in order to understand what is happening in the world and how we can affect it.

I will then discuss briefly the fundamental problem with current attempts to revive Objectivism as an intellectual movement, and point out that they are inadequate because they misconceive the basic nature of Objectivism and thus are too timid.

Next, I will turn to the content of Objectivism itself. I shall argue that if we are to renew our movement, we must open up the philosophy to expansion and incorporation of new ideas. Objectivism is at core a "scientific" philosophy with a "biocentric" ethics, which in turn has political, social, and esthetic implications. From this I argue that we must be willing to expand, and in some cases even revise, our ethical principles based on advances in scientific knowledge.

With this base, I shall present a detailed vision of what a renewed Objectivist movement ought to look like. In particular, I shall deal with the vexed question of maintaining intellectual integrity for the philosophy and the movement without setting up a system of "intellectual feudalism."

Finally, I shall provide some specific guidelines for attracting new members to the Objectivist movement and providing for its continued growth.

Much of what I have to say will be, to say the least, controversial to Objectivists. I shall challenge some of the teachings of Ayn Rand, whose genius I have revered for thirty years. I shall criticize, if only implicitly, a number of modern Objectivist thinkers whose work I admire and who have taught me much of what I know about the philosophy. In my own defense I can only repeat something I said a few years ago:

If I had to name the one thing that Ayn Rand taught that was most valuable, I would choose--because it contains all the others--the importance of intellectual independence. To place nothing--nothing--above the verdict of your own mind, is the first responsibility of the Objectivist.⁽⁴⁾

Here, then, is my argument. The rest is up to you.

Obeying Senor Professor's command,

Jose the Mayan, swart and slant of eye,

Pecks gently at his forebears' temples. Why?

He nothing knows of when they ruled this land.

Shall our descendents, for a stranger's coin,

Peck likewise at the ruins of Des Moines?

L. Sprague de Camp: Tikal

For a hint of the future, let's examine the state of the world. How do things look? Do we have grounds for optimism or pessimism?

The most obvious factor is that the Evil Empire has disintegrated. The threat of military conquest that had so long hung over Europe is gone; statesmen instead worry about the power vacuum in the East and the complications created by the formation of newly independent countries.

Indeed, threats to peace have diminished dramatically. The very idea of fighting a major war is now considered ridiculous. Unprecedented progress has been made in the last few years in arms control, with agreements signed that would have been inconceivable a decade ago. Europe, the cockpit of so many conflicts in history, is now virtually borderless. Admittedly, the Serbs are making a lot of trouble, but this is a local problem. Where else might a crisis arise? China faces political unrest, but this is mitigated by its rapid economic development. The same is true of India. Japan's extraordinary 40-year run of progress seems to have been interrupted, but most likely it will resume soon. In Southeast Asia, once-primitive economies are expanding at a remarkable rate. Africa, of course, is a mess; but then it always has been. The recent changes in South Africa, however, may portend an improvement in race relations. Latin America, led by Mexico, has been making progress in political and economic liberalization. And the United States, of course, is as strong as it has ever been.

Overall, one would have to concede that the future looks bright in this year 1914 AD.⁽⁵⁾

Now, I don't mean to imply that history will literally repeat itself and that we will soon plunge into another Great War as we did 80 years ago. But I should like to suggest that simplistic extrapolations from current trend lines are not a reliable guide to the future. History has some surprises for us, and some particularly unpleasant surprises for fat and happy people who are sure that it could never happen to them.

The problem arises because we find it so difficult to put ourselves in historical context. Consider, for instance, a young Jewish professional under the Weimar Republic. Sure, he meets with some occasional quite annoying prejudice, but overall he is quite satisfied as a successful, prosperous, respected member of his community. He feels perfectly safe, living in one of the most civilized and cultured countries in the world, the land of Beethoven and Goethe, and a country famous for its orderly and law-abiding citizens.

He cannot conceive that the day will come when his wife and children will be torn from his arms at the railway station and sent to be crammed naked into a closed room and poisoned with cyanide, while he himself is shipped to a slave labor camp to be worked to death. And this not in some distant, science-fictional future, but in just a few years. Modern Americans feel certain that nothing like that could happen here, taking it for granted with the same calm, rational perspective as the young Jewish professional.

In the Nazi era not only the participants but outside observers were stunned at the way mature governments and societies, which seemed stable as granite, crumbled to dust almost overnight under the impulse of totalitarianism.⁽⁶⁾

More recently we have seen the Soviet system collapse in the same striking manner. In spite of the guns, the tanks, the secret police, suddenly the whole system just fell apart. And Americans right and left congratulated themselves; amazing, they said, but that just showed how unstable the Communist system had always been. But the fact is that Communism had long proved highly resilient in Russia, overcoming war, invasion, and famine and always bouncing back. It was only after the moral heart of the society had been hollowed out, like Eddie Willers' oak tree, that it collapsed at a touch. The same thing can happen to any society that has similarly lost its heart, even a relatively free one, such as Weimar Germany, or Third Republic France--or the present-day United States.

Surely not here, though. Magazine articles on the subject--and there are many lately, always with the same theme, have you noticed?--concede disquieting political, economic, and social signs, but point out America's dynamic society and economy and conclude that we shall overcome. But that's what they said about the USSR just a few years ago.⁽⁷⁾

Now, of course, everyone is talking about how rotten the Soviet system had become, how rigid and out-of-touch with reality. But that's not what the pundits were saying then! Then, everyone--inside and outside of the USSR--was saying that under its new young leader, Gorbachev, the country had renewed itself. Its economy was becoming more dynamic, society more open, politics cleaner and more effective. The USSR was not only stronger domestically, but playing a much more effective leading role in world affairs. Conservatives worried that a politically and economically revitalized USSR would present an even greater military threat.

Now, of course, it's obvious where the truth lay. In the same way, pundits (if any survive) ten years from now may see unmistakeable signs of irreversible decay in the US, and wonder how we could have been so blind as to have ignored them.

For the simple fact is that the United States (and indeed the entire "free world") becomes less free day by day. For all the talk about "tax revolt," taxes usually go up, seldom go down--and when they do go down, after a decent interval they are put up again. Laws are passed constantly, at the federal, state, and local levels; laws are almost never repealed. Tens of thousands of pages of new regulations are published every year in the Federal Register; regulations, too, are almost never repealed.

The Constitution has long been honored more in the breach than in the observance. Now it has become virtually a dead letter; scarcely any defenders remain, either on the Left or the Right. A few voices are still raised in favor of freedom of the press; the rest of the Bill of Rights might as well not exist. You can be thrown in jail on trumped-up charges and held there for years without bail on the grounds that your release might be psychologically harmful to the alleged victims.⁽⁸⁾

Police can burst into your home at any hour and hold you at gunpoint while they search for drugs. If they claim to find any drugs--or subversive literature--your house or other belongings can be confiscated; they need not put you on trial, let alone prove you guilty. Recently a woman standing at her door with her baby in her arms was shot dead in cold blood by a government sniper.⁽⁹⁾

She had not been convicted, or even accused, of any crime. The persons responsible are not, it appears, to be punished in any way; the government is backing their actions. There has been no public outcry.

While those of a (classical) Liberal bent decry the situation, they display at the same time a pathetic optimism. They point with pride to the "fall of Communism;" never mind that Communists are still running most of the countries of the former U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, having changed their names but not their policies.⁽¹⁰⁾

They brag of privatization schemes; never mind that such privatizations as do occur are of at most peripheral importance, which is why the politicians allow them to proceed. They speak of intellectual leadership; never mind that the universities are more than ever dominated by the Left. They are like a person diagnosed with cancer who is still in denial.

Let us set aside for a moment our fears and our hopes and ask what an objective outside observer would think of the situation. Surely such a person would conclude that there is a pervasive, long-term trend toward statism; that resistance to it is negligible; that such temporary and local reversals as may appear are but eddies in the tide.

I do not preach a message of pessimism and despair. Far from it; I am convinced that we are capable of stopping and reversing the tide of statism. But the first prerequisite for doing so is to keep our heads out of the sand. If we refuse to recognize the seriousness of the threat, because it is too unpleasant to think about, we are in no position to fight it effectively.

Whence, then, comes the threat? Fascism--except in Russia--can scarcely muster a platoon of skinheads for a march. As for Communism, it is surely brain-dead. There are no Marxists left, the saying goes, except in American universities.

But it is the realities, not the terminology, that counts. Lenin and his followers knew better than to call themselves Jacobins or sans-culottes; yet they committed mass murder even more effectively than their discredited predecessors. The modern totalitarians are careful not to call themselves Communists or Fascists, or even to use the "s-word" Socialism; but they are as determined to control, and ultimately to destroy, human life as were Stalin and Hitler.

Who are these modern totalitarians? Those who preach Environmentalism, Feminism, and what for lack of a better term I shall call "Racialism." And, that we may be clear from the beginning, let me define them.

"Environmentalism" is the view that the natural world, that is, the natural world of non-intelligent life, has value independent of mankind.

"Feminism" is the view that men and women are not, or ought not to be, different in their basic natures or in their roles in society.

"Racialism" is the view that people are to be judged as victims or as exploiters depending on the racial or ethnic group to which they belong.⁽¹¹⁾

Why are these ideologies not merely wrong, but totalitarian? They are totalitarian, in the final analysis, because they are wrong. Like Communism and Fascism, they are based on assumptions about reality which are objectively false. Thus in order to be implemented, they must demand complete control, not only over men's bodies, but over their minds. Inherent in any such ideology is the use of government coercion to control every aspect of human existence; and this is just what we mean by "totalitarian."⁽¹²⁾

Now of course all these ideologies have been and are being opposed to some extent, by Conservatives, Libertarians, and of course Objectivists. Editorials may point out the huge costs and negligible benefits of some environmental regulation; or deny that sexual intercourse exists only because men wish to degrade women; or suggest that affirmative action actually stigmatizes those it allegedly helps. But in the main this opposition is timid and unprincipled. All too much of what passes for resistance to these totalitarian ideas is of the form, "I agree with your principles and your goals but think we could achieve them better with a more moderate approach." This is just the sort of opposition that was totally ineffectual with Communism and Fascism. Then, as now, economists and sociologists pointed out the practical difficulties, and sat down with a satisfied smile. But in the end the debate was won on principles.⁽¹³⁾

From our modern perspective it is difficult to appreciate how radical, and how courageous, Ayn Rand really was. In We the Living she explicitly attacked Communism. Today, when Communists scarcely dare admit to the name and even China is frantically trying to simulate a market economy, we say, "ho hum". But in 1936, during the "Red Decade," it was a different matter entirely. Rand had a hero blow up a government housing project. This was before Martin Anderson, before Jane Jacobs, before Charles Murray. To write that during the New Deal, when the vast majority of Americans regarded Franklin D. Roosevelt as a living god, took real courage. She advocated selfishness and laissez-faire capitalism--not today, but in 1957. Ayn Rand had real guts. What about us?

How many of us are willing to step right up to the barricades and fight with the new totalitarians--on principle? With some honorable exceptions, not many, even among Objectivists. Nobody wants to be accused of pandering to polluters. Nobody wants to be seen as a sexist who advocates confining women to bearing children and using the handloom. Nobody wants to open himself up to a charge of racism.

Very well then. Let us take it that we are ready to do battle with the new totalitarians. How shall we do so, and what are our prospects of success? To answer these questions, we need, to put it somewhat grandly, a theory of history.

Every Objectivist, of course, is familiar with the theory of history which Rand put forth in her essay "For the New Intellectual." In this model, which was popular in the Thirties (Keynes was a notable advocate⁽¹⁴⁾

), history is driven by ideas. Specifically, Rand writes, the dominant philosophical principles of a society or an age determine the trend of events.

The problem with this model (as Rand very likely recognized herself) is that it does not account for which ideas become dominant and how. Surely it is not a competition in which the best ideas win out; if so, the philosophies of Plato and Kant could never have displaced Aristotle as the basis for Western society. The theory of history as idea-driven begs the question: What drives the success or failure of ideas?

Looking at the academic world, and the intellectual subculture of which it is the source and center, we see that the way things actually work is much what one would expect from public choice theory. Just as politicians and bureaucrats make policy based, not on what is right, but on what will benefit them; in just the same way professors advocate ideas, not for their validity, but for what they will bring. Preach one set of ideas, and you will get popularity, the support of powerful politicians, and status. Preach another and you will get only the respect of those who value the truth. Professors, like politicians, all too often make the choice they are paid to make, not the right choice.

But if we are fully to understand how historical trends work, we must take into account factors other than ideas. For instance, why did the concept of liberty take root in England centuries earlier in England than in France? The key ideas involved, such as the Aristotelean philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, were as accessible in one country as the other. It has been argued⁽¹⁵⁾

that the key factor was technology. The development of the English longbow made the yeoman a serious military threat to the mounted knight. English social and political institutions unobtrusively adapted to the facts. In France, the peasant had no such weapon and was helpless to resist his masters.

In this view, the development of firearms played a crucial role in the decline of feudalism and the rise of democratic institutions in the Western world.⁽¹⁶⁾

No aristocracy could rule men armed with rifles.⁽¹⁷⁾

With the dawn of the Twentieth century, the situation changed. The development of the machine gun, and especially the tank and air weapons, again gave the governing elite the means to crush opposition. The result was an age of strong, even totalitarian, governments.

What does the technology-driven view of history predict now? The effectiveness of expensive, high-technology, "smart" weapons in recent wars would seem to augur continued dominance by powerful governments; and perhaps it does. There is a counter-trend we must take into account, however. Weapons of mass destruction are becoming ever easier to acquire. As this is written it is believed that North Korea--North Korea!--has succeeded in developing atomic bombs. Already chemical and biological weapons are in reach of individuals, and there are indications that nuclear weapons could be made also with only private resources within a few years. How the world will look when even the smallest government, and many private individuals, have the capability to destroy whole cities, I dare not attempt to predict.

Of course it is not just weapons technology that can influence the course of history. Another major factor in the rise of liberty in the Western world was the development of movable-type printing. This made it possible to distribute new (and subversive) ideas relatively cheaply, bypassing government control of information. The development of radio and television, again, reversed this trend, putting information under centralized control.⁽¹⁸⁾

Some Libertarians argue that new technology supports increasing freedom because of general access to computing power and communications. The value of fax machines in spreading information during the 1989 disturbances in China is often cited. However, telephone communications run over what is in effect a single worldwide network subject to completely centralized control. I suspect that governments will find it not too difficult to suppress individual use of these technologies should they find them threatening. Perhaps more promising is the ability to quickly transfer huge amounts of information physically on computer disk or videotape.⁽¹⁹⁾

Let us consider another perspective on the theory of history. Recently a very convincing argument for a historical cycle of generations has been made.⁽²⁰⁾

Unlike most theories of history, this argument is far from simple and cannot be adequately summarized here. Briefly, the theory asserts that there is a tendency toward historical cycles lasting about four generations, a human lifetime. Each generation shapes succeeding generations in a more-or-less predictable way, so that certain qualities are characteristic of each of the four or five living generations.

At this time, we have remnants of the "GI generation," whose formative experience was World War II and who are now elderly. Following, there is the "Silent generation," passive and indecisive. Now in middle age we have the "Baby Boom generation." They are an "idealist" generation, principled and creative--and ruthless. America's young people belong to the "Thirteenth generation" (popular parlance seems to prefer the term "Generation X"); classed as "reactive," they tend to be practical and amoral. Still children are the "Millenial generation, a "civic" generation expected to be competent and group-oriented.

This model has several implications. One (which I shall discuss in more detail below) is that Objectivism, as an idealistic philosophy, will have little appeal to young people over the coming decades. In order to grow, Objectivism will have to operate primarily as a social, rather than simply a moral, movement.

There is another, more troubling implication. The generational model of history predicts regular "crises". The last such crisis for the United States was the Great Depression and World War II. The next one should not appear until around 2020. But once before the crisis came early; the result was the Civil War. Such an event would be catastrophic: With the idealist "Boomer" generation at the height of their power and holding weapons of mass destruction in their hands, destruction could be practically limitless.

The analogy with the pre-Civil War years is not so farfetched. It has been estimated that about half of the population of the United States consists of net tax recipients. They fight bitterly against any diminution of their entitlements. The productive class in this country increasingly are finding that political institutions give them no recourse, no way to defend themselves from expropriation. As in the 1850s, the country is divided in half, and the political system has no mechanism that could resolve their differences.

After the Goldwater debacle in 1964 Ayn Rand published an article in the Objectivist Newsletter titled "It Is Earlier than You Think." Her theme was the futility of political activism in a culture where the dominant philosophy is hostile. Returning to the analysis of "For the New Intellectual," Rand stressed the need to fight, not in the voting booth, but in the universities.

Well, Objectivists have (for the most part) followed her advice. It is time to concede that this strategy has accomplished even less than did the Goldwater campaign. There are some fine intellectuals developing Objectivist ideas in academia. Their influence has been negligible. The intellectual "trickle-down" approach simply has not worked, and shows no prospect of working.

This is not because ideas do not have influence. Instead, as I shall argue in more detail below, Objectivist intellectuals have failed because they have sought acceptance and respectability in a system that is inherently and irremediably hostile to the basic nature of Objectivism. Ideas do not exist in a vacuum; they are created, debated, and adopted as part of a social process. Even the most original and correct ideas will be ignored if their advocates do not promote them in a way that takes into account this process.

I therefore argue as follows:

First: Because of the urgent dangers faced by Objectivists (and indeed anyone who values freedom) the Objectivist movement must be revived and made effective. Only Objectivism has the potential to radically oppose the new totalitarians. The renewed movement must grow rapidly in order to have the strength to become effective.

Second: The intellectual revolution cannot be conducted through existing academic institutions. Instead, these must be bypassed and the ideas must be spread through alternative routes. A key role will be played by use of technologies that allow cheap transmission of information, and Objectivists must exploit them to the hilt.

Third: In a turbulent and dangerous world, individual Objectivists will be swept under. The renewed movement must be explicitly and strongly a social movement, not just an intellectual movement.

Fourth: The new movement must ride with, not oppose, the trend of generations. The ideas remain the same; but the presentation must be adapted to the audience.

One part of knowledge consists in being ignorant of such things as are not worthy of being known.

Crates

I ask you to imagine that you are 18 years old, just starting college. You have decided that because of the importance, usefulness, and intrinsic interest of the field, you are going to major in chemistry. You are now, with joyful anticipation, attending your first college lecture in chemistry, and this is what you hear from your instructor:

Good morning, students. In this first lecture I want to tell you something about chemistry and what you are going to learn in this survey course. We will be taking up many important topics.

We will start with the earliest chemical theories, the ideas developed by the ancient Greeks. This will introduce you to some of the most fundamental questions of chemistry, including the great issue that has been debated for over two thousand years and still perplexes chemists: Do atoms exist? From there, we will go on to survey the opinions of the Roman metallurgists, and then discuss the exciting ideas of the alchemists. Many of you have pre-conceived notions about the Philosopher's Stone and the Elixir of Life; you will find that these issues are not as clear-cut as you probably think they are. In the laboratory portion of this course you will engage in dialectical interaction with your fellow students as you attempt to prove or disprove that lead can be turned into gold.

Then we will turn to the modern period of chemistry, discussing the major controversies that chemists currently argue over: The phlogiston theory vs. the believers in oxygen; Daltonism and the arguments against the Law of Constant Proportions; vitalism and its opponents. We'll also look at thermodynamics, and ask: Do steam engines really work? You will find that this question and the other important questions of chemistry are not settled, and probably never will be settled. . .

What I have been describing, of course, is chemistry--as it would be if chemists behaved like philosophers. Fortunately, they don't. Chemists, and others who work in the "hard sciences," have a solid basis of truth on which to work. Certain facts and laws become established, and they are built upon to develop further knowledge.

Now, it is true that skeptical philosophy has corrupted scientific epistemology. Scientists who ought to know better still solemnly proclaim that "theories cannot be proved, only disproved." But this is only lip service. No working scientist really believes that it might someday turn out, after further investigation, that the planets do not revolve around the sun or that gold can be made by mixing lead and sulfur with use of the proper incantations.

Every field of study undergoes a shift at some point from superstition to real science.⁽²¹⁾

At this time, the history of the field, which once was part of it, becomes detached; it is shed like a chrysalis. Thus when chemistry became a science, the history of chemistry became a separate field of study. Modern chemistry students do not concern themselves with the long and difficult struggle by which Priestley, Lavoisier, Dalton, and other pioneers gradually broke free from the concepts of alchemy and established the modern concepts of chemistry. They do not need to. This is not to say that the history of chemistry is not of interest in its own right; it is. But it is no longer relevant to the study of chemistry itself.

This provides a handy rule of thumb for evaluating the intellectual status of any field of study: Is the history of the field a major portion of its study? By this criterion, the "soft" sciences, and most especially philosophy, are still mired in the age of superstition.

We may dismiss at once the claim that philosophy is unable to find certainty because philosophical questions are more difficult than scientific questions. The Problem of Universals may not be child's play to deal with; but it does not demand more than a tiny fraction of the brainpower required to understand, say, the General Theory of Relativity.⁽²²⁾

The problem lies elsewhere. Not to put too fine a point on it, scientists achieve certainty because they want the truth; philosophers remain in doubt because they do not want the truth. Philosophical truths have implications--direct and obvious implications--for how people ought to live and how society ought to be organized. These implications are unacceptable; they are, in fact, the conclusions of the Objectivist ethics.

Which brings us to the crucial point: Objectivism is qualitatively different from previous philosophical schools of thought--in that it is not a school of thought. It is philosophy treated as a science. It does not even accept that there ought to be schools of thought; there are no "schools of thought" in chemistry or physics. In a way it is a mistake even to give the philosophy the name "Objectivism;" to do so implies that it is just another school of thought within philosophy, like Logical Positivism or Linguistic Analysis. Objectivism is not simply a new set of philosophical ideas; it is a new way of approaching the whole project of philosophy.

It is because Objectivism is philosophy treated as a science--as something absolutely and permanently true--that it can never make real progress in the university environment. For the one thing that philosophers universally agree on (even the Positivists, who claim to be "scientific") is that philosophy cannot aspire to certainty in the way that science does. Debate, dialogue, and relativism are their gods.

Ayn Rand, after the publication of Atlas Shrugged, fell into deep depression. One reason, at least, appears to be that she did not receive any acknowledgment of her achievement from any of the established leaders of the intelligentsia. She desperately wanted this sort of recognition; she never got it. A number of first-rate Objectivist thinkers have tried to achieve academic respectability for the philosophy. They have taught, written books, published papers--and accomplished nothing more than Rand did.

The time has come to recognize that the traditional university is an institution that has simply rotted to the core. It is, after all, a very old institution, eight centuries or so now. It would have quietly expired with the Enlightenment had not the rise of science given it a new lease on life. Now, though, that remission has ended, and the university is in its final decline.

A description of the modern university does not need repeating here. Anyone interested, and especially those who work on campus, know the symptoms: professors who do not teach, "research" that is merely pretentious amphigory, "political correctness" run rampant. On the one hand philosophical and ethical relativism constitute an article of faith; at the same time faculties and students ferociously denounce anyone who has the temerity to challenge political orthodoxy. Even the sciences have not escaped; to publish research which, for instance, contradicts the standard line on global warming or the ozone layer may be hazardous to one's career.

It is beyond reform. Does this mean we must abandon the goal of making Objectivism the dominant intellectual stream? Far from it. The decline of the university is not an obstacle, but an opportunity. It ought to encourage us to develop alternative means of education--not just in Objectivism, but in all fields of study.

Way back in 1958, Nathaniel Branden put Objectivism on the right track. Instead of seeking to get courses on the subject taught in universities, he set up an alternative educational institute. It is this track that we must get back on. Attempts, I know, are already being made. I shall argue later that they are not doing enough, because they think of their work as being purely intellectual, and it ought to be also social. But first we must consider the question of putting Objectivism's intellectual house in order, for if we are to really take it to the market we must have a product of the highest possible quality.

Immanuel Kant

I have said that what is truly distinctive about Objectivism is that it is philosophy treated as a science. There is no particular doctrine of Objectivism that crucially distinguishes it from other philosophies. What makes it radically different is not an idea--not even the idea of objective reality--but an attitude: Get the truth--price no object. Like any other real science, and unlike a philosophical "school of thought," Objectivism takes the position that the truth is knowable, and once truly known is certain, absolute, and permanent.⁽²³⁾

Yes, we may make mistakes; but we have always the opportunity to correct them, and at some point we have reached certainty.⁽²⁴⁾

It is precisely because we seek certainty that we must, as Rand puts it, check our premises. This constant search for truth, without regard for whether we like or dislike it, is what characterizes scientists. And if we choose to treat Objectivism as a science, it is like scientists that we must act.

This does not mean adopting a posture of indifference. There is a popular misconception that the ideal scientist is a person with no emotional commitment to one view or another, who dispassionately weighs theories and selects the best. Such a person could never create any theories in the first place. In science as in art, creativity depends on emotional engagement. To be a good scientist you must do something far harder than being dispassionate: You must love the theory you create, love it passionately--and be willing to kill it with your own hands if it will not fit the facts.

If Objectivism is to be a science, it must be open to expansion and even to correction. I have previously pointed out, as have other Objectivists, that the legacy left us by Ayn Rand is not complete and additional work remains to be done.⁽²⁵⁾

At this time I don't want to conduct a general critique or survey of the areas where the philosophy needs more work.⁽²⁶⁾

But we must take up one crucial problem that is holding back Objectivism's ability to expand its influence in society.

The Objectivist ethics, and its political, social, and even esthetic implications, are based on a "biocentric" argument which in turn depends on a particular view of human nature. If that view is not fully accurate--as a matter of objective, scientific fact--we face a serious difficulty. This difficulty in fact arises because Ayn Rand based her ethical thinking on a view of how humans develop and interact that is now known to be incorrect.⁽²⁷⁾

To understand how the problem arose, we must survey a bit of historical background.⁽²⁸⁾

The sciences concerned with human nature--psychology, anthropology, and sociology--were among the last to appear. (Indeed, even today, they have not yet matured into true sciences.) The beginnings of a scientific approach to human nature date only to the latter half of the Nineteenth century, after Darwin had established that man is part of biological nature and subject to study as such. Applying the concept of evolution to mankind, early thinkers such as Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner developed an approach that is now called "social Darwinism."

In fact, these thinkers were mostly Lamarckists, not Darwinists.⁽²⁹⁾

They believed that acquired characteristics were inherited; and specifically, that humans could (and should) raise the quality of their offspring by improving their own moral character. It was this Lamarckian aspect of their theory that made its emphasis on hereditary nature tolerable; even those with "inferior" genes could improve themselves and their children by an exercise of will.⁽³⁰⁾

When Lamarckian ideas had to give way to true Darwinian evolution by natural selection, this viewpoint was transformed into an actual genetic determinism. It was at this point that the embryonic social sciences were taken over by the intellectuals of the Left. At first they proceeded to advocate, what the "social Darwinists" never did, active intervention by the state to improve human nature via sterilization of the "unfit" and similar measures. Then, however, an intellectual flip-flop occurred. The Left dropped the idea of genetic determinism, abandoned eugenics, and took the other side of the "nature vs. nurture" debate. They asserted that humans were basically plastic, born "tabula rasa," blank slates upon which their characters could be written by their parents, their society--or the state.

This viewpoint became dominant in the 1930s. It flowered into the behaviorist psychology of B. F. Skinner and the relativistic anthropology of Margaret Mead. And, ironically, it was also picked up by--Ayn Rand.

In Rand's view, humans are basically identical at birth, and children are plastic and can be molded easily by their upbringing. This theme is repeatedly stressed in Rand's writings. The importance of heredity is dismissed. John Galt is shown arising from undistinguished lineage. The great industrialist Jeb Starnes comes "from nowhere," and his children are worthless. Even the D'Anconias remain great, as Franciso informs us, not because of their heredity, but because of their tradition of training their heirs in childhood. On the other hand, the power of upbringing and education to influence character is emphasized. An example is provided in Atlas Shrugged in the story of Tony, the "Wet Nurse," whose morality has been "bred out of him" by his upbringing. Rand later elaborated on this theme in her essay "The Comprachicos."

But in the end the strict "environmentalist" position on human nature was a bit more than Rand could swallow. Just as the "social Darwinists" had eluded genetic determinism by allowing for the action of human will, so did Rand moderate her environmental determinism. She allowed for the possibility that human volition could--though rarely--overcome conditioning:

"Give me a child for the first seven years," says a famous maxim attributed to the Jesuits, "and you may do what you like with him afterwards." This is true of most children, with rare, heroically independent exceptions.⁽³¹⁾

This, of course, is the viewpoint of a childless person! Parents generally know from direct experience how very unplastic and difficult to mold real children are. Infants show distinct personalities from the moment they leave the womb, one happy and peaceful, another fretful and irritable. One sibling will be cautious and timid, another bold to the point of recklessness, for no reason of upbringing. And children, before and after the age of seven, stubbornly maintain their personality traits, good or bad, despite all efforts of parents or teachers. One may be taught one's values; one may shape one's own character; but one is born with a personality.

Let us not get bogged down in debate over exactly where Ayn Rand stood on the "nature vs. nurture" controversy. One could cite writings, such as her critique of B. F. Skinner, to indicate that she did not really believe in the tabula rasa proposition.⁽³²⁾

When and if her notes and journals are published, scholars may be able to pin down her position more exactly. What is quite clear, in any case, is that the idea of basic uniformity and plasticity of humans had enormous influence on her thinking, with consequences that I shall presently examine.

Modern research has overthrown the entire "nature versus nurture" controversy. It is now understood that much of the human behavior pattern is "wired in" to the brain, and that differing human personalities reflect to some extent the diverse genetic makeups of the people who exhibit them.⁽³³⁾

Human cultures accomodate themselves, though in many different ways, to the universal behavior characteristics of our species, in order to implement those characteristics. Culture cannot override, except locally and temporarily, inborn behavior. But genetically based behavior patterns cannot become effective in the absence of culture. For instance, children learn to talk, at around age two, in every human culture. No culture could possibly survive which attempted to suppress this behavior. But a child to whom no one talks will be unable to learn to speak; learning to talk is genetically programmed behavior, but the program cannot be carried out without cultural support. For humans, society implements biology.

So the simple fact is that humans are not born tabula rasa. We are born with important parts of our behavioral repertoir "wired in." Each person has a certain capacity for intelligence at birth, just as he has a certain capacity for height. The circumstances of his upbringing, as well as his own volitional choices, will affect how much intelligence he actually develops. The same is true of many other personality traits, such as courage or independence. The art of living consists in understanding one's own individual nature and making the most of it. Biology is not destiny; but nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.

What difference does it make? A great deal of difference to an ethics based on logical deductions from the necessities of human nature. The consequences of Rand's misconception permeate her philosophy. They do not, fortunately, invalidate it in any crucial respect, because most of the key conclusions of the Objectivist ethics are developed at a level of abstraction that "omits" the criteria about which Rand was in error. Rather, they have created gaps and anomolies in certain places, areas where Objectivist theory is muddy and confused. There are three such problem areas that I wish to address: feminism; the family; and the "malevolent universe premise."

The issue of "feminism" (a term which its proponents carefully leave undefined) requires us to consider this question: To what extent (if any) and how, should political and social arrangements treat men and women differently? There are three principles of Objectivism which are relevant here.

First, Objectivist ethics is biocentric and contextual. How one ought to act as a man or as a woman, and how one ought to behave toward members of the male and female sexes qua men and women, depends on the facts of the nature of male and female human beings.

Second, Objectivism rejects the mind-body dichotomy. The plasticity of the human mind is high, but human "software" is not hardware-independent. Part of becoming the most that one can is adapting and shaping one's mind to fit the characteristics--including the sex--of one's body. Thus data indicating that males and females can be very similar are irrelevant.

Third, Objectivism takes an Aristotelean, not a Hobbesian, view of humankind; humans are fundamentally social animals. The reflection of ethics in a social context is custom.⁽³⁴⁾

Thus, again, even if individual males and females have the option of being effectively neuter, that is irrelevant. The question is, how ought rational people to organize society, including the customary roles of the two sexes, so as to create an environment suitable for the maximization of human life?

Ayn Rand herself was, as I have previously pointed out, profoundly ambivalent on the issue of feminism.⁽³⁵⁾

The same is true of many of her followers. Feminism, which has been a movement of the Left from its very beginnings, poses as a defender of the rights of women, just as Communism poses as a defender of the rights of workers. Who could oppose laws allowing women to own property or to vote? Just as modern "Liberals" have accepted the goals of Communism, if not its methods, so have many Objectivists sought for a "libertarian feminism." But this is futile; a "libertarian feminism," like "socialism with a human face," is simply not possible. As long as we think of the goal as making women equal to men, we are accepting the enemy's basic premises. The goal must be to give women (as well as men) their rights. It is because this has not been understood that Objectivists have been intellectually and morally disarmed in confronting feminism.

Men and women are very different creatures indeed.⁽³⁶⁾

It is therefore perfectly in accord with a biocentric ethics that they should be expected to have different needs, desires, and modes of living; and therefore, in certain ways, different privileges and responsibilities. It is not to the point here to go into details as to how society could or should be organized to best take into account sex differences, or how political institutions should be arranged accordingly. What is important to understand is that feminism can and should be opposed from a factual standpoint.

The tabula rasa vision of men and women as being cooky-cutter products with no intrinsic differences leads automatically to an implicit hostility to the family. B. F. Skinner actually advocated raising children in boxes. The Israeli kibbutzes set up childrens' collectives. Many other methods of bypassing the need for the family have been advocated and often tried; the current fad is for day-care centers.

"But be careful. Don't deny outright. Never deny anything outright, you give your hand away." So advised Ellsworth Toohey, that quintessential 1930s intellectual. Don't say the family is evil--though some have gone that far and with astonishing success. Just say that the family is limited, that there are more important things than the family. Don't say "childless," say "childfree." Imply that having children enslaves people, especially women; that homemakers (but call them "housewives") are mindless and boring; that satisfaction in life comes from a career, a busy social life, and a large income spent on expensive luxuries.

This attitude is so obviously in conflict with common sense that Ayn Rand could not consistently stick with it. In her novels she occasionally presents the family in a positive light. But beneath the facade, she was obviously very uncomfortable with the whole idea of children and family, and this attitude has been transmitted to Objectivism and to its followers. Here is the root of the virtual idolatry of career that is so common among Objectivists. Here is why so few Objectivists have successful romantic relationships. Here is why so few women are attracted to Objectivism. The anti-family attitude is pervasive, and becomes downright silly at times: In an evaluation of the book Who Prospers?, an Objectivist reviewer feels it necessary to object to the book's conclusion that cultures which encourage strong family ties tend to produce economic success.

Ayn Rand's definition of life, "a process of self-generated and self-sustaining action," does not even mention reproduction. This--in a "biocentric" ethics? No biologist would give a moment's consideration to a definition of life that did not give a central place to reproduction, life's most important and essential characteristic.

Objectivism as an ethical philosophy is incomplete and, ultimately, inconsistent, until we incorporate in it this crucial component of man's--and woman's--nature. It is our nature as human beings to want children, and to have them, and to love them. It is our nature to live in families, and to make family the center of our social existence.⁽³⁷⁾

We must explicitly recognize these facts to put our philosophical house in order. And, as I shall argue presently, we cannot build Objectivism as a successful social movement without becoming benign, not hostile, to the human family.

The most puzzling question faced by Objectivism, the philosophy of reason, is this: Why is everybody so irrational?

To be rational is to be successful and happy. And this conclusion is not the outcome of some esoteric and incomprehensible academic study. You don't have to be, as the saying is, a rocket scientist to grasp it. It is obvious. Yet the vast majority of people lead lives, not of quiet desperation, but of willful self-destruction. Why?

Ayn Rand was not the first to note this phenomenon--it has a long historical background. But it posed a particularly difficult problem for her because of her "benevolent universe premise." She rejected previous explanations of human irrationality, such as original sin. But having committed herself to the position that it is natural for men to act rationally, she was helpless to deal with the fact of reality that they simply, with rare exceptions, do not. As a result, her implicit attitude became one of the "malevolent universe," and she ended her life in almost a self-imposed solitary confinement, on the unstated premise that everyone is irrational until proven otherwise.

Now, I want to suggest that the Goldfinger Principle is relevant here: "Once is happenstance. Twice is coincidence. Three times is enemy action." If I discover one duck that quacks, well, maybe it's a freak. If I find several ducks that quack, well, maybe quacking is due to a disease. But when I discover that all, or nearly all, ducks quack, I am inclined to conclude that quacking is in the biological nature of the species. The same applies to human beings. If some small proportion of people behave in a certain way, we may come up with various accounts for it. But if essentially everyone behaves that way, the reasonable explanation is that this is the natural behavior of our species.

In this context biology is more important than fiction, because it shows things as they are rather than as they ought to be. So what is the reality of human nature? What, in other words, should we consider "normal"?

"Normal" means average, usual, or customary; the "norm" is the way things may be expected to be. We tend to identify this with the way things ought to be; "abnormal" generally connotes "immoral", or at least "unpleasant" or "unfortunate", in human affairs.

Now, "normal" may be applied in a cultural context--clitoridectomy is the norm in some Arab cultures, for instance. But we ought to give most attention to norms that are universal or nearly so. There are (at least) three behavior patterns that fit this criterion.⁽³⁸⁾

First: As soon as we open our eyes to it, we cannot miss the fact that altruism--self-sacrifice--is considered the key criterion of morality in every human culture. The precise circumstances under which self-sacrifice is considered appropriate, or most appropriate, differ; the fact that self-sacrifice is considered synonymous with morality does not. This is true across all human societies.

Second: Every human culture considers it normal for people to be very strongly concerned with other people's opinions--what Ayn Rand called "social metaphysics."⁽³⁹⁾

In fact, this obsession with peer opinion is the basic means of social organization and control in every human society; in primitive cultures, it is the only means.

Third: Every human culture is based on dominance-submission heirarchies, and considers it normal for people to seek power. Some cultures, including very primitive tribes as well as the early United States, disapprove of power-seeking and establish mechanisms to suppress it. But all cultures exhibit power-seeking, and all take it for granted that it is part of human nature.

All these behavior patterns are universal. Thousands of distinct human cultures have been studied, and phenomena such as the identification of altruism with morality are found in all of them without exception. Western cultures, Eastern cultures; advanced cultures, primitive cultures; industrial cultures, farming cultures, hunter-gatherer cultures; from the decadent aristocrats of Heian-era Japan to jungle headhunters, these norms are universal. They cannot represent some intellectual mistake or moral error made by a certain group of people. They cannot be the outcome of some freak of history in a certain area. We can account for them only on the assumption that they are part of human nature; that they are wired into the human brain.

But is this plausible? From a biological point of view, it certainly seems odd that all or nearly all of the members of a species would engage in behavior that would reduce their "fitness." How could this be explained? Several answers have been proposed.

We might speculate that general irrationality is a necessary consequence of inherent contradictions in social organization. Rand says it is on a desert island that a man needs morality most. And in fact, rationality is a prime virtue for Robinson Crusoe. But in recent decades a number of thinkers have pointed out cases in which rationality appears to be counter-productive in social, economic, or political contexts. Herman Kahn, taking the game of "Chicken" as a metaphor, used the phrase "rationality of irrationality" to describe optimum war-prevention strategies in the nuclear age. Robert Axelrod (in the Evolution of Cooperation) points out the paradoxes of the Prisoner's Dilemma. Again, public choice theorists have found that it can be very difficult simply to construct a voting system which will not result in the paradox of elections producing results opposed by the majority of voters. In this viewpoint, social interactions are unavoidably non-rational. The problem is not people, but society as such.

Another hypothesis says that there is something wrong with the human species. Arthur Koestler proposes (in The Ghost in the Machine) that an evolutionary mistake accounts for human behavior. The thinking part of the human brain has grown too fast, and become not properly connected to the older, emoting brain.

Let's consider a third viewpoint. There is nothing wrong after all; irrationality is inherent in human behavior--and this is a good thing. Tiger & Fox's "biogram" concept asserts that humans have a large repertoire of instinctual behavior, which adapts them to their primate existence. Unfortunately, when man left the paleolithic he imposed on himself a new kind of society, in which the biogram's commands no longer make sense. Thus men are irrational, but the problem can be, if not eliminated, at least mitigated by making society more like the hunter-gatherer groups in which Homo sapiens evolved.⁽⁴⁰⁾

Let me suggest another solution. Consider for a moment the first primitive amphibian that crawled up out of the sea around 400 million years ago. A contemporary biologist, had any existed, would certainly have classed this species as a rather unusual type of fish, for it would be far more closely related to certain kinds of fish than any other extant species. It is only in hindsight that we can see that it was not a fish, but the first representative of an entirely new class⁽⁴¹⁾

of vertibrates, the amphibians. But intelligence and tool-using are developments of comparable scope to the ability to breath air and move about on land. I therefore argue that human beings are not primates; we are not even mammals. Homo sapiens is a radical evolutionary phenomenon, the first representative of a new class of vertibrates.

Now, that first amphibian was a biological mess. Its primitive lungs were very inefficient. Its legs, adapted from fins, were clumsy and arranged at its sides so they could not support its body properly. By analogy, humans too retain biological defects simply because our species represents such a radical evolutionary innovation. Our brains (as Koestler points out) do not properly integrate the animal layers of emotion with our intelligence. We retain remnants of the compulsive need to fit into the group, no matter what values must be sacrificed, from our ancestors who lived in troops like baboons and could not survive as individuals. The need for dominance and power, which makes no sense for thinking creatures, did have a use in organizing groups of semi-intelligent animals for mutual protection against predators.

Though there is much more that could be said on this subject, scientific speculation is not my present objective. I wish merely to show that plausible explanations do exist for the peculiar phenomenon of human irrationality. It is a fact that must be explained, and, like any fact, it can be explained. But what concerns us at the moment is not so much the explanation as the fact. For the implications are vast, and troubling. We are driven to the conclusion that Objectivism is a philosophy that is inherently unattractive, indeed repulsive, to the vast majority of the human species. Of course we have always known this in a way; one has only to go out and preach Objectivism to experience the enormous resistance it arouses in most people. But what we may now understand is that this resistance is not due to one's incapacity for persuasion. It is not due to some quirk of this particular culture. It is not due to some arch-villain of philosophy; if Plato and Kant had never been born, it would have made no difference.

Not to put too fine a point on it, Objectivism is a philosophy for man as he should be--a rational animal--rather than man as he is. Human beings in reality are not adapted to practice it. The corollary is that Objectivism is not for everyone. Only a small minority can ever be expected to become Objectivists. These are people who can achieve rationality--whether because of some genetic factor, or due to growing up in an unusually favorable environment, or by sheer force of will, or perhaps all three.⁽⁴²⁾

This is not a conclusion that I find congenial. I derive no satisfaction from being part of a sort of moral elite. I have been wrestling with this problem for thirty years, starting as a bewildered college boy, trying, like Eddie Willers, to understand why people do not do what is right when it is so simple. I have been driven, kicking and screaming every step of the way, driven by facts and logic to come to my present position. If this be the malevolent universe premise, make the most of it.

I argue, then, that the Objectivist ethics must be reworked starting from fundamentals. To begin with, Ayn Rand's definition of life, brilliantly perceptive as it is, is incomplete. The fact that life includes reproduction must be integrated into the definition. Objectivist ethics needs also to be based on a vision of man as he is--Homo sapiens as modern science has characterized the species--and not on some fantasy of humans as blank slates which, in the right culture, would naturally be filled with heroic writing.

This will not be easy to accept. What, I wonder, would Ayn Rand have thought of my concept of human evolution? A vision of a primitive creature, crawling about on clumsy limbs, barely adapted to a new mode of life . . . hardly inspirational, is it? And yet, perhaps this is more heroic a vision of man than the picture of a sleek animal efficiently adapted to some static ecological niche. Nietzsche saw Homo sapiens as a bridge between the brute and the truly human species yet to come, and heroically striving to reach that vision. Perhaps he had the right of it.

Let us attend to the example of Dagny Taggart. Blinded by a false optimism, she struggled fruitlessly. It was only when she accepted the unpleasant truth about the human nature around her that she was released to help build a society of truly ethical people. It is now for us to do the same.

Nothing is more expensive than a start.

Friedrich Nietzsche

We should like to see Objectivism become an important, and if possible dominant, factor in our culture. We might begin by asking, how have other idea-systems become successful? There are two models we can follow: the ideological movement and the social movement.

The ideological movement aims at becoming dominant in the realm of ideas with the goal of achieving political ends. It focusses on entering, influencing, and eventually taking over existing institutions.

The social movement may become involved with political objectives, but its primary concern is with the personal character of its followers. Generally it will more or less ignore existing institutions and build its own.

The ideological movement was the model that Rand instinctively adopted. She had seen first-hand how the Left had been highly successful in taking control of society with this method. Her interpretation of history in For the New Intellectual relies heavily on this model, in which dominance of the intelligentsia leads to control of the levers of power.

As mentioned above, I am skeptical that Objectivism can succeed in this way. The Left could be successful because they could co-opt important power centers in society by offering them the use of government as a bludgeon to attain their goals. Objectivism cannot do this. Statist thinkers, from Plato to Rawls, find ready acceptance from existing academic and political institutions because what they say is very congenial to the people in power. Even if they oppose the existing rulers, as did, say, Karl Marx, they quickly pick up support from young and ambitious power-lusters. Objectivists, like Ayn Rand, will always find the door slammed in their faces; we have nothing to offer the masters of the establishment.

Furthermore, our opponents have, literally, a natural advantage in the marketplace of ideas. Their prescriptions are much more attractive, because they appeal to that which, though base, is dominant in human nature: emotions unfettered by reason; self-sacrifice; group acceptance; an assured place in a dominance-submission heirarchy. On a level playing field, such attractions will always draw a majority over the call of rationality.

The other model is the social movement. This is more commonly the vehicle of religious rather than secular movements. Naturally this tends to put off Objectivists. But there is nothing about a social movement that inherently requires it to involve mysticism or cultism. And because a social movement focusses on the personal beliefs and character of its adherents, it is the appropriate form for implementation of Objectivism, which is not just a philosophy but a formula for personal growth.

A social movement almost by definition requires building new institutions. This again makes it highly appropriate for a philosophy such as Objectivism, which encounters savage and unrelenting hostility from existing institutions. It allows us to spend our time building rather than fighting.

What, though, of my argument that most humans are inherently repelled by rationality, and that Objectivism cannot be expected to attract the majority of people? A social movement makes the best of this disadvantage. By drawing rational persons together into social institutions it allows them to complete their selves--to live in a society that supports, rather than attacks, their rationality. It supports those who are marginal, or wavering. And by concentrating, organizing, and sustaining the class of rational persons, it maximizes their influence in the wider society.

The original Objectivist movement of the 1960s was, as it grew, unintentionally but increasingly a social movement. Setting up NBI, an alternative educational institution, was a brilliant stroke by Nathaniel Branden. It bypassed the existing university system, which would not accept Objectivism (and still has not). And as time went on, NBI lectures became not just an educational but a social experience for the participants. The formation of student groups augmented the social organization of Objectivists. Toward the end, NBI was developing explicitly social events, from movie showings to dances and balls.

What must we do, then, to revitalize and rebuild an Objectivist movement?

To begin at the beginning, we must attract people to Objectivism--converts, to put it bluntly. As a businessman, my first reaction when faced with a problem of this sort is to ask: "What is the need in the market?" Here is how I have put the answer previously:

Objectivists should not underestimate the sheer power of moral example. We live in an age of relativism and subjectivism. But--as Objectivism teaches us--this is not natural for human beings. People need consistent values; they need standards; they need to make sense of their lives. Have you ever noticed the way people speak of members of strict religious sects, such as the Amish or the Mormons? There is a tone of amusement, of making fun of their unusual beliefs or outlandish customs. But mixed with it there is a hesitant admiration, a grudging respect for those who have chosen to hold themselves to a strict moral standard--those who not only have something to believe, but who act in accord with their beliefs. People long for integrity, and many of them--especially young people, and especially the best among them--are drawn to a creed such as Objectivism that can offer them standards to live by. What attracts them is not proselytizing or preaching, but the sight of people quietly and matter-of-factly setting an example of moral integrity.⁽⁴³⁾

In short, we should appeal to the best within people and draw them to it by example. But we can do so only if they can identify the personal examples we provide with Objectivism. We must therefore attach meaning to the idea of "being an Objectivist." Nathaniel Branden once said, "You don't know anything about a person from the fact that he calls himself an Objectivist." I think this somewhat exaggerated; but it is painfully close to the truth in many cases. To clarify what being an Objectivist means, so that people interested in the philosophy can have a distinct idea of what living it will do in their lives, we must clearly define not only a set of beliefs, but a set of standards. Ideally a movement's membership standards should correspond to its behavioral standards. Of course enforcing such a rule raises the danger of a rigid heirarchy that attempts to control people's beliefs, a problem which I discuss below. The key point at the moment is that there must be some sort of membership standard.

An intellectual movement can be populated mainly or even exclusively by a single sex. In the New Left of the 1960s one male leader said, "The only position for a woman in this movement is prone."⁽⁴⁴⁾

Today the Feminist movement takes a similar though complementary position. On the other hand, a social movement, by its very nature, must present a balanced appeal to both sexes.

It must be fairly said that Ayn Rand herself presented in her fiction a series of strikingly attractive female heroines. She explicitly endorsed, moreover, the value of childbearing and the family. Unfortunately, the attitude of Objectivism toward the sexes has become profoundly unbalanced by the flawed conception of human nature that lies at the root of the Objectivist ethics. The result is an implicit message that attacks female values.⁽⁴⁵⁾

Housewives, said Rand, are "boring." Message: Raising children is drudgery unworthy of a real woman. A woman must have a job outside the home--and not just that, she must have a career. It's like a baseball-cap slogan: "If you ain't Dagny Taggart, you ain't shit."

I am well aware that Rand and other Objectivist intellectual leaders, past and present, have shown occassional interest in and support for child-rearing activities. Objectivism's strong advocacy of Montessori schooling is an outstanding example. But no amount of superficial support can counteract the deep and inherent disregard of the family as a value which derives from basic premises.

To correct this problem will not be easy. We will need to change, not only the content, but the tone of our philosophy.

Let us turn to specifics. A renewed Objectivist movement, I have argued, must be a social movement. To make it successful we must bypass existing social institutions and create our own. We should give priority to the creation and growth of institutions which: (1) fill urgent needs created by the collapse of the outside society; (2) help to connect Objectivists and build social ties between them; (3) promote the formation and flourishing of Objectivist families and the transmission of Objectivist values to our children.

The most obvious need is for educational institutions. Here of course we have the example of NBI to draw on, and it has been drawn on. Organizations such as the Institute of Objectivist Scholars and the Ayn Rand Institute are doing useful work in providing courses, seminars, and books and periodicals on the philosophy. Valuable though this work is, it can achieve only limited impact because its primary focus seems to be on developing students into professional philosophers. What is far more urgently needed is instruction in Objectivism for the layman, focussed on how to put the philosophy into practice.

We ought in any case to quickly advance beyond this stage and tackle the problem of college education in general. America's universities are now in such bad shape that one must begin to question the desirability of a university education--even if one could handle the problem of affordability. I suggest the formation of educational cooperatives. A group of professionals could get together and educate one another's children. A relatively small group of intelligent people could assemble the necessary expertise for a complete education: One person teaches physics and math, another history, another literature, and so on. In this way they could provide a better education for their children than they would get in most universities, and at very low cost.

A similar cooperative approach is already being used for pre-schools. Here it is somewhat more difficult because an infrastructure is needed (equipping a single Montessori classroom can cost $25,000) and government intervention and regulation must be dealt with. Nonetheless there is no reason why Objectivists cannot set up their own private schools (which of course could also be attended by the children of non-Objectivists), and every reason why we should.

The next step is the development of business and, in general, economic ties among Objectivists. (There already exists an Association of Objectivist Businessmen, but its objectives are limited and unclear.) As this is written it appears that most of the "advanced" economies of the world, including that of the United States, are slowly disintegrating under the pressure of taxation and government regulation. The middle-management jobs that have been the backbone of the professional class are disappearing. Furthermore, it becomes increasingly less rewarding to work in a large company; managers have far less ability to achieve anything innovative or useful. For these reasons, more and more people are drawn to entrepreneurship or small business. This trend provides a natural opportunity for development of new business institutions that can be occupied by Objectivists.

There is room for Objectivist organizations to sponsor educational efforts in entrepreneurship. More important, the development of financing networks could add real value. Perhaps we might look at cooperative saving and investment clubs modelled on the Korean kye.

Objectivists have long renounced political activism, and I agree that action through existing political institutions is hopeless. Again, we should be looking to create and grow alternative institutions.

The development of right-wing legal defense funds shows one way. It would be well to see such a fund based on an explicitly Objectivist legal doctrine. It should operate not just on a charitable basis, but as a service for Objectivists being oppressed by the State.

Objectivists might also be able to exercise useful influence through existing alternative political organizations. I think for instance of the National Rifle Organization, which has considerable political clout and uses it in general to defend rights. An influx of support from Objectivist professionals could provide an intellectual underpinning that would make the NRA, and other organizations, more effective.

We cannot expect to achieve major political influence; there are simply too few of us. But we can accomplish much by concentrating our powers on key leverage points. For instance, simply collecting a list of contributions by Fortune 500 companies to left-wing groups and publicizing them to stockholders might have a significant effect on political trends.

In the area of culture, Objectivists could accomplish, I suspect, a great deal more than might be thought from their limited numbers. We should be seeking to develop news media and entertainment that reflect our values and serve our needs. Most likely this can best be done, not by building our own, but by organizing ourselves as consumers.

Businesses are always struggling with the problem of reaching a homogeneous customer group, to whom they can sell a product or service. Advertising is a horribly inefficient way to assemble customers; but it must be used because there is nothing better. For this reason, when a group of customers assemble themselves and solicit businesses to serve them, they can achieve tremendous influence in the market. Such a pre-organized customer group presents an extraordinarily profitable opportunity to businesses. (A good example here is the American Association of Retired Persons, which has quietly built up a huge economic and even political influence by exploiting organized buying power.)

So, even though Objectivists represent a very small market, that market could be so profitable as to attract service--if we are organized to request it. We could be provided with magazines, art, movies, and other products aimed specifically at us. But this cannot occur if we simply sit back and wait for businesses to perceive us as a market. We must organize and delegate someone to buy for us.

Now, the development of Objectivist institutions invariably implies identifying a membership of people who may be called "Objectivists." If we have a movement, who is part of it and who is not? And if it is an Objectivist movement, what constitutes Objectivism and what does not? The crucial problem is to develop a consistent system of principles, and enforce it, without becoming a religion or an intellectual dictatorship.

We will inevitably face the problem of true believers; our movement, like any movement, will have its hangers-on. We cannot eliminate this possibility, and it is pointless to try.⁽⁴⁶⁾

But if we keep the vital intellectual core of the movement healthy, the "Randroids" will pose no real threat.

The key here is the objective truth of Objectivism. We don't need priests to decide on the truth, any more than mathematicians or chemists do. As long as we think of Objectivism as being just one more philosophical doctrine, on a level with Platonism or Kantianism, we lose. This is the viewpoint that allows some people to "define" Objectivism as being that which agrees with Ayn Rand's writings. If Objectivism is a philosophical system among many, naturally it will be defined in this way; and its adherents will be delimited based on somebody's decisions as to whether a particular person is in agreement with the founder's positions. Those who are not in such agreement will be "excommunicated." But if we view Objectivism, not as a "school of thought" but as objective truth, it becomes self-policing in the sense that any science is.

Thus, for the issue of intellectual authority, we may turn to the sciences for a model. The content of the philosophy, like the content of a science, is a matter of logical inference, not of who said what. Leadership is earned by performance. Excommunication takes place, as in the case of Pons & Fleischmann, when people get out of line with the basic objective truth. We do not want to use the Leftist model from the social sciences, where leadership is earned by sucking up to the powers that be (or would be).

It will be seen that I have by no means provided a detailed blueprint for an Objectivist movement. I don't think that is possible; the ultimate nature of the movement will emerge from our mutual efforts. But this will not happen automatically; the effort must be made.

A crucial problem in building an Objectivist movement is that there simply are not enough of us. The "Class of '43," always small, is now nearing retirement. The "Class of '57," though larger, still numbers probably only a few thousand. There is a certain critical mass that makes it possible to create organizations and institutions. To attain this we must make converts. I therefore offer some suggestions:

Work on young people. To convert from any conventional philosophy of life to Objectivism involves an immense change in mind-set. Whole categories of belief must be abandoned and replaced with new ideas. Entirely novel ways of thinking must be accepted and mastered. This is a radical change, and very difficult.

You may wish to read Fred Hoyle's The Black Cloud. In this science-fiction novel, a space-dwelling alien of intelligence far superior to man's visits our solar system. Scientists make contact with it, and wish to draw on its vast knowledge. So a machine is constructed by which the alien may read its scientific knowledge directly into the human brain. Unfortunately, the scientists who volunteer for this process die. The new information contradicts too much of their existing knowledge systems, disintegrating their minds and brains.

The human mind automatically protects itself from this threat. Strongly held beliefs--whatever they may be--are very resistant to challenge. As Ayn Rand pointed out, the nature of human epistemology demands an integrated view of the universe. Right or wrong, that view's integrity must not be lightly discarded. So when we talk to someone whose philosophy of life is already fixed and reinforced through years of use, we have little chance of changing his mind.

Young people are naturally more open to new ideas. Indeed, many of them are searching for a consistent philosophy of life. So the best candidates for conversion are people of high-school and college age. (Note that I do not say "college students". Don't assume that just because someone is not an "intellectual" he can't understand Objectivism!) You want to talk to people who are old enough to understand Objectivism, and young enough to accept it.

You may be surprised how young a child can understand some abstract concepts. I once wrote for my children a little story, imitating the style of Dr. Seuss, called "The Fool at the School". The fool, who invades and nearly wrecks a Montessori schoolroom, announces that he "never obeys any rule". He is defeated by a student who points out that "never obey any rule"--is a rule! Somewhat to my surprise, this story proved quite popular with their schoolmates, including pre-schoolers who, one would think, could scarcely comprehend the nature of self-contradiction.

Set an example. In our society we are surrounded by people who want to convince us of something, from political propagandists to UFO fanatics. When you wish to convert somebody to Objectivism, you cannot simply assume that you are entitled to a hearing. Even if he listens to what you say, he very likely is not giving it serious consideration. There is too much competition for his support, and even if he is young experience probably has made him a bit cynical.

One might think that one could make the argument, "These ideas are worth listening to"--but that begs the question! In practice, people generally filter the crush of new ideas by evaluating the advocates. The UFO enthusiast gets dismissed at once because he's an obvious flake. The feminist professor who foams at the mouth in class loses credibility.

Again, an example from fiction is apposite. In Quo Vadis?, Scienkivicz describes how the Christian martyrs under Nero boosted the fortunes of their faith by their demeanor in the Colosseum. The Roman masses were impressed by their courage, and this made them curious about the new religion and willing to listen to its preachers.

It is because of this phenomenon that the Great Schism was such a catastrophe for the Objectivist movement of the Sixties. More than anything else, it lost converts because they lost respect for the intellectual leaders and teachers of the movement.

So you can best make converts to Objectivism if you are clearly successful in life. By "successful" I do not mean that you must be rich or famous. What makes you effective is that you are clearly competent and functioning well in whatever place you hold in life--whether as a student, a scientist, a business executive, or a homemaker; that you project a quiet self-confidence; and that you have a calm but very firm commitment to strong principles. This attracts people and makes them want to know how you became what you are, and how they can do the same.

Use written introductions, and disdain to argue. It's very hard to make converts by arguing, no matter how skilled you are in debate. Nobody likes to be beaten in an argument, especially on a face-to-face basis. Consider how a lawyer works when his job is to convince a judge on a legal point. First he files a brief, a written argument. As the judge reads it in the privacy of his own chambers, he is more likely to examine the points objectively; there is no personal challenge to evoke a hostile response. Then the lawyer follows up with oral arguments aimed at clearing up any disputed points.

Usually the best start in explaining Objectivism is to say, "Read Atlas Shrugged". (Sometimes, especially for older prospects, I recommend The Fountainhead first.) Nobody explains the ideas better than Rand, and she makes it part of an exciting story too. Now, after somebody has read Atlas Shrugged he may return with a less than positive response. This is not the time to give up! Not everyone "gets" it right away. If you drop it at this point, he'll probably drift away. If instead, you follow up on the points of disagreement, there's a good chance you can clear up his doubts.

Even yet, don't argue. Take a tip from--of all people--Socrates. Ask questions. "What is your position on this? Would you accept this general principle? Can you reconcile your position with the principle?" The objective is to bring the convert to a completely self-consistent viewpoint. And tactically, you will arouse far less emotional resistance if this process is viewed, not that he abandons his ideas to accept yours, but that he changes some of his ideas to bring them into line with his principles.

Maintain a calm and somewhat detached style. Not contemptuously superior; you should have the attitude of an expert confronted with a puzzled student.

Focus on fundamental principles. First, because once he admits to them, he's logically committed to the rest; second, because he'll respect and listen to you because you have a principled basis for your beliefs.

To try to get across a point of political principle to someone who is in fundamental disagreement with you on ethical principles is at best inefficient. Usually it is a waste of time. In the same way, it is pointless to mount an eloquent attack on altruism if the person to whom you are talking does not believe there is such a thing as objective truth. You should always strive to seek out the prospective convert's fundamental principles in metaphysics and epistemology, and work at that level first.

And yet, frequently relate your arguments to real life. A unique aspect of Objectivism is its focus, not only on reason, but on reality. Avoid getting bogged down in discussions of abstruse philosophical issues, which so often involve floating abstractions. Always ask, what is this issue about in reality?

A good example is provided by Francisco's argument to Rearden. He says, this is the way you make decisions about what is right and wrong in business or engineering; why do you not use the same method in deciding what is right and wrong in ethics?

Finally, it helps to tailor your presentation to the audience. Thus, when speaking, say, to a law student, you may wish to emphasize Objectivism's commitment to moral integrity. To a scientist or engineer, a stress on having a logical basis for one's belief's will usually provide the best entry point.

The age of the prospective convert is another factor to take into account. For younger people, who are actively searching for a belief system, a focus on outlining the basic concepts of Objectivism is effective. Older people generally already have fairly fixed positions on major issues, and these must be challenged and corrected before they can accept Objectivism.

Age also places a person in a generation. Because each generation is brought up differently, members have different attitudes and habits of thought. Following Strauss & Howe's analysis, we can make the following recommendations:

"Boomer Generation" (born 1943-1960): An "idealist" generation, these people are best attracted by an emphasis on moral issues. They are strongly interested in means of personal growth and development.

"Thirteenth Generation" (born 1961-1981): As a "reactive" generation, these people were raised when children were relatively disvalued, even denigrated. They tend to be alienated, even cynical, and are likely to be risk-takers. They are most attracted to Objectivism initially by its radical differentiation from conventional philosophies and ideologies. Undeterred, or even drawn, by its unconventionality, they value Objectivism's potential for offering an independent worldview.

"Millenial Generation" (born 1982-): This is a "civic" generation, outer-fixated and oriented to participation in a group or team. They are best reached through an emphasis on the possibility of achievement and leadership in building a new society.

It is doubtful that we can make a sufficient number of converts without a certain amount of active missionary work. Who will do it, and why? The first Objectivist movement was essentially a creation of Nathaniel and Barbara Branden. He recounts in his memoirs his disappointment at the way other members of the "Collective" failed to show enough enthusiasm for proselytizing. We may expect that this will always be a problem. Most Objectivists lack the inclination or the aptitude for making "cold calls." The job will have to be left to those who find it appetizing, and our institutions will have to in some way support them.

Not to put too fine a point on it, Objectivism is a product, and like any other product it will have to be marketed and sold. Obviously the works of Ayn Rand will always play a key role in the process. It is dangerous, however, to rely on them too passively. The major focus of post-Rand Objectivist thinkers has been on preaching to the choir--providing more advanced material for people who are already Objectivists. We need more work on materials which will augment Rand's novels in attracting new people into the movement.

In particular, we need to moderate our total reliance on the written word as a medium. Most people who started school after the mid-Fifties or thereabouts were taught by the "look-say" method and have considerable difficulty in reading. For them, a book like Atlas Shrugged is a very ambitious undertaking indeed. We need materials on Objectivism in media that are more accessible to the general population. Video is of course the prime candidate.

The man who fears nothing is as powerful as he who is feared by everybody.

Friedrich von Schiller

Does it really matter whether there is an Objectivist movement, or whether it succeeds or fails? To people leading busy and successful lives, involvement in such an activity may seem an unwelcome distraction.

This is precisely the attitude of Dagny Taggart and many other of Rand's heroes in Atlas Shrugged. It is only when they join the strike and become part of a society of their own kind that they understand what it was that was missing in their lives. I, like many other members of the "Class of '57" can remember what a difference the Objectivist movement of the Sixties made. Younger Objectivists, of course, have never known it.

In the end, each of us must decide what Objectivism means in our lives. Is it something we really believe in--or a lost ideal of our youths? Is it a complete system that integrates and gives meaning to life--or just some disconnected ideas that we cite during political arguments? Is it really important? Do we really need it? Is it worth fighting for?

I think that it is worth fighting for. And I believe that it will find the people to fight for it. The great thing about Objectivism is not that it encourages a few heroes, but that it turns ordinary people into heroes.

1. I have written at more length about the Objectivist movement in The Ideas of Ayn Rand. Extensive accounts of the movement, and the Rand-Branden affair, are provided by Barbara Branden in The Passion of Ayn Rand (Doubleday, 1986) and Nathaniel Branden in Judgment Day (Houghton Mifflin, 1989). For a contrasting view on the subject, see Virginia L. L. Hamel, In Defense of Ayn Rand (New Beacon Publications, 1990).

2. I am of course aware of the wide variety of publications with a Libertarian or Objectivist focus. One might mention, for instance, Liberty, Critical Review, Objectivity, and so on. However, so far as I am aware none of these has achieved more than the most miniscule circulation, and none have any great influence even within the restricted confines of the Libertarian intellectual world.

3. I have discussed Rand's idea of the alienation of the good in somewhat more detail in The Ideas of Ayn Rand; see pp. 15-16, 54-55, 84-85.

4. Ronald E. Merrill, The Ideas of Ayn Rand: Three Lectures on Objectivism; San Francisco, 1991.

5. This is an actual summary of the world situation in 1914. The "Evil Empire" in those days, of course, was Turkey, which had become the "sick man of Europe."

An interesting characteristic of the Belle Epoque is the widespread conviction at the time that economic interests trumped military concerns. Norman Angell's bestselling The Great Illusion (1911) made an immense stir with its "proof" that a major war was impossible because it would not make economic sense. Besides, even the richest of the Great Powers would run out of gold within a few months of the outbreak of war and would thus be forced to cease hostilities.

Today, we again find widespread (especially among Libertarians) the touching illusion that people will live and trade in peace because that way everybody will be better off. Middle-class people leading comfortable lives cannot conceive that there are issues for which many people will spill blood very willingly.

Which leads us to another delusion of the Belle Epoque: the belief in democracy as the universal solvent of social conflicts. Europeans ought to have known better after watching the American Civil War. We cannot blame them for not foreseeing the breakdown of the Kerensky government in Russia, or the Weimar Republic in Germany; these examples lay in their future. But they had plenty of warnings, including the Dreyfuss Affair.

6. I would particularly recommend reading the relevant passages in the books of William Shirer, including The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich and The Fall of the Third Republic. He provides a perspective, from one who observed at the time and on the spot, of what it was like when the German, and later French, societies disintegrated. The student may also wish to look into the many other available historical examples of cultural disintegration, including the fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate, the collapse of the Inca Empire, and of course Russia's March Revolution. Unfortunately, contemporary accounts giving the viewpoints of the inhabitants are not easy to come by.

7. For the record, I pretty much agreed with the consensus on the USSR, and I was as stunned as anyone at the "fall" of communism in Eastern Europe.

8. I refer specifically here to the McMartin preschool child-molesting case.

9. This refers to the Randy Weaver case. Detailed accounts appeared in Reason (October 1993) and American Rifleman. The notorious Waco incident, of course, might also be cited.

10. The current situation in Russia, for instance, is very reminiscent of Lenin's "New Economic Policy" period in the 1920s when the newborn Soviet Union was on the ropes economically and militarily. Then, as now, Western analysts thought Communism was being "reformed" into something resembling a market economy, and that the Soviet Union no longer presented such an aggressive threat to its neighbors.

11. Ayn Rand labelled something resembling this view as "tribalism."

12. It might be asked whether, then, any ideology based on false-to-fact assumptions is totalitarian. Should we say, then, that Libertarianism or Conservatism is totalitarian? No, although Conservatism, at least, has the potential to evolve toward a totalitarian form. The key distinction here is that totalitarian ideologies base themselves on false theories about the nature of individual human beings, and the societies they form. Thus to implement them means to attempt to mold human nature or the organization of society by coercion. Non-totalitarian ideologies, on the other hand, are based on false theories about the effective way to organize governments.

13. It is very instructive to study how Lenin and his tiny gang of Bolsheviks were able to take over the government of Russia by a series of forcible coups. Again and again their opponents, who were in the majority and could easily have crushed them, surrendered instead, because they had accepted the basic principles of communism. See Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution.

14. To cite a famous quotation: "Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist . . . It is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil." Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936).

15. As I understand it, this line of argument is most often associated with the historian Carrol Quigley.

16. And in the Eastern world also. It is notable that Japan, after a long period of feudal anarchy, was unified shortly after the introduction of firearms into the country. The victorious Tokugawa shogunate then stabilized its system against challenge from below by eliminating guns and the industry that produced them.

17. Or pistols. As an old advertisement had it, "God created man. Colt made them equal."

18. The importance of radio in establishing and maintaining the Nazi regime was clearly understood by Goebbels; see Shirer, the Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, pp. 341-342. At the same time, Franklin D. Roosevelt was using his broadcast "fireside chats" to consolidate his power in the United States.

19. One of the major tools used by the Ayatollah Khomeini in conquering Iran was videotaped sermons smuggled into the country. These bypassed the Shah's control of television broadcasts.

20. William Strauss and Neil Howe, Generations (William Morrow, 1991).

21. I discuss this process in The Ideas of Ayn Rand, pp. 171-172.

22. It is interesting to note the order in which sciences have emerged and matured. One might expect the easiest fields of study to progress the fastest; in fact, just the opposite occurred: First mathematics, then physics, then chemistry, then biology, and finally anthropology, sociology, and psychology developed into sciences. IQ tests show that mathematicians are, on average, more intelligent than physicists, who in turn outrank chemists, and so on. Scientists themselves confirm the relative intellectual difficulty of these disciplines. Einstein complained that he was hindered by his inability to grasp difficult mathematics. I have often heard biologists say that they found chemistry too difficult, and chemists admit that they had problems with physics.

On the other hand, this order of scientific development is exactly what one would expect if the crucial factor were not the difficulty, but the desirability, of finding the truth. Pure mathematics seldom has ethical or social implications. Physics (the Copernican system) and chemistry (the refutation of vitalism) affect human self-concepts only indirectly. Biology, with the development of Darwinian evolution and genetics, has much more immediate social and political implications. The social sciences, by definition, must directly impact such issues.

23. I have discussed this point and its implications at more length in The Ideas of Ayn Rand, pp. 87-90.

24. As I point out in The Ideas of Ayn Rand (pp. 91-92), the absence of a theory of certainty is a gaping hole in the Objectivist epistemology. I have suggested the outline of such a theory (in "What is Objectivism?," Ronald E. Merrill, Three Lectures on Objectivism, San Francisco, 1991) and I excerpt some paragraphs here.

Let's begin by noting that "certainty", like "knowledge", is personal rather than impersonal. When we use the passive voice--"it is certain that the Earth is round"--what we really mean is that many or most people hold it as certain that the Earth is round. One person may be certain of something, another not.

Note that in this context we are using "certain" to mean not just "something I am sure of" but "something I am sure of that really is true". We have no interest in false convictions; that would be more a psychological than a philosophical topic.

Now, a useful procedure in general when examining a concept X is to ask, what are the consequences in reality of X or not X? How does X affect our thinking or behavior? Let's apply this to the concept of certainty.

How do we behave about "certain" knowledge? I am certain that 7 X 12 = 84. I am certain that I cannot make gold by mixing mercury and sulfur in just the right proportions. I am certain that I am not a butterfly dreaming that I am Ron Merrill. How does that certainty affect my behavior? It means that I will not consider any challenge to the truth of these statements. They are not debatable. No argument, proof, or evidence that may be offered to contradict them will be accepted, or even considered. Certain means unchallengeable.

Our next step is to ask, what is the source or nature of certainty?

Is something certain because it is proved? But I could not construct a rigorous mathematical proof that 7 X 12 = 84. I once saw, in a mathematics text, a full-blown proof that 1 + 1 = 2. It took several pages, and I couldn't understand a word of it. And if I were shown a proof that 7 X 12 = 85, I would not accept it, even if on going through it I could find nothing wrong with any step. I would instead insist that there was some error too subtle for me to detect. So when I regard something as certain, it is not just because I have seen it proved.

Neither can certainty derive from empirical evidence. If you mix mercury and sulfur in a bubbling pot, right before my eyes, and at the end of the process pull out a nugget of pure gold, what will I say? "Well! Obviously I was wrong and the alchemists were right, transmutation of the elements is possible after all!" No, I will not say that. On the contrary, I will assume that you pulled some slight-of-hand that I failed to detect.

Certainty, like knowledge in general, is, so to speak, not "local". When a statement is certain for a given person, that certainty lies not just in the evidence or logical inference directly associated with the statement, but with its status in that person's overall structure of knowledge.

Suppose, for instance, that I did not regard it as certain that I am not a butterfly dreaming that I am Ron Merrill. I would then be in no position to know anything at all. I would be epistemologically wiped out. This is generally true of certain knowledge. When we say, "I am certain of X," the meaning is, "If X is not true, then I know, and can know, nothing."

Those facts which we take as certain are the corollaries, in the personal context of each individual, of the axiom of consciousness. To deny something of which one is certain would be to deny that one exists as a conscious entity.

25. As I mentioned above, lack of a theory of certainty is an important deficiency in the Objectivist epistemology. I also pointed out, in The Ideas of Ayn Rand (pp. 141-147) that Rand fails to provide a positive theory of government. A serious problem arises in Objectivist metaphysics because of Rand's truncation of Aristotle's Four Causes. She drops the efficient cause and, at least to some extent, the final cause, apparently because she sees them as leading inevitably to theistic conclusions. Unfortunately, this leads to real difficulties in developing a coherent account of causality.

26. Let me state for the record that in my view the deficiencies in Objectivism are few, correctable, and not of a sort to threaten any of the major implications of the philosophy.

27. I expand here upon a point I made in The Ideas of Ayn Rand, pp. 120-122.

28. For a detailed account of the history of the social sciences, see: Carl N. Degler, In Search of Human Nature (Oxford University Press, 1991).

29. In spite of Darwin's immense influence, it was not his concept of evolution that was accepted in the Nineteenth century. The old Lamarckian model, with its inheritance of acquired characteristics, was retained by most believers in evolution. It was not until well into the Twentieth century that the rediscovery of Mendelian genetics, by solving certain theoretical problems, brought general acceptance of the theory of natural selection. For a detailed discussion, see: Peter J. Bowler, Evolution: The History of an Idea (University of California Press, 1989).

30. The "social Darwinists" (a name applied by their enemies) have been savagely libeled as racists, imperialists, and advocates of a "dog-eat-dog" culture. In fact, their project was to put classical Liberalism on a scientific basis, an undertaking which the Utilitarians had attempted with dismal failure. Despite their serious errors, Spencer and especially Sumner can still be read with profit.

31. Ayn Rand, "The Comprachicos," in The New Left: The Anti-Industrial Revolution (New American Library, 1971), p. 155.

32. See "The Stimulus . . . and the Response" in The Ayn Rand Letter, Vol. 1, nos. 8-11.

33. There is now an extensive scientific literature on this subject. For a comprehensive though somewhat dated survey, see: Robert Plomin, J. C. DeFries, and G. E. McClearn, Behavioral Genetics (W. H. Freeman, 1980).

34. Rand's "utopia of greed" shows her conviction that custom lies at the root of society, prior to any other institutions:

"Miss Taggart," he said, "we have no laws in this valley, no rules, no formal organization of any kind. We come here because we want to rest. But we have certain customs, which we all observe . . ."

35. See The Ideas of Ayn Rand, pp. 68-71.

36. The scientific literature on the question of male-female differences is copious--and overwhelming in its support of extensive and significant innate differences. Interested readers may wish to consult some of the following books; and I would encourage any who have doubts about this conclusion to follow up on the references contained within these books to the primary scientific literature and look up the original experimental studies. For a historical overview, see: Patrick C. Lee and Robert Steward (eds.), Sex Differences (Urizen Books, 1976). A good basic survey, now, alas, somewhat dated, is: Corinne Hutt, Males and Females (Penguin, 1972). More recent is: Martin Daly and Margo Wilson, Sex, Evolution, and Behavior (2nd ed.; Willard Grant Press, 1983). A rather more technical work on some specific issues is: Robert W. Goy and Bruce S. McEwen, Sexual Differentiation of the Brain (MIT Press, 1980). Readers looking for less technical explanations may consult: Jo Durden-Smith and Diane deSimone, Sex and the Brain (Warner Books, 1983); Anne Moir and David Jessel, Brain Sex (Lyle Stuart, 1991); and Glenn Wilson, The Great Sex Divide (Peter Owen, 1989). These popular accounts are more readable but still contain bibliographic references so that the skeptical reader can check on sources.

37. Recent theoretical studies suggest that the family is crucial to the development of society. Without the family as a "seed" of kinship-based cooperation, cooperative strategies could not get a foothold so that larger groups could become cohesive. See Karl Sigmund, Games of Life (Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 189-190.

38. Recently it has been brilliantly argued that there are a number of behavior patterns that are universal across human cultures. While I by no means agree with all his conclusions, I am enormously impressed by the basic logic of the argument made by James Q. Wilson in The Moral Sense (Free Press, 1993).

Also relevant in this context is: Jane Jacobs, Systems of Survival (Random House, 1992). Jacobs provides the most ingenious and effective defense of Plato's ethical system to appear for 2,000 years. I vigorously disagree with her conclusion. However, her discussion of the nature of human behavioral patterns and their ethical implications sets the debate in an entirely new context and merits careful study by her opponents as well as her supporters.

39. The term "social metaphysics" was actually invented by Nathaniel Branden.

40. This might be correlated with the fact of optical illusions. Note also that people make "irrational" (that is, not mathematically optimum) choices when faced with probabilistic alternatives. The assumption is that evolution has not designed us to be perfect reasoners; we are designed to survive in a very complex world by reasoning from incomplete data and playing the odds.

41. I use "class" here in the biological or taxonomical sense of the word; that is, the grouping which comes between orders and phyla.

42. It should go without saying that, although Objectivism is not a philosophy for everyone, it is a philosophy for anyone. It is not possible in fact, nor, I believe, in principle, to categorize people and say, "This person can become rational, but that person cannot." Human beings are volitional; only the mentally defective and those psychotic or very near it are truly incapable of rationality.

43. From "Objectivism and Society"; Ronald E. Merrill, Three Lectures on Objectivism (San Francisco, 1991).

44. I've often wondered if this reflected some sexual eccentricity in New Left circles, or just ignorance of the distinction between "prone" and "supine."

45. Gaia is pregnant at the end of Anthem, but she is the only one of Rand's heroines who shows the slightest interest in having children. Rand sympathetically portrays the young woman with children in Galt's Gulch--although she makes her say her children are her "career." Note, however, that the portrayal of mothers in Rand's fiction is otherwise unrelievedly negative. It would be hard to find another author who has so consistently provided protagonists with mothers ranging from negligible to repellent. Consider Kira's mother in We the Living; Peter Keating's mother in The Fountainhead; Dagny's mother and Rearden's mother in Atlas Shrugged.

46. In describing Apollodorus, a follower of Socrates, Allan Bloom makes some comments that will be stunningly familiar to Objectivists:

This is a problem faced by all great teachers, the fanatic loyalists whose fanaticism is quite alien to the teacher's disposition. They develop an almost religious reverence for this man whose teaching they are so deeply impressed by but are not themselves in a position adequately to judge. The teacher himself may very well not want to discourage such people. They are the scholars who study him carefully and pass on what he has to say to others. But there is a danger that he will be misinterpreted or rigidified or codified by them in a way contrary to the spirit of his teaching. There is the further danger that the pupil's imprudence, partly connected with preening himself with this special learning, will attract undue and hostile attention to the teaching. Pupils can appear to be members of a crazy sect and permit onlookers to dismiss teacher as well as pupils. This risk may have to be accepted when one teaches, but it involves a real problem of responsibility or even self-protection.

See Allan Bloom, Love and Friendship (Simon & Schuster, 1993), p. 448.